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Abstract 
Using two unique datasets, one at a daily frequency including six currency pairs, and 
another tick-by-tick dataset in €/US$, we investigate some of the unanswered 
questions in the field of foreign exchange market microstructure. 
 
We confirm the contemporaneous relationship between flows and exchange rates 
found in the literature in the daily data, but in the forecasting experiments we find no 
forecasting power, regardless of model, history used forecast horizon or currency 
pair. The forecasting performance is not improved by considering a system of 
exchange rates, or by evaluating based on directional ability instead of the more usual 
RMSE ratio. 
 
Subsequently we estimate two standard market microstructure models  - Madhavan-
Smidt and Huang-Stoll – using the high-frequency dataset in order to gain an insight 
into the information content of customer order flow. While we are unable to find any 
evidence of information content from financial customer trades, we find strong 
evidence that large corporate customer trades are perceived to have statistically and 
economically significant information content. 
 
Lastly we turn our attention to the issue of causality. Using a distributed lag model to 
investigate the impact of flows on exchange rates and vice versa, corporate orders are 
found to have a small long-term impact, but more significantly we find evidence of 
positive feedback trading in both corporate and financial customers.  
 
We explore the long-run dynamics of the system using a VECM, and find that all 
counterparty types have a positive equilibrium relationship with the exchange rate. 
Crucially, the adjustment dynamics show that all of the weight of adjustment to 
restore equilibrium after a shock falls to flows. Lastly, we conduct a high frequency 
forecasting experiment, but again find no evidence of forecasting power. 
 
Two important themes emerge from the high-frequency investigation. The first is the 
apparent importance of corporate customers, and the second is that the direction of 
causality runs not from flows to exchange rates, but from exchange rates to flows. 
 
We conclude that the weight of the evidence suggests that feedback rather than 
information content is what drives the strong contemporaneous relationship between 
exchange rates and flows. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Running 24 hours a day, with a daily turnover in excess of US$3trn, the foreign 
exchange (FX) market is by far the largest financial market in the world. It is also 
arguably the most important of the financial markets, since FX rates affect prices and 
competitiveness for all other assets and commodities around the world. The BIS 
Triennial Central Bank Survey 2007 estimated daily turnover of $3.2 trillion includes 
spot, forward and swaps volumes, although for the purpose of our study, the spot 
market, with an estimated daily trading volume of $1 trillion, is the most important 
segment that we plan to look at.  
 
In the post-Bretton-Woods era, FX rates have been very volatile and have proven 
notoriously hard to forecast. A series of macroeconomic models were developed in 
the seventies that were both elegant and theoretically appealing. They represented a 
shift in thinking, from the “elasticities” approach to the “asset” approach, and are 
based on solid theoretical foundations. An influential series of papers by Meese and 
Rogoff in the early eighties however, demonstrated that these models are an empirical 
failure particularly in the short term. For decades since, the inability of researchers to 
come up with models to explain or forecast exchange rate changes using 
macroeconomic variables except over the very long-run has been a source of 
embarrassment to the profession (Meese and Rogoff, 1983; Cheung and Chinn, 
2004).  
 
The FX market has undergone some major changes in recent years with the advent of 
electronic trading, and this change in market structure has had important implications 
when considering how to explain and forecast FX rates. From an academic 
perspective, this switch to electronic trading has provided transactions level data that 
can be studied, adding another layer to the analysis of FX movements and their 
determinants. The analysis of foreign exchange order flows—either those of 
customers themselves or as they are reflected in the inter-bank market—has 
consistently revealed a positive contemporaneous correlation between order flows of 
financial customers and exchange rate movements (Evans and Lyons, 2002; Marsh 
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and O’Rourke, 2005). This new approach to FX – the micro approach – was 
pioneered by Lyons (1995). 
 
The microstructure approach to FX moves the thinking about how FX rates are set 
from a rather abstract theoretical approach to a more realistic information-theoretic 
approach, recognizing that it is important to understand what information the dealers 
have available to them, and what forces influence their decisions. “Whether we like it 
or not, it is a stubborn fact that in the major currency markets, there is no exchange 
rate other than the price these people [FX dealers] set.” (Lyons, 2001) Micro based 
models focus on the mechanism through which market makers get information. There 
is no assumption that all information is symmetrically disseminated and immediately 
impounded in price, and it is a central premise of the micro approach to FX that 
market makers learn about the macro economy by observing order flow, which is 
defined as the net of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated currency orders submitted to a 
particular FX dealer. It may be interpreted as ’buying pressure’ originating in shocks 
to customers’ hedging or liquidity demands, differential interpretation of public news, 
etc. The results point to the presence of dispersed, fundamental-related information in 
order flow. The basic premise is that the FX market, like any other securities market, 
acts to aggregate dispersed information. 
 
The main participants in the FX market are central banks, commercial banks, 
institutional investors, traders, hedge funds, commercial companies and retail 
investors. Currencies are traded in an interbank exchange system by market making 
currency dealers. The high liquidity in the interbank market has driven spreads to 
very low levels, making even large volume transactions very cost effective for the 
investor. In contrast to the equity markets however, the FX market is relatively 
opaque. Only FX dealers have access to the interbank market, and although dealers 
can extract a noisy signal of other bank’s customer order flow by observing interbank 
trading, the order flow seen by each individual dealing bank is essentially private 
information.  
 
The very heterogeneous nature of the market participants and their objectives when 
entering into currency transactions is the major reason for the hypothesis that order 
flow from different customer types will have different price impact. While some 
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actors like hedge funds and financial institutions trade currencies mostly for 
speculative reasons, others buy and sell currencies without the primary objective of 
achieving speculative gains. Central banks for example intervene in the foreign 
exchange market to reach their macroeconomic and monetary policy objectives. 
Corporate hedgers trade currencies to diminish the impact of currency fluctuations on 
their firm’s core business activities. Traditional asset managers’ currency transactions 
also tend not to be driven by currency forecasts. A switch from holding Japanese 
equity to holding European equity is not usually motivated by expectations that the 
Euro is going to outperform the Yen, but a currency transaction will still be necessary 
to buy the Euro and sell the Yen. Observing the trades from this varied group of 
investors each trading for different reasons, can give dealers a view – albeit a partial 
one – of the market’s interpretation of the macro economy.  
 
 In contrast to the macro approach, micro FX has enjoyed considerably more 
empirical success in explaining exchange rates (Evans and Lyons, 2002a,b).  
Furthermore, Evans and Lyons (2005,b) presents a micro model of forecasting using 
customer order flow that achieves extraordinary results compared to any other short 
term forecasting model in the literature. The contemporaneous relationship between 
order flows and exchange rates is by now undisputed and has been verified in a 
number of different datasets. (see inter alia Menkhoff et al 2006, Bjonnes and Rime 
2006) The reasons for this relationship, the direction of causality, and whether there is 
information in order flow that has stable implications that can be used for prediction 
and trading are all questions that remain without clear answers however. 
 
Based on this relative empirical success of FX microstructure, and using two new 
customer order flow datasets, one from the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), spanning 
three and a half years at a daily frequency, and another a high-frequency order flow 
dataset from a major European bank we attempt to address some of the questions that 
remain unanswered in the micro FX literature. First we replicate and extend the Evans 
and Lyons (2005b) forecasting experiment. Since the RBS data covers six bilateral 
exchange rates, it will allow us to test whether the E&L results are generaliseable to 
other exchange rates beyond euro-dollar, as well as to order flow data from a different 
bank and in a more recent time period.  The high frequency dataset will enable us to 
investigate the impact of customer trades on a dealer’s own quotes, as well as the lead 
 14 
 
– lag relationship between order flows and market clearing prices, answering the 
question whether the exchange rate adjusts to flows or whether flows react to changes 
in exchange rates. 
 
 The rest of this document will be structured as follows: first a very brief description 
of some of the key literature in macro FX is necessary to help situate micro FX in the 
broader FX literature. An overview of the structure of the FX market follows, and 
then a more detailed coverage of the micro FX literature. The first empirical chapter 
(chapter 4) describes a number of forecasting experiments motivated by E&L (2005, 
b) at a daily frequency and lower. We then study the pricing of customer transactions 
at a tick-by-tick frequency in chapter 5. Chapter 6 examines the price impact of order 
flow on market prices, looks for forecasting power in high-frequency order flow, and 
looks at the long-run relationship between exchange rates and order flow in an error 
correction framework, attempting to determine the direction of causality. Chapter 7 
concludes.  
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2 From Macro to Micro – A Brief Look at the FX Literature and 
the FX Market 
2.1 Macro Models  
The seventies were an interesting time for foreign exchange. The new floating 
exchange rate system had just replaced a long-standing fixed exchange rate regime, 
and it was a period of adjustment when the implications of the new FX system were 
not fully understood. At the time, there was a great deal of excitement in academia, 
over a new approach to FX forecasting that had thus far been shown to have very 
promising results. The “asset approach to exchange rates” pioneered by Dornbusch, 
Frenkel, Mussa and others, seemed to provide a new and very plausible explanation 
for the high volatility observed in the new flexible exchange rates. The thinking up to 
that time had been that the FX rate depended on supply and demand for imports and 
exports – the elasticities approach. The new theory postulated that FX rates depended 
not only on this, but also on expectations of future developments in variables such as 
outputs, money supplies, interest rates, trade balance and other macroeconomic 
variables. This theory explained the volatility in the exchange rates, since the 
monetary policies themselves were very volatile. The literature on macro models of 
FX is vast, and beyond the scope of this document. Here we will focus only on the 
very specific stream of literature that motivates the focus on the microstructure of the 
foreign exchange market, stemming from the seminal Meese and Rogoff papers. 
2.2 Meese and Rogoff – A Benchmark for FX Forecasting  
The main focus of the Meese-Rogoff study was to examine how well existing 
empirical exchange rate models fit out-of-sample compared to a naïve forecast of no 
change. As a first step in evaluating the models, they constructed forecasts based on 
actual realized values of the fundamentals, although this would obviously not have 
any real value as a forecasting tool, since it would be impossible to replicate this 
method in real time. The benchmark they used for comparison was the random walk, 
and they used both Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and Mean Absolute Error 
(MAE) as comparison criteria. Including MAE is important if the FX rate distribution 
has fat tails or if exchange rates are governed by a stable Paretian process (infinite 
variance) (Clements and Hendry, 1993). Surprisingly, the random walk forecast beat 
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all the models at forecast horizons below 2 years, and this result was robust to data 
set, model specification, error term specification, estimation technique, choice of 
theoretical model etc.  
 
The forecasting interpretation of the results of this study is counterintuitive. What 
they had shown was that even if you were given the actual, realized values of the 
future fundamentals, the structural models could not predict the future FX rate any 
better than the random walk model could. In fact, the models performed worse than 
the random walk. In a follow up paper, the constraints on the models were relaxed 
even further, testing simply whether the structural models could predict the direction 
if not the magnitude of change in FX rates given the realized values of the 
fundamentals (Rogoff, 2001). Once again they were surprised to find that the random 
walk performed consistently better than any of the structural models they tested at 
horizons less than two years. 
 
More than two decades of research have failed to overturn the Meese-Rogoff result - 
empirical exchange rate models perform poorly at predicting exchange rates over 
shorter horizons. Meese himself says “empirical researchers have shown considerable 
imagination in their specification searches, so it is not easy to think of variables that 
have escaped consideration in an exchange rate equation” (Meese 1990, 130). The 
weight of evidence seems overwhelming, but at the same time it is important to 
examine some of the reasons why these models fail before dismissing them.  
 
Exchange rates are determined by a large number of variables in the short, medium 
and long term, and it is the precise nature of all these interactions that eventually 
determine the level of the spot exchange rate that proves so evasive. In the short run, 
exchange rates can vary far more than the macroeconomic fundamentals that 
influence them in the longer term. This rather chaotic behaviour of exchange rates 
over shorter time horizons can create “noise” that makes it hard to discern a definite 
relationship between the level of FX rates and the underlying fundamentals.  
 
Short term technical, or bandwagon effects, can also cause FX rates to move away 
from their equilibrium values. Market participants tend to have extrapolative 
expectations over the short term, and mean-reverting expectations over the longer 
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term. “Extrapolative expectations can tend to accentuate and perpetuate FX rate 
movements in the short term far beyond the path justified by fundamentals” 
(Rosenberg, 2003). In addition to these effects, there is also the question of “peso 
problems” and “finance minister problems”. Peso problems arise when an event, such 
as a change in monetary policy, is expected to occur in the future, and the path of the 
exchange rate changes in anticipation of this event. This can pose a problem for a 
model that cannot take anticipations into account. The finance minister problem arises 
when an event is expected to occur, anticipations change the path of the exchange 
rate, and then the event does not transpire. In this case, expectations will appear 
unrelated to the past. (Saidi, p.109, 1983) 
 
One of the reasons that the Meese-Rogoff study had such a great impact was the fact 
that when testing their empirical exchange rate models, they used future, realized 
values for the underlying fundamentals, seemingly giving the models an artificial 
advantage. This was seen as giving the results added credibility, since it suggests that 
even knowing the future values of fundamentals does not help the models to perform 
better than the random walk. Faust et al (2003) challenge this notion. Work on 
evaluating FX rate forecasting models generally uses the most recent data available. 
The problem with this however, is that macroeconomic data used is often subject to 
revisions that can be both large and unpredictable. Using the most recent data 
assumes that agents can anticipate data revisions perfectly. In their paper, Faust et al 
examine the real time forecasting power of standard exchange rate models, using an 
international real time dataset that they constructed. They used real time data on 
lagged economic fundamentals instead of ex post realized values, and also used 
forecasts of future values of fundamentals instead of actual future values in a real 
time forecasting exercise.  
 
The conclusions reached by Faust et al are that measured forecasting ability is quite 
sensitive to data revisions and to sample period. They found that the predictive power 
of the exchange rate models they tested is almost uniformly better using original 
release data than using revised data. This conclusion suggests that giving the models 
the supposed advantage of using final revised data is actually more of a hindrance 
than a help. The problem with this method is that the availability of a time series 
database of original release data is very limited.   
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 The bottom line however is that macro models are an empirical failure in the short 
term – at the very least at horizons less than 3 months, and Meese-Rogoff have 
provided the benchmark against which any forecasting model must be measured – can 
you beat the random walk? There is reason for optimism however, as all these sources 
of ‘error’ can be at least partially addressed, not by changing the theory per se, but by 
shifting its focus. This is where the microstructure approach can add some value, and 
is the topic of the following section. 
2.3 Shifting the Focus to Microstructure Models   
If macro models can’t be used to forecast exchange rates in the short term, we are still 
left with the problem of how to forecast or even explain FX at shorter horizons. 
Empirical analysis has been based on the following specification: 
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All the “action” so to speak is in the error term, and over twenty years of research has 
failed to uncover any fundamentals that have not been included in the specification 
that would rescue the model. To elaborate on this point, empirical analysis has 
approached the problem of exchange rate determination by considering that the 
exchange rate represents the present value of future macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Since no set of fundamentals has been found – despite extensive research – that 
adequately describes the movement of exchange rates, this implies that almost all 
explanatory power remains in the error term. Decomposing the error term into a part 
corresponding to unmeasured fundamentals and a part corresponding to expectational 
errors can maybe help us to extract what information contained in the error term is 
helping to determine the path of the exchange rate. 
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Specifically, the microstructure approach looks at the second part of the error term – 
expectational errors, and argues that changes to expectations about measured 
fundamentals are important. More specifically, it studies how dispersed information 
about fundamentals gets impounded into exchange rates via trading decisions. Here 
we return to the valid criticism of Faust et al (2003) who argue that using ex post 
measured fundamentals should not in fact be helpful in explaining exchange rates. 
What matters is not what the fundamentals turned out to be exactly, but what the 
expectations of future fundamentals were. Using ex-post measured fundamentals 
implies perfect foresight in the market and realistically this cannot be true. The micro 
approach then in effect shifts the focus, not away from fundamentals per se, but to the 
mechanism through which fundamentals affect prices. The argument is not that 
fundamentals are not important, but that they are not necessarily observable, so we 
need a proxy for them. In FX microstructure, this proxy is order flow.  FX 
microstructure argues that the market’s expectations about future fundamentals are 
mirrored in their aggregated trading decisions, and it is in this sense that order flow is 
said to contain information. 
 
More formally, under the microstructure approach, like the asset market approach, the 
demand for currencies comes from purchases and sales of assets. The micro approach 
however relaxes three of the asset approach’s most uncomfortable assumptions:  
 
(1) Information: micro models recognize that some information relevant to 
exchange rates is not publicly available. 
(2) Players: microstructure models recognize that market participants differ in 
ways that affect prices. 
(3) Institutions: microstructure models recognize that trading mechanisms differ 
in ways that affect prices. 
 
Of the three, information is the main focus of the FX micro approach, and one of the 
hallmarks of microstructure is order flow. Order flow is transaction volume signed 
according to the aggressor or initiator of trade. It is the channel through which 
dispersed information gets aggregated and incorporated into prices. Order flow has no 
role in the macro approach because macroeconomists believe that all information that 
is relevant to exchange rates is publicly known and is instantaneously included in 
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prices. The microstructure approach therefore allows the FX market itself – its 
structure, participants and trading mechanisms - to affect exchange rates, replacing 
the abstract “Walrasian auctioneer” with the reality of multiple FX dealers, and 
allowing for a heterogeneous pool of market participants who are not all equally well 
informed and who all have distinct motivations for trading. It recognizes that the FX 
market acts to aggregate information just like any other financial market. We need to 
understand the structure of the FX market then before examining micro FX in more 
detail. To this end, the following section gives a very brief overview of the FX market 
and its participants. Additional information including some summary statistics and 
recent trends from the latest BIS survey (2007) can be found in Appendix A. 
2.4 The Foreign Exchange (FX) Market 
2.4.1 The Main Characteristics of the FX Market in Summary 
The main characteristics of the FX market can be summarized as follows:  
 
i. Huge size – trading volume in FX dwarfs that of other markets. 
ii. Interdealer risk sharing (hot potato trading) – 43% of the volume in FX is 
due to FX dealers trading amongst themselves to share risk. 
iii. Trade transparency is low – there is physical separation of trading and 
customers do not have access to the interdealer market. This distinction is 
becoming less clear as trading in FX evolves however. 
iv. Credit risk management is very important in FX. 
v. “Private” information in the form of dispersed information is present in the 
FX market. This information is “contained” in customer order flow. 
 
These characteristics will be examined in more detail in the following sections. 
2.4.2 The Market 
The FX market is unique in its structure and operations. Daily trading volume is huge 
compared to other markets - $3.2 trillion according to the 2007 BIS survey – and 
trading is continuous around the clock and around the globe, with the exception of 
weekends. It is thus a decentralized market with multiple dealers in many locations 
quoting and trading simultaneously. “The introduction of telecommunications 
allowed decentralized trade of FX as is most natural. Banks want to be present where 
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the customers are, and because an exchange rate is the relative price of two assets 
from two different countries, it is natural to have a decentralized market. Given that 
customers are in different time zones and may have an interest in the same asset, say 
$, trading must also be continuous around the clock. Finally, given the geographical 
pattern of customers and the fact that several banks serve them, it is natural to have a 
number of dealers acting as liquidity providers in each currency pair.” (Rime, 2003) 
The fact that the FX market is not centralized means that it is also mostly unregulated. 
The structure of this market has evolved endogenously, largely without regulation, in 
response to the demands and peculiarities of the asset being traded – foreign 
exchange. The resulting structure and the lack of disclosure requirements in FX make 
this market far more opaque than other markets such as the equity market.  
 
2.4.3 FX Market Participants 
Trading in FX can be divided into customer trading and interbank trading. Interbank 
trading can be either direct or brokered, and in recent years broking has moved onto 
electronic platforms such as EBS and Reuters dealing. As such, the main participants 
in FX can be divided into customers and dealers. Customers are the end-users of 
foreign exchange, and in essence are the aggressors in FX deals. Dealers stand ready 
to provide liquidity and trade with each other on the interbank market to manage their 
positions. Customers are active in FX for disparate reasons, with different needs and 
ways to conduct transactions. They can be large multinational corporations, central 
banks, governments or financial institutions, and they generally do not have direct 
access to the interbank market, hence the aforementioned lack of transparency. 
Customers trade FX for a variety of reasons. For example, a hedge fund may trade FX 
in order to speculate, while a corporation may trade FX in order to repatriate profits 
from an overseas operation. The order flows from customers are only seen by the 
individual dealer handling the transaction, and as such it is private information for 
banks. In the microstructure approach to FX, order flow is the mechanism through 
which dispersed information gets impounded into price, and thus provides a tool for 
dealers to learn about the expectations and interpretation of the state of the economy 
of their customers.  
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2.4.4 Electronic Brokers 
Electronic brokers were first introduced in 1992 with Reuters Dealing 2000-2. There 
are two electronic brokers in the FX interdealer market today, Reuters Dealing 3000 
and EBS, and electronic broking now represents the main trading channel in this 
market. Electronic brokers are well suited to a market such as FX due to its huge 
volume, decentralized structure and need of fast, efficient matching of orders. The 
two systems have each carved out a niche for themselves, with EBS being dominant 
in EUR/USD, USD/JPY, EUR/JPY, USD/CHF and EUR/CHF, and Reuters being 
used for all other currency pairs. In terms of volume EBS is larger since it dominates 
in the larger USD, EUR and JPY markets. These systems, which can also be 
described as electronic matching systems, do just that – they collect orders from 
screens in dealing rooms around the world connected in a network and match them 
automatically, using strict time priority according to time of entry for market orders. 
Order entry is anonymous, but once a transaction has taken place both parties see the 
counterparty’s identity.  
 
In short, electronic brokers bring some degree of centralization to a decentralized 
market. They offer more transparency in the interbank market, are cheaper, and for 
liquid, standardized instruments are more efficient at matching orders. This is not to 
say that the market has gone, or even should go, completely electronic. Many smaller 
currencies without much liquidity are not traded electronically, and voice brokers can 
still fulfil a useful function in less liquid currencies by using their knowledge of the 
market and the players in the market to find suitable counterparties for trades. The 
optimal level of transparency in FX is not an issue with a clear answer. Complete 
transparency will discourage participation by informed dealers resulting in less 
information being aggregated by the market. It would also become more risky for 
dealers to take on large trades because managing inventory before the entire market is 
aware of the deal will become very difficult. As will be discussed in a subsequent 
section, inventory management is very important for FX dealers. This could have the 
effect of increasing spreads to customers to compensate dealers for the additional risk 
they would have to take on. However, the current increase in transparency offered by 
electronic broking seems to have been beneficial to the FX market as the level of 
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transparency before was so low. This can be deduced by the fact that trading has not 
decreased due to the increased transparency. (Rime 2003)  
 
2.4.5 Competing FX Platforms 
The FX market is a dynamic environment that is constantly innovating and evolving. 
In recent years, technology has enabled an ongoing revolution in how we trade in FX. 
In the mid 1990s non-bank internet trading sites for FX, such as OANDA and 
ChoiceFX appeared. Most of these sites operate as crossing networks, depending on 
prices obtained from another venue. This implies that there is no price discovery in 
these networks. Others, such as ChoiceFX depend on limit orders from customers. 
These sites all act as a counterparty to all trades (customers must all place a margin 
account before trading). Since they depend on the interbank market for their 
existence, crossing networks can never replace the interbank network, but they could 
influence it if they were to draw enough customers away from banks. Banks response 
to the emergence of these non-bank trading sites was to create their own, multi bank 
state-of-the-art dealer-to-client electronic communication networks, including 
California-based Currenex (launched in 1999), New York-based and dealer-owned 
FXall (launched in 2000) and Hotspot (launched in 2001), all of which gained market 
share. These allow customers to get quotes from multiple banks quickly and easily 
therefore increasing the efficiency of the market from the customer perspective, and 
increasing competition between banks. (Jung 2007) 
 
The success of electronic platforms has had a significant impact on the FX market. 
Besides simplifying transactions, technology has enabled greater price transparency 
and a wider range of agents to participate in the marketplace. Newer players include 
smaller fund managers, individuals and algorithmic traders—all of whom participate 
mostly or exclusively through e-trading systems, particularly in the spot market. 
2.4.6 Prime Brokerage 
Yet another innovation is the prime brokerage service offered to small banks without 
direct access to the interbank market and to hedge funds by EBS and Reuters. Large 
hedge funds, quantitative trading firms and active currency managers have investment 
strategies that require them to trade FX high frequency and to seek deep liquidity. On 
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the spot interdealer platforms - EBS and Reuters Dealing - hedge funds cannot trade 
directly, and instead must have their trades executed through their prime brokers. 
Both EBS and Reuters now provide prime brokerage services to large buy-side 
institutions through EBS Prime and Reuters Prime Brokerage respectively, through 
which a designated prime broker can extend credit to small banks or hedge funds and 
execute trades on their behalf. Customers pay a fee to the partner bank for its services 
and also pay a brokerage fee. Services such as these, address the issue of credit risk, 
but leave dealers at a disadvantage, as they would not know who is on the other side 
of the trade. EBS does not require full-name give-up for hedge funds trading on EBS 
Prime, meaning banks would not know who the end counterparty is. 
2.4.7 Settlement Risk 
Credit risk management is an important structural aspect of FX. Counterparty credit 
risk is currently managed by the banks, and is one issue that complicates the 
movement of the FX market onto an exchange. Counterparty trading limits – credit 
lines - are extremely important in FX, and at times even the major banks in FX are 
unable to transact with each other if they have exhausted their bilateral credit lines. 
Dealer screens will in fact show both the best bid and ask prices in the market and the 
best bid and ask prices available to the particular dealer taking into account bilateral 
credit lines. Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) is a major development in FX that 
was started in 2002 by a number of the world’s largest banks in response to the need 
for an efficient method of dealing with “temporal” settlement risk.  
 
In 1996 the G10 central banks endorsed a strategy to reduce the systemic risk arising 
from the settlement of foreign exchange trades. The strategy was motivated by the 
finding that banks' foreign exchange settlement exposures to their counterparties were 
in many cases extremely large relative to their capital, lasted overnight or longer and 
were poorly understood and controlled. Foreign exchange settlement risk is the risk 
that one party to an FX trade pays out the currency it sold but does not receive the 
currency it bought. It consists of both liquidity risk (the risk that the purchased 
currency is not received when due) and credit risk (the risk that the purchased 
currency is not received when due or at any time thereafter). In this situation, a party's 
foreign exchange settlement exposure equals the full amount of the purchased 
currency. (BIS,1996) Settlement risk numbers dwarf any other risk category in many 
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institutions. In some cases, large banks have almost three times more exposure to 
settlement risk than to credit risk. In FX, the largest market by value, transactions can 
involve settlement exposures amounting to tens of billions of dollars each day to 
individual counterparties and in some cases, exposure to a single counterparty 
exceeds that institution’s capital. (BIS – CPSS 2008) CLS is at least a partial solution 
to this issue. “CLS is a real-time system that enables simultaneous settlement 
globally, irrespective of time zones. Settlement is final and irrevocable or funds are 
returned same day. Participating banks get real-time settlement information that helps 
them to manage liquidity more efficiently, reduce credit risks and introduce 
operational efficiencies”. (CLS website)  Since it began operations, CLS has rapidly 
gained significant market share, becoming the market-standard for foreign exchange 
settlement between major banks. It currently settles on average more than $3 trillion 
each day in FX-related payment obligations. (Progress in reducing foreign exchange 
settlement risk, CPSS Publications No 83, May 2008) 
2.4.8 Separation of Trading 
Lyons (2001) describes the physical separation of trading in the FX market as “rings 
of trading” as can be seen in the diagram below. It is important to recognize however, 
that as the market changes the lines are becoming increasingly blurred. The 
introduction of electronic brokers and their rapid gain of market power has increased 
price transparency, and customers now have a more precise view of spreads in the 
interbank market, leading to tighter spreads for customers themselves. All the new 
developments in FX outlined above have resulted in a more fragmented market, and 
changes in market structure may eventually change the mechanisms of price 
discovery. We therefore propose possible simplified models of price discovery, but 
with the understanding that this may change as the market itself changes.   
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Figure 2-1 - Rings of Trading Lyons (2001) 
 
Figure 2-2 – A Changing Relationship between the players in FX 
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2.4.9 FX dealers  
Just as the FX market itself differs from other financial markets, so do FX dealers 
differ from market makers in the other markets. In a groundbreaking paper for 
international finance, Richard Lyons followed an FX dealer for a week, observing 
how he conducted his business. This paper was groundbreaking not only for the fact 
that it effectively spawned the field of micro FX (along with Charles Goodhart), but 
for actually bothering to go to the horse’s mouth so to speak and observe and interact 
with the people who actually deal with FX every day and set prices without 
econometric models to guide them in their second by second decisions. The Lyons 
dealer can teach us something about how some dealers in FX operate. Microstructure 
theory, which is based mainly on studies of the equity market, tells us that the spreads 
quoted by dealers are functions of four components: (i) adverse selection, i.e. 
protection against potentially informed customers, (ii) inventory costs, (iii) fixed costs 
or order processing costs and (iv) monopoly power. Fixed costs are generally 
modelled as a constant and the monopoly power component is not relevant in a 
competitive market such as the FX market. (Osler, 2006) Asymmetric information 
and inventory costs are the components of spread that we are most interested in. A 
dealer should widen spreads to protect himself against trades from informed 
customers – spreads increase with trade size. Larger trades also mean that the dealer 
takes on more risk by holding onto large positions that will need to be managed. This 
again implies that spreads should increase with trade size. The Lyons (1995) dealer 
can give us some insight into whether the equity microstructure theory holds in an FX 
setting, as well as giving a picture of the behaviour of a “typical” FX dealer. A plot of 
his net position is shown below.   
 
Figure 2-3 – Net Position of an FX dealer (Lyons, 1997) 
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The Lyons dealer does in fact increase spreads with increasing trade size. He also 
learned from the order flow he observed and adjusted his mid-point to take this 
information into account, i.e. he engaged in bid shading to control his inventory. 
Some other interesting facts that emerge from observing this particular dealer are that 
he always closed flat at the end of each day thus avoiding the need to manage 
positions overnight. This is clearly shown on the graph above, and also points to the 
fact that a dealer’s comparative advantage comes from monitoring the market and his 
order flows at his desk so it would be very risky to maintain overnight positions. This 
is in contrast to the behaviour of dealers in other markets who regularly maintain 
large positions over long periods of time. The average half-life of his positions was 10 
minutes, again in sharp contrast to a half-life of 7 days in the equity markets. This 
dealer had an average of 340 transactions per day, an average volume of $1.4 billion, 
and he made $500,000 profit in the one week Rich Lyons was observing him. This 
contrasts again to the average equity dealer who makes $10,000 per day on volume of 
$10 million. (Lyons 1997)  
 
Of course it is hard to suggest that all dealers in FX operate in the same way, and in 
fact not all FX dealers do. This particular dealer observed no customer order flow, so 
he was effectively uninformed about things like sentiment shifts or portfolio shifts. 
Lyons finds that he speculated very little and made his profits simply by market 
making. In this sense, for a dealer in an investment bank with no customer order flow 
to glean information from, the Lyons dealer is a typical type of FX dealer. Lyons 
argues that he is representative because he was experienced in this market and had 
traded for a number of years, he was well-known and maintained $10 million quote 
relationships with other dealers and he traded very large volumes in excess of $1 
billion per day. (Lyons 1997) 
 
A final point to make about FX dealers is that they do not use currency options, 
futures or forward markets to hedge risk, finding it cheaper to use the interdealer spot 
market. (Fan and Lyons, 2002) 
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2.4.10 Hot Potato Trading 
Hot potato trading refers to the “repeated passing of inventory imbalances between 
dealers” (Lyons 1997). The trading volume in FX is enormous and is far larger than 
the volume in other financial markets. Interdealer trading accounts for an estimated 
43% of total trading volume. (BIS 2007) FX dealers are risk-averse, and as we have 
seen in a previous section manage their inventory aggressively, not holding on to 
positions for long, and actively driving their inventory to zero at close of business 
each day. Incidentally, this is not inconsistent with the 24 hour nature of the FX 
market as dealers do not pass along positions to their counterparties e.g. from Tokyo 
to London or from London to New York. What does get passed around the globe is 
the order book, not the positions themselves. A direct consequence then of the risk-
averse nature of FX dealers is that as soon as they are hit with a customer order they 
will seek to restore their inventory equilibrium by trading in the interbank market. 
 
“When hit with an incoming order, a currency dealer seeks to restore his own 
equilibrium by going to another marketmaker or the broker market for a two-way 
price. A game of ‘hot potato’ has begun… It is this search process for a counterparty 
who is willing to accept a new currency position that accounts for a good deal of the 
volume in the foreign exchange market” (James Burnham, 1991) 
 
Understanding the source of the huge volume in FX is very important from a policy 
perspective. Some who attribute this large volume to excessive and “destabilizing” 
speculation support the imposition of a tax on FX trades to provide disincentives to 
speculation. Considering the fact that as Flood (1994) says, “the large volume of 
interbank trading is not primarily speculative in nature, but rather represents the rather 
tedious task of passing undesired positions along until they happen upon a 
marketmaker whose inventory discrepancy they neutralize”, imposing such a tax 
would only impede the process of risk sharing. When marketmakers can share risks 
more easily, for example through a large and liquid interdealer market, they are 
willing to quote narrower spreads. Lyons (1997) however disagrees with the 
hypothesis that hot potato trading is innocuous. He formulates a simultaneous trade 
model of the FX hot potato showing that it produces an informational asymmetry, the 
intuition being that the interdealer market is where the private information coming 
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from customer trades gets aggregated and revealed. Lyons argues that the precision of 
this information is lowered as a result of hot potato trading.   
 
2.4.11 A Rapidly Changing Landscape 
The huge growth in daily turnover in the global foreign exchange market, revealed in 
the BIS 2007 survey, continues to solidify FX as an asset class, and the changing 
demands of market participants is naturally gradually changing the structure of the 
FX market itself.  
 
Unlike the equity or bond markets, the foreign exchange market is highly fragmented, 
with more than 20 dealer-to-client spot platforms, two interdealer spot platforms and 
three interdealer options platforms - and with the spot currency dealer-to-client 
platforms also trying to expand into options. EBS allowed hedge funds to trade on its 
platform in 2004 and Reuters followed suit in July 2005. (Jung 2007) In 1995, 64% of 
the foreign exchange trades were executed on interdealer platforms; by 2007, that 
figure had dropped to 43% despite an increase in the overall market. (BIS 2007) 
Reuters and EBS continue to be at the centre of FX trading, but their share has 
reduced as alternative liquidity providers have emerged. Multi bank platforms allow 
customers to access prices and to trade with any of the participating dealers with 
whom they have an established credit relationship, thus facilitating investors’ access 
to market-makers, and also providing tools for algorithmic trading.  
 
The distinction between banks that are market makers in the interbank market and 
other financial institutions continues to become less apparent as these other financial 
institutions increasingly provide market liquidity. The Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York pointed to the greater role of hedge funds "behaving more like dealers with 
regard to pricing and the liquidity they are willing to provide to the market". This 
trend is underpinned by the consolidation in the banking industry, the growth of 
banking organizations that play a number of different roles in foreign exchange 
markets, the strong growth in prime brokerage and the granting of access to electronic 
brokers in the interbank market to hedge funds (Jung (2007)). While the impact of 
these changes is difficult to assess, it does suggest that the ability to characterize the 
behaviour of different counterparty types may be more difficult.   
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These features of the FX market are likely to complicate attempts at modelling and 
forecasting exchange rates, and although this is at best a superficial description of the 
market it gives us the requisite knowledge of its most important aspects that allows us 
to move on to the micro FX literature, and examine some of its organizing ideas in 
more detail. 
 32 
 
3 Micro FX 
 
Having briefly covered the different focus of the micro approach as compared to the 
macro approach, and discussed some of the main features of the FX market itself, in 
this chapter we will analyze in more detail what micro FX can offer to the FX 
literature, firstly in terms of explaining FX movements and then in terms of 
forecasting, which is the main focus of this document. We start with the seminal 
Evans and Lyons (2002) paper demonstrating the striking contemporaneous 
relationship between order flow and changes in the exchange rate. Backing up these 
results is a simplified model of trading, providing a very plausible theoretical basis 
for the empirical results. We then proceed to the literature dealing with some of the 
main issues facing micro FX, mainly the question of private information and direction 
of causality. Subsequently we discuss the micro literature on macro news 
announcements and some puzzles of international finance.   
 
Much of the empirical work in micro FX uses interdealer data, largely because of 
issues of availability. However the most important section of the micro literature in 
terms of relevance to our empirical focus which is forecasting and price impact, is the 
work done using customer order flow data. The last part of this chapter describes 
some of the literature using customer order flow data, which in turn leads us to the 
rather limited literature on forecasting FX using order flow which is the topic of the 
first empirical chapter. 
 
3.1 Order Flow – Could it be the Omitted Variable in Macro Specifications? 
 
Evans and Lyons (2002a) use interdealer data from Reuters D2000-1, a direct dealing 
platform, on DEM/USD and JPY/USD. The data is sampled at a daily frequency and 
spans four months from May 1 to August 31, 1996. The equation estimated is: 
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The coefficient on order flow is correctly signed (positive) and significant in both the 
DEM and JPY equations, suggesting that excess demand for currency is positively 
correlated with the return of the currency. The coefficient on the interest differential 
is correctly signed (positive according to theoretical models) but is only significant in 
the JPY equation. Most importantly, the fit of the model is unheard of in the FX 
literature, with an R
2
 of 64% for the DEM equation and 45% for the JPY equation. 
Furthermore, removing order flow from the model reduces the R
2
 to less than 1% in 
both cases and results in coefficients on the interest differential that are statistically 
insignificant, implying that almost all the explanatory power in the regression is due 
to order flow. In the JPY equation therefore, adding order flow makes the coefficient 
on the macro variable – interest differential – significant. This result suggests that 
order flow is the omitted variable that could “rescue” macro specifications, albeit by 
adding a micro component.  
 
3.2  Micro FX and the Evans and Lyons Model of Trading  
 
The microstructure approach to FX moves the thinking about how FX rates are set 
from a rather abstract theoretical approach to a more realistic information-theoretic 
approach. It introduces friction to the system if you will, recognizing that it is 
important to understand what information the dealers have available to them, and 
what forces influence their decisions. “Whether we like it or not, it is a stubborn fact 
that in the major currency markets, there is no exchange rate other than the price these 
people [FX dealers] set.” (Lyons, 2001) 
 
Evans and Lyons (2002a) propose a simplified model of quoting and trading that 
incorporates the idea of the informational content of order flow, as well as the stylized 
facts on FX dealers concerning their risk aversion and aggressive inventory 
management. In this model there are three rounds of trading. In the first round, 
dealers quote prices to customers. Each dealer then observes some customer order 
flow based on these quotes. Then each dealer quotes prices in the interdealer market, 
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and dealers trade amongst themselves to manage their inventory. Interdealer trading is 
simultaneous and it is possible to trade with multiple partners. In the third round of 
trading dealers trade with customers again to share overnight risk with the market, as 
we have seen that dealers do not provide overnight liquidity.  All prices are publicly 
observed and are assumed to be good for any quantity. This condition implies that all 
dealers will choose to quote the same price within a given round, otherwise they 
would be vulnerable to arbitrage. The no-arbitrage condition ensures this aspect of 
dealer behaviour, since dealers are setting prices based on common knowledge 
information. In this model dealers will trade on private information gained from their 
customer order flow, but will not find it optimal to change their quotes based on this 
information and thus reveal their private signal.  They will instead wait for a more 
precise signal that they get by observing order flow in the interdealer market, the 
intuition being that interdealer flows, which are caused by customer order flows, can 
give a better – though noisy – indication of the “true” value of aggregate order flow. 
 
The timeline of trading in this model can be represented graphically as follows (Evans 
& Lyons, 2002): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1 – Daily Timing – Evans and Lyons Model of Trading 
 
Mathematically, the period-t quote can be represented as:  
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Of course, saying that the quote must be a function of the information known to all 
dealers does not imply that all dealers have the same information set. In fact, since 
each dealer observes his own distinct customer order flow, each dealer has a different 
information set. Due to fear of arbitrage however, as we have seen, individual dealers 
will not use their private information to set quotes, but will use it to trade with other 
dealers, and in this way will contribute to the process by which all dealers get 
information.  
 
If we re-write the period t quote as: 
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we can see that changes in the log spot rate can be decomposed into an expected part, 
the first term, and an unexpected part expressed in the ?
t+1
 term. New information 
affects the price quoted in period t+1 because it revises the forecasts of the present 
value of fundamentals based on the dealer’s common information set ?
t
D . This last 
point points to a great advantage that micro models have over macro models, in that 
they attempt to quantify exactly how new information about the macro economy gets 
to dealers and how it induces them to change their quotes. In macro models this 
process is assumed to be somehow instantaneous.  
 
Based on the mechanism of trading described above, although dispersed information 
reaches the market in the form of customer orders seen by individual dealers, this 
information can have no impact on quotes until it becomes known to all dealers. This 
information aggregation will take place in the interdealer market when the individual 
dealers use the private information they gleaned from their customer order flow to 
inform their trading decisions.  
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Importantly, in this simplified model of trading, prices are set in round 3, conditioned 
on round 2 interdealer order flows. In contrast to round 1 trading, customer’s motives 
for trading are non-stochastic and purely speculative, and dealers must set prices at a 
level at which the public will willingly absorb dealer inventory imbalances. This 
implies that dealers not only need to know the size of the total inventory that the 
public needs to absorb, but also the risk bearing capacity of the public which is less 
than infinite. “Specifically, given negative exponential utility, the public’s total 
demand for the risky asset in round 3, denoted C3, is a linear function of the expected 
return conditional on public information:”  
 
 
 
C3 = ? ? P
3,t+1
?
3
?? ?? ? P3,t( )  (3.6) 
 
The positive coefficient ?  captures the aggregate risk-sharing capacity of the public, 
and ?
3
 is the public information available at the time of trading in round 3 (Evans 
and Lyons, 2002a). 
 
It is important to note at this point that round 3 is a simplifying assumption. It is 
necessary to complete the model and may not be entirely realistic. Particularly for FX 
dealers outside the US, even if we accept that all dealers close out their day flat, as 
one financial centre closes, another opens so interdealer trade is still possible. 
Customers do not necessarily need to be induced to take on overnight risk.  
 
Alternative models suggest that information is priced at different times. Osler et al 
(2006a) make a very convincing argument that price discovery in the FX market does 
not operate in the way predicted by the standard adverse selection theory of spreads, 
and in fact a dealer who does observe large volumes of customer order flow would 
not find it advantageous to behave in the same manner as the “Lyons dealer” 
discussed in a previous section. The stylized facts that FX dealers do not hold on to 
positions for long, actively and aggressively manage their inventory and close flat 
each day still hold, but a dealer who observes customer order flow covets the 
information in large trades so would be willing to pay for this information by quoting 
narrower spreads for large trades. Adverse selection theory posits that the exact 
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opposite should happen, however Osler et al claim that conversations with dealers 
suggest that this mechanism more closely reflects the realities of spreads in FX 
trading.  
 
Using a dataset comprised of the entire USD/EUR transaction record of a bank in 
Germany from 11 July 2001 to 9 November 2001 (87 trading days), they find that 
customer spreads are inversely related to deal size. This means that spreads are 
narrower for customers the bank considers to be informed, and in fact they find 
variation in spreads between different customer types. Commercial customers who 
are generally considered to be less informed pay substantially wider spreads than 
financial customers. The traditional components of spreads mentioned above cannot 
explain these observations. Osler et al (2006a) suggest that asymmetric information 
may affect spreads through two channels that are distinct from adverse selection.  
 
The first is market power. In a quote-driven market, market-power comes from 
knowledge of the market, and commercial customers typically know much less about 
the conditions prevailing in the market than their financial counterparts. It has been 
suggested by Greene et al. (2004) that dealer quotes are directly proportional to their 
market power. This would explain why commercial clients pay wider spreads.  
 
The second channel is strategic dealing, which refers to the argument that FX dealers 
strategically vary spreads in order to gain from the information in customer order 
flow. Effectively this suggests that FX dealers are willing to “pay” through tighter 
spreads in order to attract order flow from better-informed customers that they can 
then use to speculate. A dealer who observes customer order flow in FX would have 
incentives to speculate and his profits would not come mainly from market making. 
The strategic dealing argument successfully explains why spreads were narrowest for 
large trades from financial customers as these would be the trades expected to be the 
most informative.  
 
Based on their observations, Osler et al proceed to suggest how information may get 
embedded in prices without involving the key mechanism considered by adverse 
selection theory which considers spreads in the customer market. They suggest that 
the process by which information gets into price involves the behaviour of dealers 
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managing their inventory in the interbank market. The intuition is that trading with 
informed customers generates strong incentives for dealers to place a market order in 
the interdealer market both for inventory control and speculative reasons. This will 
trigger changes in interdealer prices. In contrast, trading with a customer who is not 
perceived to be informed is more likely to trigger a limit order thus generating 
liquidity in the interdealer market rather than driving exchange rates. In this scenario 
therefore, prices begin to reflect information during interbank trading – round two in 
the Evans and Lyons (2002) model.  
 
3.3 Order Flow and the FX Rate, Private Information and Causality 
 
 
Figure 3-2 – Contemporaneous Relationship (E&L 2002) 
Four months of exchange rates (solid) and cumulative order flow (dashed) May 1 – 
August 31, 1996: a, deutsche mark/dollar; b, yen/dollar. Evans and Lyons (2002) 
 
 
The contemporaneous correlation between order flow and the FX rate is obvious even 
if we just rely on the two graphs above from Evans and Lyons (2002). The cause of 
this correlation is not undisputed however, and certain points need to be dealt with at 
this stage. It should be pointed out that if a positive correlation between order flow 
and FX rates seems like nothing more than simple demand, we should recall that in 
text book models actual trades are not necessary for price movements. 
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One of the main hurdles to accepting the microstructure way of thinking is the idea 
that there could be any private information in the FX market. In one sense, this is a 
perfectly reasonable objection – there is no private information in FX in the sense of 
insider information in equities. What the FX microstructure approach does suggest 
however is that there is a great deal of dispersed information in FX. What we mean 
by that is that market participants in the form of end-users of FX – the customers – 
observe the market, news, fundamentals etc. and based on their own interpretation of 
this information, which is conditioned on their needs and reasons for trading, they 
place orders. This is the idea that order flow measures individuals’ changing 
expectations and reflects a “willingness to back one’s beliefs with money” (Lyons, 
2001). The change in price can be represented by the following: 
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Where: 
z
t
= current macro fundamentals 
z
t+1
e = expected future fundamentals 
 
 
Expected future fundamentals are not well captured by macro-econometric 
techniques, and estimates are slow-moving and imprecise. Order flow can serve as an 
expectation proxy, and in this sense it is very much a means of transmitting 
information to price. Allowing for an information role for order flow simply entails 
relaxing two assumptions in macro-asset models: that all information relevant to 
exchange rates is publicly known, and that the mapping from information to price is 
also known. This second assumption is especially stringent, especially in FX where 
most, if not all, news can have very ambiguous effects on any particular exchange 
rate. In a realistic micro framework, FX dealers learn about the macro economy 
directly from news, but crucially also from the order flow they observe. 
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Figure 3-3 – How Dealers Learn about Macro Economy 
 
An interesting property of order flow is that it can be disaggregated according to 
customer type. For example you can separate order flow into order flow from 
financial customers (hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds etc.) and order flow 
from commercial customers (large multinationals, shipping companies etc.). The 
financials category can even be subdivided into leveraged and unleveraged financials. 
Disaggregating order flow in this way is very useful since these separate groups of 
end-users of FX all trade for very different reasons, and the information contained in 
their order flow could therefore be very different. Financial customers, particularly 
hedge funds, might be assumed to be more knowledgeable about the state of the 
markets, since that is essentially what they are paid to do. As such, their order flow 
should be very informative. Corporate client trades are mostly need-based – they will 
trade FX to repatriate profits for example, or because they are planning a project. 
Corporate order flow might be considered to be the least informative for short term 
FX movements, but possibly should be the most informative were we to use order 
flow to forecast future fundamentals since it will be reflecting the needs of companies 
on whose performance figures such as industrial production or GDP are ultimately 
based, albeit in an aggregate form, not on the basis of individual companies. Perhaps 
most importantly though, disaggregating order flow allows us to answer the question 
of whether order flow is simply undifferentiated demand.  
 
Microstructure sceptics can legitimately argue that FX dealers simply demand a risk 
premium for holding unwanted inventory and any correlation between order flow and 
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price is simply the effect of a liquidity premium and not due to any information 
content of order flow. Evans and Lyons (2003b), among others, show that the price 
impact of orders from financial customers is, dollar for dollar, significantly higher 
than the price impact from non-financial customers. This definitively tells us that 
order flow cannot just be undifferentiated demand and cannot account for a liquidity 
premium explanation since a $10M buy from a corporate and a $10M buy from a 
hedge fund should have the exact same impact in such a scenario. Of course this 
result alone cannot make the case for information content.  
 
Using a dataset of over 6 million FX transactions from State Street Corporation, Froot 
and Ramadorai (2002) examine the relationship between order flow, exchange rate 
returns and fundamentals. Their dataset includes FX transactions for 111 currencies 
by 13,230 funds. All fixed and pegged currencies are removed from the data, as are 
currencies with few transactions, leaving 19 currency areas. The sample runs from 
January 1, 1994 to February 9, 2001, a period of 1,855 trading days. Using this novel 
dataset, Froot and Ramadorai attempt to differentiate between the three scenarios that 
they consider as possible explanations for the strong contemporaneous correlation 
between flows and returns. Evans and Lyons argue that this correlation exists because 
flows contain information about future fundamentals, which would therefore have 
permanent effects on exchange rates. They call this the ‘strong flow-centric view’. In 
a weaker version of this theory they consider the possibility that institutional flows 
contain information about deviations from fundamentals, which would have only 
transitory price effects. Lastly they submit the possibility that a contemporaneous 
relationship may simply reflect flows passively responding to fundamentals rather 
than revealing them.  
 
As a first step Froot and Ramadorai essentially replicate Evans and Lyons (2002), 
considering the following regression:  
 
 
 
r
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r
t+1, j
(P)= P-period cumulative excess return on currency j (against basket of major 
currencies),   
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 zt , j (P)  = corresponding cumulate for signed trade size (value in US$ of all currency j 
inflow in the interval (t, t+1]) 
 
They find a strong contemporaneous relationship of about 30%, also finding that the 
flow/return correlation rises with the horizon over which they are calculated, peaking 
at around 45% for major currencies at the one month horizon and then declining 
sharply as horizon continues to increase, actually falling below zero at long horizons. 
This interesting result suggests that there are significant non-contemporaneous 
correlations between returns and flows, although it can give no indication of the 
direction of the causality, and in addition to this it appears that the impact of flows on 
returns is transitory.  
 
Expanding on this line of research, Froot and Ramadorai then used a VAR and the 
Cambell-Shiller return decomposition to separate excess currency surprises into a 
permanent and a transitory component. This approach allows us to examine the 
dynamic interactions of flows, returns and measures of fundamentals. They consider 
the following VAR for x
t
= (r
t
, z
t
,i
t
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t
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)'  (excess return, flow, interest rate 
differential, inflation differential respectively):  
 
 
 
x
t
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t?1 + ?t  (3.10) 
Since they are interested in the short and long-run interaction between order flow, 
fundamentals and returns, they are particularly interested in the impulse response 
functions associated with the VAR. Their results indicate that order flow positively 
anticipates 1-month ahead movements in FX rates, but at longer horizons the co-
movement between order flow and expected long-term future returns is negative. 
They also show that there is positive covariance between current excess returns and 
expected short-term cumulative innovations in order flow. Over longer horizons this 
relationship changes sign becoming strongly negative. This could indicate that some 
traders follow positive feedback trading rules over short horizons but then unwind 
their positions in the longer term.  
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In short, Froot and Ramadorai conclude that there is no clear link between order flow 
and permanent components of exchange rates, and any positive impact of order flow 
on the FX rate is transitory and unrelated to fundamental information. They do also 
examine short and long run covariance between order flow and interest rate 
differentials and excess returns and interest rate differentials. They find a positive 
correlation between returns and expected short-term future changes in interest rates, 
and a positive correlation between order flow and expected short-term future changes 
in interest rates. In view of this result, Vitale (2004) suggests that order flow is at 
least related to some short-term fundamental information. 
 
Breedon and Vitale (2004) use six months of interdealer flows from EBS and Reuters 
and propose a simple structural model of exchange rate determination to disentangle 
the liquidity and information effects of order flow on FX rates. They present evidence 
that most of the correlation between FX rates and order flow is due to liquidity 
effects. This result is hard to reconcile with results from disaggregated customer order 
flow that, as mentioned above seem to discount a pure liquidity effect. One 
explanation offered by Marsh and O’Rourke (2005) is that a dealer with private 
information may prefer to transact in the less transparent direct interdealer market to 
protect his informational advantage, and only trade in the brokered interdealer market 
to manage inventory positions caused by uninformed trades.  
 
A difficult issue that remains unresolved when considering the correlation between 
order flow and exchange rates is that of direction of causality. Is order flow causing 
changes in spot rates or are changes in spot rates causing changes in desired positions 
and therefore causing order flow? This is not as simple a question to answer, but 
disaggregating order flow can help us to take a position. Corporate order flows have a 
negative correlation with spot changes, and financials have a positive correlation. 
(Lyons, 1995, Marsh and O’Rourke 2005) If we consider the possibility of feedback 
trading, these opposite correlations would imply that corporates follow negative 
feedback trading – buy a currency that has just fallen, and financials follow positive 
feedback trading – buy a currency that has just risen. Both these possibilities are 
plausible, but are hard to test without high frequency, intraday, order flow.  
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If FX movements cause order flow, a problem of simultaneity bias emerges, and this 
would in turn imply that OLS estimates of beta coefficients would be biased. To take 
into account possible feedback effects of the FX rate on order flow, Payne (2003) 
uses an alternative methodology based on the study of a simple linear VAR model for 
trades and quote revisions, originally used by Hasbrouck (1991) in his study of the 
NYSE. Payne (2003) applies the VAR methodology to a transaction dataset on the 
brokered section of the FX spot market.  His data gave information on the size of 
transactions, so he was able to investigate the theoretical assumption from rational 
expectations models that in the presence of asymmetric information there is a clear 
relationship between trade size and information content, i.e. the larger the trade, the 
more information it can be expected to contain. In fact, neither trade size, nor squared 
trade size were found to be significant, although this could be due to the small 
variability in trade size observed in the data sample. From the VMA representation, it 
is found that a market buy1 causes an approximately 1 basis point increase in the 
value of the US$. From the variance decomposition Payne finds that over 40% of FX 
rate variability can be attributed to unpredictable trading activity. In addition, he finds 
that the asymmetric information coefficients are not stable, changing according to the 
level of market liquidity and across different time intervals. This implies that time of 
day and liquidity effects complicate the relationship between order flow and excess 
returns. The Payne (2003) results suggest that even when possible feedback from the 
FX rate to order flow is accounted for order flow imbalance remains a determinant of 
FX rate movements, although the relationship is not as clear-cut as we might have 
hoped.  
 
Killeen, Lyons and Moore (2002), henceforth KLM, also address the question of 
causality. They estimate a VAR consisting of the FX rate, cumulative order flow and 
the interest differential, as well as a constant and a trend, and find one cointegrating 
vector in the system. We know that a system of variables that is cointegrated must 
have an error correction representation, which can then provide clues about direction 
of causality by allowing us to estimate whether adjustment to long run equilibrium 
occurs via the exchange rate or via order flow. The KLM results indicate that the 
                                                
1 The transaction indicator in the VAR was constructed to take a value of unity for a market buy, zero 
for no trade and minus one for market sell. Payne (2003) 
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burden of adjustment falls to the exchange rate, suggesting that causality does indeed 
run from order flow to price. They also find no evidence of Granger causality from 
the FX rate to order flow, and taken together with the conclusions from the ECM this 
implies that cumulative order flow is strongly exogenous. This conclusion can seem 
somewhat counterintuitive, as order flow might be considered to be almost by 
definition endogenous.  
 
This small sampling of papers should give a good indication that although order flow 
has been shown empirically to have a definite role to play in FX rate determination, 
there are as yet no clear cut answers as to what that role is. 
   
 
3.4 Macro Announcements, Surprises and FX Rate Movements   
 
Understanding how, if at all, order flow affects how macro news announcements are 
interpreted and incorporated in prices is extremely important, perhaps particularly in 
terms of forecasting. If order flow loses its importance as an information transmission 
mechanism, or conversely if this importance is enhanced around periods of news 
announcements, this will have consequences as we try to model and predict exchange 
rates. As such, another focus of the research on order flow and FX rates is the effect 
of macro news on both FX rate movements and order flow itself. Naturally 
researchers are interested in how macro news gets into prices – is information 
incorporated in prices immediately as efficient markets theory suggests, or is there 
room for order flow to play a role? If we accept that order flow does convey 
information, there are two types of information that it can convey: (i) information 
about the stream of future cash flows, which in FX also includes future interest 
differentials and (ii) information about market-clearing risk premia. Similarly, macro 
announcements can be understood to contain two kinds of information: (i) common 
knowledge (CK) information and (ii) dispersed incremental information that can be 
inferred from order flow. Announcements relative to FX rarely have unambiguous 
interpretations however. To use an example from Andersen et al (2003), a positive US 
inflation surprise could produce US$ depreciation in an environment in which the Fed 
places little weight on the level of inflation, or conversely could produce US$ 
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appreciation when the Fed shows a strong preference for low inflation. Andersen et al 
(2003) examine whether high frequency FX rate movements are linked to 
fundamentals. Using six years of Reuters high frequency returns data on 6 major 
currencies observed at 5 minute intervals, and International Money Market Services 
(MMS) data on money managers’ expectations on 41 macro variables for the US and 
Germany as well as the realized (announced) values, they attempt to measure the 
effects of the expected and unexpected components of macro announcements. News 
is defined as the difference between expectations and realized values. Modelling the 
5-minute spot exchange rate Rt as a linear function of I lagged values of itself (I=5), 
and J lags (J=2) of news on each of K fundamentals (K=41):  
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They find that unexpected fundamental shocks affect FX rates significantly and 
immediately – most of the effect felt within a 5 minute interval, whereas adding a 
variable for the expected component of news had no effect on the FX rate. They also 
find an asymmetry in the way in which the market reacts to news with bad news 
having greater impact. They link this last finding with the model in Veronesi (1999) 
where the effect of bad news in good times is amplified due to increased state 
uncertainty. Lastly they find that many US indicators have statistically significant 
news effects across all the currencies they studied. 
 
It would be wrong to conclude from the results of Andersen et al. (2003) among 
others that public news is the major determinant of exchange rate variation. As Evans 
and Lyons (2006b) points out, less than 5% of total exchange rate variation is 
accounted for by public news arrivals. To reconcile this fact with results such as those 
in Andersen et al (2003), it is important to realize that the papers linking exchange 
rates and news are event studies, and therefore focus on explanatory power within 
event windows, not across full samples.  
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Love & Payne (2003) use 10 months of transaction level data from Reuters D2000-2 
in 1999-2000 on USD/GBP, USD/EUR, and GBP/EUR coupled with Euro-area, UK 
and US macro announcement and expectations data to study the relationships between 
order flow, spot rates and macro news, both simultaneously and separately, at a 1 
minute sampling frequency. Like Andersen et al, they also find an immediate reaction 
to macro news by FX rates, but interestingly also find that news also affects order 
flow with both immediate and delayed effects. Following on from this result, they test 
whether order flow has a greater or smaller role in FX rate determination around the 
time of macro news announcements, by estimating a non-linear regression. They find 
that FX rates are more sensitive to order flow around times of macro announcements. 
Lastly, Love and Payne estimate a multivariate VAR for rates and flows to measure 
the contribution of order flow to the overall FX rate response to news.  
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?Pt = 3 by 1 vector of FX rate returns 
Ft = corresponding 3 by 1 vector of order flows 
Nt = 3 by 1 vector of standardized euro-area, UK and US news 
 
Studying the impulse response function of the VAR following news releases, Love 
and Payne are able to separate the direct (no role for trading) and indirect (through 
order flow) channels through which news gets impounded in price. They do this by 
estimating the IRF, imposing the restriction that order flow is not affected by news, 
and again without this restriction and calculating the difference. The hypothesis that 
all news is immediately impounded in price with no role for trading is rejected, and 
the results suggest that 50%-66% of the reaction of FX rates to public news 
announcements that are simultaneously available to all market participants is 
mediated by order flow. Regardless of the mechanism, all price changes occur within 
2 minutes of announcement so there is no question of inefficiency in the FX market. 
As to providing a reason for why order flow is so important, the authors find the 
argument that the mapping from news about fundamentals to price varies among 
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market participants, and these differing beliefs induce order flow that moves price to 
a new equilibrium level to be the most plausible explanation.  
 
A problem with all empirical work on the effect of news is one that has already been 
mentioned – the “sign” that should be given to any particular news announcement is 
not necessarily obvious as the same announcement can have opposite effects on a 
currency depending on other factors in the macro economy. To avoid this problem, 
Evans and Lyons (2006) focus on the effect of announcements on the second moment 
of exchange rates and order flow, i.e. on the effects of news on the volatility of FX 
rates and order flow. Their data covers 4 months (May – August 1996) on Reuters 
D2000-1 in DEM/USD. This is a bilateral direct trading system where quotes are very 
short lived, thus avoiding any stale quotes problem that could cloud inferences. The 
Love and Payne data described above is exposed to such a problem since it is derived 
from limit order trading. Evans and Lyons also do not limit their announcement data 
to scheduled announcements (only 10% of all announcements on trading desk 
screens), thus getting a more complete picture of the dynamics of order flow and FX 
rates. In their intraday analysis, they estimate a model for the joint dynamics of FX 
prices and order flow at a 5 minute frequency. The focus is on the relative importance 
of the direct and indirect information channels operating immediately after an 
announcement. This relative importance is quantified using a variance decomposition 
of FX price changes. Unlike Love and Payne, Evans & Lyons suggest that only the 
private component of information has an effect on FX rates through order flow, and 
that the public component is immediately reflected by a change in FX rates.  The 
following 2 equations are at the heart of their model (an extension of Evans (2002)): 
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Common knowledge news is immediately impounded into price, whereas dispersed 
information shocks will first affect order flow and only subsequently will be 
impounded into price. B(L) and Cy(L) are the lag polynomials that determine the 
dynamic response of prices and order flow to dispersed information shocks. 
 
Using GMM to estimate the model, the intraday analysis concludes that order flow 
contributes more to changing FX prices in the period immediately following the 
arrival of news than at other times. Evans and Lyons also conduct a daily analysis, 
which finds that about two-thirds of the effect of macro news on FX prices is 
transmitted via order flow, the remainder being the direct effect of news. In total, they 
estimate that macro news accounts for 36% of total FX price variance in daily data, a 
much higher figure than the 5% found in previous studies. 
 
3.5 Puzzles of International Economics: Macro Questions, Micro Answers? 
 
The field of international macroeconomics is replete with a number of obstinate 
puzzles, and an entire literature review could be devoted to the research dedicated to 
trying to solve these puzzles. This is obviously beyond the scope of this document but 
the interested reader can look to Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and Sarno (2005) for an 
excellent treatment of the topic. Here we will limit ourselves to the contributions that 
the micro literature has made towards resolving some of these puzzles. Lyons (2001) 
reviews the progress made in resolving two major FX puzzles – the determination or 
exchange rate disconnect puzzle and the excess volatility puzzle – by applying a 
dispersed information approach.  
 
The exchange rate disconnect or determination puzzle refers to the fact that empirical 
evidence shows that fundamentals have little explanatory power for exchange rates – 
the by now famous, or infamous, Meese-Rogoff result. In a sense, the entire field of 
FX microstructure is an attempt to resolve this puzzle in that it has provided a well 
specified – if not a macro – model that can account for exchange rates empirically. 
Evans and Lyons (2002), using 4 months of interdealer data, find that the flow of buy 
and sell transactions explains up to 2/3 of the daily variance in the USD/DEM rate 
and about ½ of the daily variance in the USD/YEN rate. Others such as Payne (2000), 
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Rime (2000) and Marsh and O’Rourke (2005) find similar results. In this sense 
therefore the micro approach, i.e. an information theoretic modelling approach has 
provided some insight into the Meese-Rogoff puzzle. It is important to note however 
that since order flow is not an underlying cause of FX movements but is only a 
proximate cause, until we understand what is driving order flow this puzzle cannot be 
satisfactorily resolved, but a growing micro FX literature is tackling precisely this 
issue.  
 
Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2003) seek to tackle the exchange rate determination 
puzzle by introducing investor heterogeneity into an otherwise standard monetary 
model of exchange rate determination. They introduce two types of heterogeneity to 
their model: heterogeneous information of market participants about future 
macroeconomic fundamentals, since surveys show that investors have different views 
about the macroeconomic outlook, and non-fundamentals based heterogeneity. This 
second type of heterogeneity includes noise traders, but more generally involves 
rational investors who trade for non-speculative reasons. The study reaches a number 
of conclusions. First, under heterogeneous information, the FX rate becomes a source 
of information about future fundamentals, so whereas under homogeneous 
information non-fundamentals based trade has little or no effect, when information is 
no longer common to all investors a small amount of non-fundamentals based trade 
can become the dominant source of exchange rate volatility. The impact of non-
fundamentals trade on the exchange rate can then be significantly amplified as agents 
rationally misinterpret the resulting exchange rate movements as information about 
future fundamentals. Second, this confusion can be persistent, and therefore an 
endogenous persistence of the impact of non-fundamentals based trade on the 
exchange rate is created. In other words, in this framework, order flow variability 
accounts for much of the volatility in FX over the short term. Finally, they conclude 
that the amount of FX rate volatility explained by fundamentals increases as the time 
horizon increases as investors learn about or observe fundamentals. This result is 
consistent with other empirical evidence such as Mark (1995).  
 
Killeen, Lyons and Moore (2002)  - henceforth KLM - address the excess volatility 
puzzle, which refers to the fact that exchange rates are excessively volatile relative to 
our best measures of fundamentals. Exchange rates are generally less volatile when 
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they are managed rather than allowed to float freely. KLM use the switch from the 
European Monetary System (EMS) to the European Monetary Union (EMU) which 
was a switch from a target zone to a fixed rate regime, and focus their analysis on the 
role of order flow to address this puzzle. Using one year of daily EBS data on the 
DEM/FRF, their analysis concludes that FX rates are more volatile under floating rate 
regimes because of order flow. This is because under floating regimes order flow 
conveys more information and in turn increases volatility. Under fixed regimes there 
is no role for order flow as a determinant of FX rates. The intuition for this is tied to 
demand elasticity, which is low under floating regimes due to higher volatility and 
therefore more risk aversion, but infinite under fixed regimes as return volatility 
shrinks to zero and holding FX becomes effectively riskless. As such, under floating 
there is room for portfolio-balance effects and this allows a role for order flow to 
convey information about these effects as in the Evans-Lyons model. Under fixed any 
portfolio balance effects are eliminated and consequently so is any information role 
for order flow. (Lyons, 2001)  
 
The puzzles of international macroeconomics are far from solved, but we can see that 
the micro approach to FX has some definite insights to offer even in this decidedly 
macro area of international finance. 
3.6 Customer Order Flow  
 
Much of the FX microstructure literature focuses on the interdealer market. This is in 
large part because of data availability issues since interdealer data is more readily 
available than customer order flow data, but it is not without theoretical merit also. As 
has been discussed previously, the interdealer market is the only part of the FX 
market that is at least somewhat transparent, at least to FX dealers. As such it can be 
argued that the interdealer market is more immediately relevant to FX price 
determination than customer-dealer order flow (Lyons, 2001a), and many of the 
papers discussed in other sections deal with interdealer flows. It is indisputable 
however, that although interdealer trading accounts for much of the volume in FX 
(43% according to the latest BIS survey), this is in a sense derivative, and it is the 
demands of the end-users of currency – the customers – that represent underlying 
demand for FX in the real economy (Fan and Lyons, 2002).  Why are customer orders 
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the “crack cocaine” of the FX market as one trader put it? Because customer orders 
are the catalyst that causes FX movements, and as such customer order flow is much 
coveted by banks and is jealously guarded. Fan and Lyons (2002) use over 5 years of 
daily customer order flow data from Citibank – one of the top three FX trading banks 
with a 10-15% market share in the major-currency customer business (at the time of 
the study). The data covers the USD/EUR and USD/JPY markets and includes both 
spot and forward transactions. FX swaps are not included since they do not have any 
net order flow implications. Lastly, the data is divided into the trades of three 
customer types: corporates, unleveraged financials and leveraged financials. The 
mainly graphical analysis in this paper broadly yields the following results: (i) 
Citibank customer order flow shows little evidence of mean reversion, and cumulated 
over time is approximately a random walk. (ii) Customer order flow and FX rate 
movements are closely correlated at lower frequencies (e.g. annual). (iii) The 
different components of disaggregated order flow behave quite differently. (iv) 
Extreme exchange-rate movements at high-frequency are generally associated with 
large net flows from financial institutions, while low frequency trends are associated 
with flows from corporates.   
 
Marsh and O’Rourke (2005) also use customer order flow, this time from RBS, a 
leading European bank. They confirm the findings of strong contemporaneous 
correlation between order flow and FX rates, and discount the possibility that this 
correlation is simply due to a liquidity effect as they find that order flow from 
different customer types has different correlations with FX rate changes. Since the 
RBS dataset covers six bilateral FX rates between four currencies (euro, dollar, yen 
and pound), they are able to show that information relevant to one exchange rate is 
contained in customer order flows observed for other exchange rates. Finally, they 
apply a tool from equity microstructure, namely Easely, Keifer and O’Hara’s 
probability of information based trading measure, and show that the correlation 
between FX rate changes and customer order flow is positively correlated to P.I.N., a 
result that they interpret as an additional indication that customer order flows contain 
information.  
 
A more recent paper is Evans and Lyons (2006b), that develops a model for 
understanding customer order flow in the FX market. They present both simulation 
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results that address the relationship between FX rates and customer order flow in the 
model, and empirical estimates based on the Citibank customer flow data.    
 
The simulations show that: Customer flows provide more accurate information about 
fundamentals when there are more longer-horizon customers; flows from customer 
segments can produce negative coefficients in contemporaneous return regressions, 
even when they are positively correlated with fundamentals, and customer flows 
forecast returns because they are correlated with the future market-wide information 
flow that dealers use to revise their FX prices. The empirical analysis shows that: both 
the aggregated and disaggregated customer flows are positively auto-correlated; 
contemporaneous correlations across flow segments are high at the monthly 
frequency but decrease as frequency increases to daily; the coefficients on some 
customer groups can be negative in contemporaneous regressions; the explanatory 
power of flows increases with horizon; and about one-third of order flows power to 
forecast exchange rates one month ahead comes from flows ability to forecast future 
flow, with the remaining two-thirds applying to price components unrelated to future 
flow. 
3.7 Forecasting Using Order Flow 
A large body of literature exists describing the inability of fundamentals based 
models to even explain FX rate movements (e.g. Meese and Rogoff, 1983a, b, Mark, 
1995). The microstructure approach has had considerably more success, with strong 
empirical evidence to support a significant contemporaneous relationship between 
order flow and exchange rates (see inter alia Evans and Lyons 2002a, b, Marsh and 
O’Rourke 2005, Fan and Lyons 2000). An important question however is whether 
this contemporaneous relationship can be extended to a forecasting one. It is a 
stubborn fact that FX rates cannot be successfully forecast using traditional macro 
models, but this has become the yardstick by which models are judged. The 
motivation for this study is Evans and Lyons (2005b), which presents a 
microstructure model of forecasting that achieves unprecedented success. Evans and 
Lyons (2005b) conduct a true ex-ante forecasting experiment, using a 3 year 
forecasting sample and over horizons ranging from 1 day to 1 month. They compare 
the results of their forecasts to a naïve random walk as well as to a standard macro 
model, and find that the micro model consistently outperforms both, with micro-based 
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forecasts accounting for almost 16% of the sample variance in monthly spot rate 
changes.  
3.7.1 Theoretical Foundations 
 
The theoretical basis for the Evans and Lyons (2005b) model stems from a new 
perspective on the forecastability of FX rates, first described by Engel and West 
(2004a,b). The fundamentals in most macro models do not follow random walks, so if 
there is some unobserved fundamental that does follow a random walk, this could 
offer an explanation for the random walk nature of exchange rates. Engel and West 
(2004a,b) show that “if fundamentals are I(1), but not necessarily random walks, then 
as the discount factor in the present value relation approaches one, the exchange rate 
will follow a process arbitrarily close to a random walk.” (Evans and Lyons, 2005b) 
If we consider that an I(1) process can be split into a stationary and a non-stationary 
component, we can see that a discount factor close to one implies that most of the 
weight is placed on future fundamentals, whose expectations will be dominated by the 
random walk component. It is reasonable to conclude therefore that stationary 
components of fundamentals provide little promise for forecasting. Therefore, “one 
needs to focus on where all the action is, namely, exchange rate dynamics that come 
from expectational surprises.” (E&L 2005b)  
 
We can illustrate this issue more formally, starting with the present value expression 
for the spot rate (equation (1) in E&L 2005b): 
 
 
s
t
= 1? b( ) biEt
i=0
?? ft+ i  (3.15) 
s
t
= log nominal FX rate 
ft = current macro fundamentals 
b = discount rate 
E denotes expectation 
 
 
Iterating forward and rearranging, gives us (equations (2) and (3) in E&L 2005b): 
 
 
?s
t+1
=
1? b
b
s
t
? E
t
f
t( ) + ?t+1  (3.16) 
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 where :  
 
 
?
t+1
? 1? b( ) bi
i=0
?? Et+1 ? Et( ) ft+ i+1  (3.17) 
 
Engel and West’s analysis tells us that forecasting based on st ? ft( )  is difficult as b 
is close to unity and changes in fundamentals are not very predictable. A logical next 
step therefore is to focus on the error term ?
t+1
 and examine the FX rate dynamics 
that come from expectational surprises, Et+1 ? Et( ) ft+ i+1 in the equation above. 
3.7.2 A Micro Model 
 
The micro based model in E&L (2005b) is based on the present value relation 
discussed in the previous section, with one main difference. Micro based models 
focus on the mechanism through which marketmakers get information. There is no 
assumption that all information is symmetrically disseminated and immediately 
impounded in price, and in fact this is the major difference between macro and micro 
models. As such, the difference in the present value relation is one of expectations, 
namely that expectations now refer to the marketmakers expectations conditioned on 
information at the start of period t, making the present value relation: 
 
 
 
s
t
= 1? b( ) bi
i=0
?? Etm ft+ i  (3.18) 
 
Et
m
ft+ i = marketmaker expectations of future fundamentals 
 
Therefore, iterating forward and rewriting gives us: 
 
 
 
?s
t+1
=
1? b
b
?
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?
?? st ? Et
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?
t+1
m ? 1? b( ) bi
i=0
?? Et+1m ? Etm( ) ft+ i+1  (3.20) 
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The above specification implies that innovations in spot rates are driven by the 
present value of revisions in marketmaker forecasts of future fundamentals.  It is a 
central premise of the micro approach to FX that marketmakers learn about the macro 
economy by observing order flow. This need not imply that customers have private 
information per se. Customers trading for allocative reasons can still, in aggregate, 
convey information, although on a customer-by-customer basis there would not be 
significant information in the trades. “When a large number of agents are trading for 
correlated reasons, the resulting transaction flow during period t (after s
t  is set) will 
convey information to marketmakers that causes them to revise their fundamentals 
forecasts” (E&L, 2005b).  
 
The contemporaneous relationship between order flow and exchange rate innovation 
has been demonstrated empirically in a number of papers as discussed in a previous 
section, (e.g. E&L 2002a,b) but from a forecasting standpoint this is not helpful. 
What does interest us is whether order flow observed before the start of period t is 
correlated with exchange rate innovation between t and t+1. Consequently, two 
conditions need to be satisfied in order for micro-based models to be useful for 
forecasting: 
(i) Orders must contain information either due to customers trading 
because they feel they have superior information that they can 
take advantage of, or due to the aggregate flow of allocative 
trades signalling information about the macro-economy that is 
not yet publicly known; and  
(ii) There must be a lag between the time information triggers order 
flow and the time it is seen by all marketmakers and therefore 
impounded into price. 
 
The second condition is not an unreasonable one in a market as opaque as the FX 
market. Each dealer will only observe part of the order flow in any period, and will 
only learn of the aggregate order flow with a lag, and even then this knowledge will 
be received indirectly by observing trading on the interbank market. “The forecasting 
power of order flow arises precisely because it takes time for the implications of 
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aggregate order flow to be recognized across all market makers and hence reflected in 
spot prices” (E&L, 2005b).  
 
Before extending this theoretical construct to create a model that can then be tested 
empirically, we must first consider a model of marketmaker behaviour, i.e. we must 
answer the question whether dealers will revise their quotes based on any information 
they gain from observing their own customer order flow. The models of marketmaker 
behaviour in Lyons (1997) and Evans and Lyons (2002a) suggest that this does not 
happen. The dealers in the FX market are involved in a repeating game of incomplete 
information. Each dealer’s information set consists only of information about prior 
aggregate order flow, his own private order flow signal, and the fact that other dealers 
cannot know what order flow he has observed in each period. It would not be optimal 
therefore to reveal his private signal (i.e. any information gained from his individual 
order flow) through a price quote. Rather, he will prefer to trade on any information at 
the prices quoted by other dealers. The Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this model dictates 
that dealers will wait until they have a precise signal before updating their quotes, and 
this happens after they observe trading in the interdealer market, when they can infer 
the “true” value of aggregate order flow during the period t to t+1. At the start of 
period t+1, aggregate order flow during the previous period has become common 
knowledge to all dealers. 
 
Combining all these ideas allows us to formulate a model of fundamentals and order 
flow, which can then be rewritten to give a forecasting equation. Assuming 
fundamentals follow an autoregressive process, but splitting the innovations into a 
common-knowledge component and a part correlated with the innovation in 
aggregate order flow, we get the following specification: 
 
 
 
?f
t
= ??f
t?1 + ut + vt  (3.21) 
?ft = changes in fundamentals 
u
t
= common knowledge component observed contemporaneously 
v
t
= component correlated with innovation in aggregate order flow, becomes known 
to all dealers with a 1 period lag 
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x
t
= ?x
t?1 + vt  (3.22) 
x
t
= aggregate order flow 
 
Under these assumptions, dealers learn about the state of the macro economy with a 
lag, i.e. 
 
 
E
t
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t?1 = ft?1  (3.23) 
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therefore 
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Using these assumptions with the present value relation for the spot rate, and 
substituting for v
t
gives the following forecasting equation (equation 11 in E&L, 
2005b): 
 
 
?s
t+1
=
1? b
b
s
t
? E
t
m f
t( ) +
1
1? b? ut+1 +
1+ ? 1? b( )?? ???
1? b? xt ? ?xt?1( )  (3.26) 
 
“This equation shows that lagged order flows can have forecasting power for spot 
rates even when the discount factor is very close to unity: the coefficient on the last 
term has a limiting value of ? / (1? ?)  as b? 1.” (E&L 2005b) 
Regression Specification in Evans and Lyons (2005b) 
Based on the above forecasting equation, E&L (2005b) consider the two following 
regressions in their empirical analysis: 
 
Micro 1: 
 
 
?s
t+1
= a
0
+ ax
t
agg
+ e
t+1
 (3.27) 
 
x
t
agg
= aggregate order flow  
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Micro 2: 
 
 
?s
t+1
= a
0
+ a
j
j=1
6? x j ,tdis + et+1  (3.28) 
             
 
x
j ,t
dis
= order flow from segment j (1 of 6 separate customer segments)  
3.7.3 Empirical Analysis in Evans and Lyons (2005b) 
 
The Micro 1 and Micro 2 models are run on a dataset comprised of customer order 
flows and spot rates over six and a half years, from January 1993 to June 1999, in the 
USD/EUR market. The data is provided by Citibank, and is disaggregated into six 
different customer types: (i) corporations, (ii) investors such as mutual and pension 
funds and (iii) leveraged traders such as hedge funds. These three categories are 
further divided into US and non-US customers to make up the six customer 
categories. The forecast sample starts at 6/3/1996, and 5 different forecast horizons, h, 
are examined: 1, 5, 10, 15 and 20 trading days, with 20 trading days corresponding to 
one calendar month. The order flows used for each model are taken from transaction 
that occur over the h trading days starting at day t-h, i.e. for the 5 day forecast 
horizon, 5 days of history are used. The forecast performance of each model is 
compared to a random walk by means of a MSE ratio in the spirit of Meese and 
Rogoff (1983). Two macro models are also examined, although no details are given 
here since the results simply reiterate the findings of Meese and Rogoff (1983) and 
those of the voluminous literature that followed them, in stating that macro models 
are of little use as a forecasting tool for FX rates. The results of this forecasting 
experiment, summarized in the table below are unheard of in the FX literature. The 
Micro 1 model performs better than the RW at horizons longer than 10 days, and the 
Micro 2 model outperforms the RW model at all forecast horizons. They also report 
values for ? which estimates the contribution of the model forecasts to the variance of 
the spot changes over the forecast period, and although at the daily frequency the 
micro 2 model only accounts for 2% of the sample variance, this proportion increases 
with the forecast horizon, reaching a value of almost 16%, i.e. the micro 2 model 
accounts for almost 16% of the sample variance in monthly spot rate changes.  
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Table 3-1 - Forecast Comparisons, Evans and Lyons (2005b) 
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4 Forecasting with RBS Order Flow 
 
4.1 Meese-Rogoff Redux…Redux 
 
Based on the mostly positive results of the small but growing microstructure literature 
inspired by Lyons (1995), as well as the results of E&L (2006a) described in the 
previous section – thus far the only published paper demonstrating forecasting power 
using customer order flows – we were motivated to conduct a forecasting experiment 
of our own. We attempt to replicate the Evans and Lyons results using a new dataset 
from RBS, a leading European bank. Replication of published results is an essential 
part of the scientific method, but unfortunately economic research faces problems 
with “replicability”. This stems from the fact that in order to replicate a study a 
researcher needs not only the same data, but the same software and code the original 
authors used. “Few journals would even attempt to publish a description of all an 
article’s data sources and every programming step, but without knowledge of these 
details, results frequently cannot be replicated or, at times, even fully understood” 
(Anderson et al, 2005). Compounding this problem in our case is the fact that the data 
used in the Evans and Lyons studies is proprietary, so naturally we do not have access 
to it. Nevertheless, we establish that the RBS data is the same type of data, and is 
directly comparable to the Citibank data. Using this equivalent dataset, we seek to 
demonstrate whether the Evans and Lyons results can be generalized to the customer 
flows of other banks. In addition, since our data contains information on multiple 
currencies we examine whether the relationship extends to currencies other than the 
Euro-Dollar.  
 
Our data spans three and a half years, starting 01/08/2002 to 02/03/2006, and is 
comprised of spot rates and customer order flows in six major currency pairs: 
EURO_GBP, EURO_JPY, EURO_USD, GBP_USD, USD_JPY and GBP_JPY. RBS 
maintains a 24-hour foreign exchange trading service for its customers, and the order 
flows are aggregated across a 24-hour window from Sydney open to US close. All 
spot transactions are included in the data, but no forward deals or deals in the 
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interbank market are included. Once currency specific holidays are excluded, we are 
left with 878 trading days of order flow data. 
Similarly to the Evans and Lyons dataset, order flows are disaggregated into four 
categories of customer: non-financial corporates (Corp), unleveraged financials such 
as mutual funds and pension funds (Unlev), leveraged financials such as hedge funds 
(Lev), and other financials (Other). The last group contains trades of smaller banks 
that do not have access to the interbank market, as well as trades of central banks.  
 
Contemporaneous spot FX rate data was provided by RBS and is from Reuters. We 
used the daily rate at NY 4pm to calculate log changes in exchange rates. Earlier 
limited experimentation using Sydney open and New York close did not affect our 
results.  
 
Section B in the appendix contains descriptive statistics of both the actual and 
absolute values of net order flows in all currency pairs and for all customer 
categories. Net order flows are very volatile, and in many cases the standard deviation 
is larger than the mean absolute net flow. In this sample period the EUR_USD market 
had the largest average absolute net order flow, followed by USD_JPY. EUR_GBP 
and GBP_USD follow with similar average absolute net flows. The GBP_JPY market 
trails the other five markets with significantly smaller average absolute net flows.  
4.2 Contemporaneous OLS – Total Order Flow 
 
Before even considering whether the RBS order flow data can be used to forecast 
exchange rates, it is important to establish if the contemporaneous correlation found 
by Evans and Lyons in the Citibank data exists in our data. To this end, we ran a 
series of contemporaneous OLS regressions on both total order flow and 
disaggregated order flow for each of our six exchange rates. The regressions were 
estimated at the daily, 5 day, 10 day and 15 day horizons. The 20-day horizon was 
omitted since our dataset is slightly shorter than the Evans and Lyons dataset. Non-
overlapping windows were used thus avoiding any problems of induced serial 
correlation in the residual, and Newey-West (HAC) standard errors were used 
throughout. The specification for the first set of regressions using total order flow is 
shown below: 
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?S
t
: change in log spot FX rate
x
t
:  total net customer order flow
 
The results from these regressions are summarised in table 4-1 at all time horizons 
examined. 
 
Table 4-1 - Contemporaneous OLS – Total Order Flow 
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The results of the aggregated order flow regressions are not particularly encouraging, 
with only the coefficients on Euro_JPY and USD_JPY significant at all time 
horizons. A positive coefficient in this regression implies that net buying pressure 
results in currency appreciation, so it is encouraging that most coefficients are 
positive, although many are not significant.  
 
4.3 Contemporaneous OLS – Disaggregated Order Flow 
 
A significant drawback of the regression equation using total order flows is that it 
assumes that the impact of order flow from each customer type is the same. If order 
flow does in fact serve as a source of private information this is not a reasonable 
assumption to make. Relaxing this constraint involves regressing FX rate changes on 
disaggregated net order flows. The regression specification now becomes: 
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Sample results for the EUR_USD are shown in Table 4-2. Results for the remaining 
currency pairs can be found in the appendix. 
 
It is important to note that “in this setting, estimated coefficients are not unbiased 
reflections of the total price-impact of order flow from a given segment and … 
specifications that include contemporaneous flows only are reduced-forms for 
complex microeconomic dynamics, and cannot produce structural estimates of the 
price-impact of incremental trades” (E&L 2005c). This introduces a certain amount of 
difficulty interpreting price-impact from these regressions. Even a bank as large as 
Citibank only sees a fraction of total order flow, and as such, customer flows may be 
representative of the flows seen by other large dealers, but they do not represent the 
means through which information gets impounded in prices. Customer order flows 
are one factor driving interdealer flows, which in turn are also a source of information 
to dealers if we recall the model of trading introduced in a previous section. 
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“Individual coefficients simply map variations in customer flows into an estimate of 
the information flow being used by dealers across the market” (E&L, 2005c). 
 
 
Table 4-2 – Contemporaneous OLS – Disaggregated Order Flow €/$  
 
The results of the disaggregated regressions are clearly indicative of heterogeneity 
among customer types. Corporate customer flows have negative coefficients when 
significant, and profit-maximizing financials (both levered and unlevered) have 
positive coefficients. Comparing these results to those of Evans and Lyons 
summarized in table 4-3 below from E&L (2006a) we see that the patterns are 
broadly comparable. In other words, the RBS data share the contemporaneous 
properties of the Citibank data. There is a contemporaneous relationship between 
order flow and changes in spot rates, and just as in the Citibank data this relationship 
is sharpened by disaggregating order flows into distinct customer types. R squared 
values are similar, and although the size of coefficients are not the same, their signs 
are.   
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Table 4-3 – Contemporaneous return regressions (E&L, 2005c)  
 
4.4 A Forecasting Experiment 
 
Having established that the RBS dataset is closely equivalent to the Citibank dataset 
in many ways – both are comprised of customer order flows, disaggregated into 
broadly similar categories and share the same contemporaneous correlation with spot 
FX rates – the next logical step would be to replicate the E&L (2005b) forecasting 
experiment described in chapter 3. Both the Micro 1 and Micro 2 models are tested on 
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our data, using daily, 5 day, 10 day and 15 day historical order flow to forecast 
forward over a large number of forecast horizons. At the daily frequency, order flow 
observed in period t is used to forecast change in spot FX in period t+1, t+2, t+3, t+4, 
and t+5 respectively. This is a departure from the E&L (2005b) methodology in that 
they use symmetric history and forecast horizons  - i.e. one day history to forecast one 
day ahead, 5 day history to forecast 5 days ahead etc. We felt that it was important to 
include the intermediate forecast horizons as we do not know how quickly order flow 
information gets reflected in price. To go back to the theoretical model discussed in 
section (ii), we don’t know how long it takes for the “true” aggregate order flow to 
become common knowledge to all dealers, and in our model of dealer behaviour 
quotes will not change until this happens. When using 5 days of order flow history, 
forecast horizons are extended from t+1 to t+10, 10 days order flow history extend 
the forecast horizon in daily increments to t+15, and 15 days order flow history are 
used to forecast out to t+20. In general if h is the history used (h=1, 5, 10, 15) each 
model uses order flow in t-h to forecast t+1, t+2…[t+(h+5)].  
 
As in the contemporaneous regressions, non-overlapping windows were used to avoid 
the problem of induced serial correlation in the error term, and HAC standard errors 
were used throughout. The 20 day horizon estimated in the E&L(2005b) paper could 
not be estimated in our dataset since it is shorter and we would run the risk of our 
results suffering from small-sample bias. An advantage of the RBS dataset is that it is 
comprised of 6 major exchange rates as opposed to just 1, so we can extend the 
E&L(2005b) forecasting experiment to include more than just the EUR_USD market. 
This allows us to test whether these forecasting models are generaliseable beyond the 
EUR_USD market, at least to the major, liquid FX markets.  
 
In all cases, a true out of sample forecasting exercise is performed. We retain 2/3 of 
our data sample to estimate the model and use the remaining 1/3 to perform the out of 
sample forecasts. Forecasting model performance was evaluated on the basis of 
RMSE ratio of each model to that of a simple random walk, making our results 
comparable to most other FX forecasting studies post Meese-Rogoff.  
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Micro 1 Model  
 
 
 
?s
t+ f
= a
0
+ ax
t
agg
+ e
t+ f
 (4.3) 
                             
 
x
t
agg
= aggregate order flow, f = forecast horizon  
 
 
This model tests the forecasting power of total (aggregated) net order flow, i.e. we 
want to test whether observing net buying or selling pressure, regardless of customer 
type, gives us information that will allow us to forecast the exchange rate. Regression 
output for each model is summarized in table 4-4 below for the EUR_USD. 
 
It is immediately obvious that the contemporaneous correlation we found earlier has 
disappeared in the forecasting regressions. No coefficients are significant and R-
squared values are all essentially zero. Nevertheless we compare the performance of 
each forecasting model in terms of RMSE ratio to the random walk model for the 
sake of completeness, and so that our results can be directly comparable to the 
E&L(2005b) results. RMSE ratio results are summarized in Table 6-5. Forecast 
evaluations for the remaining currency pairs can be found in Appendix D. 
 
A RMSE ratio below 1 would signify that the model performs better than a naïve 
random walk model. As we can see however, although the RMSE ratio does dip 
below 1 in a few cases (shown in bold in the table), it is only marginally below one 
and appears to be random. We would expect to have some RMSE ratios below 1 
simply by chance, and in view of the results of the forecasting regressions themselves, 
we consider the above results to be indicative of a complete failure of the Micro 1 
model as a forecasting tool, at least using RMSE as a measure of performance.  
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Micro 2 Model 
 
 
 
?s
t+ f
= a
0
+ a
j
j=1
4? x j ,tdis + et+ f  (4.4) 
 
x
j ,t
dis
= order flow from segment j (1 of 4 separate customer segments)
f = forecast horizon
 
 
Using the same reasoning as in the contemporaneous regressions, we extend our 
forecasting model by disaggregating our net daily order flows according to customer 
type. To reiterate, the intuition behind using disaggregated net order flows stems from 
the informational properties of order flow. If we assume that order flow contains 
information, distinguishing between the types of customers placing orders should 
serve to sharpen the precision of the information content. This hypothesis is supported 
by the results of the contemporaneous regressions, as we saw that corporate net order 
flow is negatively correlated with spot FX changes, while financial customer net 
order flow is positively correlated. This difference may be due to the fact that 
different customer types have distinct motives for trading and by extension their order 
flow would have different information content.  
 
Regression output and RMSE ratio to the random walk model are summarized in 
Tables 4-6 to 4-9 for the EUR_USD models. Once again, we find that in the 
forecasting regressions our coefficients have lost all significance and R-squared 
values are essentially zero. RMSE ratio results confirm the poor forecasting 
performance of the model regardless of history used and at all forecast horizons.  
 
We do not report the results of the forecasting regressions for the other currency pairs 
here for the sake of brevity, since they reach the same conclusions, i.e. lack of 
significance for most coefficients and poor forecasting performance. RMSE ratio 
tables for all currency pairs and for both models (Micro 1 and Micro 2) can be found 
in Appendix D. 
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Table 4-4 – Micro 1 Forecasting Regressions: Aggregated Order Flow €/$ 
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Forecast 
Horizon:
1 1.004 1.048 1.037 1.092
2 1.007 1.042 1.042 1.032
3 1.010 1.008 1.047 1.090
4 1.014 1.014 1.053 0.998
5 1.017 1.016 1.052 0.983
6 - 1.027 1.095 0.997
7 - 1.047 1.121 0.989
8 - 1.030 1.067 0.999
9 - 1.033 1.059 0.991
10 - 1.043 1.083 1.020
11 - - 1.082 0.998
12 - - 1.137 1.024
13 - - 1.149 1.020
14 - - 1.196 1.063
15 - - 1.189 1.127
16 - - - 1.121
17 - - - 1.145
18 - - - 1.122
19 - - - 1.085
20 - - - 1.074
Currency: €/$
This table evaluates the Micro 1 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using total order flow -
using the RMSE ratio of the model to that of the random walk. A number below 1 (shown in
bold) would indicate the that model outperformed the random walk.
Micro 1 Model Forecast Evaluation
 
Table 4-5 – Micro 1 Forecast Evaluation – RMSE ratio to RW 
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Table 4-6 – Micro 2 Forecasting Regression Estimation (A) 
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Corporate (p-value) Unlevered (p-value) Levered (p-value) Other (p-value) R-Squared RMSE
10 Day
Horizon:
1 0.088 0.670 -0.053 0.875 0.589 0.130 -0.125 0.574 0.061 0.591
2 -0.041 0.872 -0.262 0.529 0.104 0.825 -0.384 0.160 0.045 0.928
3 0.366 0.230 0.104 0.835 -0.226 0.689 -0.117 0.719 0.036 1.169
4 0.243 0.494 0.201 0.729 -0.327 0.620 -0.073 0.847 0.017 1.306
5 0.503 0.161 -0.257 0.659 -0.119 0.857 -0.247 0.517 0.052 1.464
6 0.607 0.111 -0.476 0.442 0.506 0.471 -0.208 0.605 0.080 1.518
7 0.463 0.288 -0.978 0.172 0.862 0.287 -0.164 0.724 0.079 1.605
8 0.393 0.409 -0.344 0.659 0.630 0.477 -0.253 0.618 0.036 1.631
9 0.234 0.671 -1.208 0.184 0.568 0.580 0.230 0.697 0.045 1.972
10 0.058 0.920 -0.914 0.334 0.011 0.992 0.275 0.655 0.024 2.026
11 0.220 0.724 -0.846 0.409 -0.601 0.605 0.522 0.435 0.035 2.210
12 0.371 0.581 -0.937 0.396 -0.506 0.686 0.397 0.581 0.029 2.259
13 0.187 0.774 -1.081 0.314 -0.592 0.626 0.409 0.559 0.035 2.411
14 0.462 0.485 -0.699 0.519 -1.095 0.374 0.831 0.242 0.057 2.635
15 0.194 0.779 -0.854 0.452 -1.455 0.260 0.534 0.471 0.051 2.591
See footnote for Micro 2 Panel (A)
(Currency forecast: €/$)
Micro 2 Forecasting Regression Estimation (B)
 
Table 4-7 – Micro 2 Forecasting Regression Estimation (B) 
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Corporate (p-value) Unlevered (p-value) Levered (p-value) Other (p-value) R-Squared RMSE
15 Day
Horizon:
1 0.097 0.561 -0.232 0.417 0.188 0.603 0.114 0.505 0.050 0.815
2 0.179 0.202 -0.323 0.355 0.224 0.612 0.284 0.181 0.090 1.347
3 0.098 0.693 0.158 0.709 0.077 0.886 0.387 0.134 0.066 1.577
4 -0.016 0.957 -0.299 0.545 0.156 0.804 0.809 0.010 0.201 2.042
5 -0.053 0.885 -0.988 0.116 -0.095 0.903 0.815 0.034 0.200 2.103
6 0.038 0.930 -1.090 0.147 -0.205 0.828 0.521 0.247 0.102 1.900
7 0.164 0.736 -1.450 0.087 0.264 0.802 0.192 0.701 0.093 1.729
8 0.091 0.858 -1.160 0.185 0.018 0.987 0.092 0.860 0.052 1.810
9 0.037 0.949 -1.809 0.069 0.041 0.973 0.124 0.832 0.096 1.907
10 -0.323 0.561 -1.506 0.116 -0.184 0.878 0.087 0.879 0.088 2.193
11 -0.243 0.680 -1.560 0.126 0.568 0.656 0.212 0.726 0.089 2.352
12 -0.017 0.978 -2.069 0.050 -0.095 0.942 0.138 0.824 0.111 2.274
13 -0.121 0.846 -1.830 0.090 -0.137 0.919 0.518 0.419 0.109 2.547
14 0.323 0.608 -1.535 0.157 -0.808 0.553 0.483 0.455 0.080 2.521
15 0.034 0.958 -1.465 0.182 -1.039 0.453 0.282 0.667 0.070 2.395
16 0.208 0.754 -1.700 0.137 -0.933 0.516 0.131 0.847 0.071 2.474
17 0.223 0.742 -1.564 0.181 -0.643 0.662 -0.044 0.950 0.054 2.349
18 0.102 0.878 -1.848 0.108 -0.487 0.735 0.032 0.962 0.074 2.859
19 0.326 0.639 -1.789 0.137 -0.971 0.520 0.111 0.876 0.071 2.834
20 0.605 0.393 -2.221 0.071 -1.554 0.312 -0.074 0.919 0.115 2.899
See footnote for Micro 2 Panel (A)
Micro 2 Forecasting Regression Estimation (C)
(Currency forecast: €/$)
 
Table 4-8 – Micro 2 Forecasting Regression Estimation (C) 
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Forecast 
Horizon:
1 1.008 1.205 1.041 1.202
2 1.005 1.048 1.045 1.272
3 1.004 1.007 0.989 1.255
4 1.016 1.033 1.013 1.349
5 1.015 1.079 0.999 1.408
6 - 1.137 1.03 1.199
7 - 1.19 1.104 1.115
8 - 1.134 1.048 1.028
9 - 1.177 1.128 1.019
10 - 1.15 1.139 1.037
11 - - 1.167 1.113
12 - - 1.167 1.113
13 - - 1.216 1.354
14 - - 1.331 1.287
15 - - 1.29 1.373
16 - - - 1.224
17 - - - 1.141
18 - - - 1.174
19 - - - 1.15
20 - - - 1.14
Micro 2 Model Forecast Evaluation
Currency: €/$
This table evaluates the Micro 2 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using order flow
disaggregated by customer type - using the RMSE ratio of the model to that of the random 
walk. A number below 1 (shown in bold) would indicate the that model outperformed the RW.
 
Table 4-9 – Micro 2 Forecast Evaluation – RMSE ratio to RW 
 
4.5 Cross-Sectional Advantages of the RBS Data 
 
Since the RBS data gives information on six bilateral exchange rates between four currencies 
(euro, dollar, yen, pound), this allows for a more comprehensive analysis of inter-currency 
information content than is possible in the E&L (2005b) data that is limited to just the EUR_USD 
rate. It is a natural extension of the dispersed information model to relax the restriction that 
customer trades in one exchange rate should only contain information relevant to that exchange 
rate. A customer with information on the Yen who trades USD_JPY reveals information to that 
market directly, but could also be revealing information to the “related” EUR_JPY and GBP_JPY 
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markets through the Yen side of the deal, and the EUR_USD and USD_GBP markets through the 
USD side of the deal, and through these possibly even to seemingly unrelated markets like 
EUR_GBP. Evans and Lyons (2002b) use direct inter-dealer flows in a system of nine bilateral FX 
rates against the US dollar, and find that information relevant to one exchange rate is contained in 
order flows observed in other exchange rates. In addition, Marsh and MacDonald (2004) suggest 
that currencies can be forecast if a system of exchange rates are estimated together, rather than 
modelling them one by one. 
 
This leads to regressions of “related” exchange rates on Euro flows, Yen flows, Dollar flows and 
Pound flows. For example, the EUR_USD rate is regressed against Euro flows as well as against 
Dollar flows, first in contemporaneous form and then as forecasting regressions at various 
horizons. The contemporaneous regression specification is shown below: 
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Euro Flows Equation R= {€/$, €/¥, €/£} 
GBP Flows Equation R= {€/£, £/$, £/¥} 
USD Flows Equation R= {€/$, £/$, $/¥} 
JPY Flows Equation R= {€/¥, $/¥, £/¥} 
 
This less restrictive model allows changes in the euro-dollar rate for example to be affected not 
only by the flows observed in the euro-dollar market, but also by flows observed in the euro-yen 
and euro-pound market in the euro flows equation, and in the pound-dollar and dollar-yen markets 
in the dollar flows equation. Sample output from the euro-dollar regressions are presented in table 
4-10. All remaining output can be found in Appendix F. 
 
As we can see adding related flows improves the fit of the regression. Coefficients retain their 
significance and in most cases keep the same sign as in the bilateral regressions, i.e. coefficients on 
corporate flows are negative and coefficients on financial flows are positive. Exchange rates react 
to both ‘own’ and ‘related’ order flows as expected. 
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Table 4-10 – Cross-Currency OLS: Using ‘own’ and ‘related’ flows to model FX 
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Since the contemporaneous relationship is confirmed, the forecasting version of these 
regressions is then tested to see if forecasting performance improves by adding lagged 
order flows in related markets. Forecasting performance is evaluated using history 
h=1, 5, 10, 15 and forecast horizons for h=1 at 1 and 5 days ahead, for h=5 at 1, 5 and 
10 days ahead, for h=10 at 1, 5, 10 and 15 days ahead and for h=15 at 1, 5, 10, 15 and 
20 days ahead. The regression specification is shown below: 
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Euro Flows Equation R= {€/$, €/¥, €/£} 
GBP Flows Equation R= {€/£, £/$, £/¥} 
USD Flows Equation R= {€/$, £/$, $/¥} 
JPY Flows Equation R= {€/¥, $/¥, £/¥} 
 
Regression output is omitted for brevity but RMSE ratios are reported in Table 4-11 
and in Appendix G for all forecasting regressions. As in the bilateral forecasting 
exercise, coefficients lost all significance and there was no improvement in 
forecasting performance. RMSE ratios to the random walk model fall below one in a 
limited number of cases and in a random fashion, and as in the bilateral models we 
judge that even these results are no more than would arise simply by chance.  
 
4.6 Problems with RMSE? 
 
In the real world, forecasts are made for specific purposes, and as such conventional 
statistical measures of forecast accuracy may not be the most appropriate. A forecast 
is a tool that enables a decision maker to make better decisions. In the case of FX 
forecasts for example, it should enable traders to make better trading decisions. Since 
we know the purpose the forecast is to be used for, a method of forecast evaluation 
that takes this into account may be more relevant than statistical measures of accuracy 
of point forecasts. Leitch and Tanner (1991) make just such an argument. Using 
interest rate forecasts, which allowed them to easily calculate a profit measure, they 
argue that profitability and not the size of the forecast error or its squared value is a 
more appropriate test of forecast accuracy. They calculate the correlation between 
various forecast evaluation criteria – Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE), Average 
Absolute Error (AAE), Theil U Coefficient and Directional Ability (DA) – and profits 
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generated by using the forecasts, and find no relationship. “Regardless of the profit 
rule followed, there is little systematic relationship between profits and the 
conventional measures of forecast quality. The only conventional measure of forecast 
quality that is related to profits is directional accuracy, and it is infrequently used” 
Leitch and Tanner (1991). This result suggests that, in the event that profits are not 
directly observable, directional ability may serve as the best proxy, giving a more 
realistic evaluation of the usefulness of a forecasting model. 
4.6.1 Testing for Directional Ability 
 
Bearing this result in mind, we tested the forecasting ability of both the Micro 1 and 
Micro 2 models on the basis of directional ability. This was done very simply by 
taking the point forecasts from our models and comparing them to the actual realized 
changes in FX rates, but evaluating them only on the basis of direction, not 
magnitude. This allowed us to calculate a directional percent correct value for each 
model. Sample results for the euro-dollar Micro 2 model are shown in Table 4-12 
below, while all remaining directional ability tables can be found in Appendix D.  
 
Our results show us that even when we relax the requirement of the forecasting model 
to simply indicate the direction of the move if not the size, performance is still 
uniformly poor among all models for all currency pairs.  
 
4.7 Conditional Models – Order Flow as a Trading Signal 
 
Unwilling to give up on finding some forecasting power in the RBS order flows, we 
hypothesized that perhaps there was only forecasting power some of the time. To test 
this hypothesis we ran a number of conditional models, ranging from very simple to 
quite restrictive. While in the regression-based models we are assuming trading based 
on the forecasts generated every period, in this case trades are only triggered when a 
certain set of conditions is satisfied. We restricted ourselves to daily and 5 day 
frequencies as we continue to use non-overlapping windows to retain comparability 
with our previous results, and at longer histories we had very little trading triggered. 
We assume that a trader’s investment horizon is one day, so he will close out any 
positions triggered by the model at close of business without waiting for the model 
itself to give a sell signal for example. This is consistent with the model of trader 
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behaviour in Lyons (1998) where FX traders manage their positions to close flat each 
day. This also implies that in the conditional models we are focusing only on one day 
ahead forecasts. Also, we are again only trying to forecast direction, so each model is 
evaluated on the basis of simple percent correct values. 
 
Obviously the conditions we tested are only a small sample of the possible 
permutations we could use. Theoretically we could have run an algorithm on our 
estimation sample to pick out the best combination of conditions to forecast, variably 
weighting the importance of each customer groups’ order flow to create a set of 
conditions that produce optimal forecasts. This methodology, while it may have been 
successful, runs the risk of over-fitting the data, as well as raising issues of possible 
data mining. As such we chose to focus on a small set of conditions that follow on 
from the theory of order flow as a means of information aggregation, while allowing 
for heterogeneity in our customer base. The set of conditions chosen are summarized 
in Tables 4-13 and 4-14. 
 
Sample results for the Euro_USD models are shown in Tables 4-15 and 4-16, while 
summary results from all conditional models for all currency pairs are included in 
Appendix H. Unfortunately we find that in the vast majority of cases the percent 
correct value is around 50%, and in the more restrictive models where a number of 
conditions must be satisfied there is almost no trading. We are forced to conclude that 
there is little value added by using these conditional models to inform trading 
decisions. 
4.7.1 Testing for Profitability 
Lastly, we must of course acknowledge that, despite directional ability  being the only 
statistical measure of forecast accuracy that has been found to be related to 
profitability, directional ability and profitability are not the same thing. It is possible 
that even if the model has only a 50% directional accuracy, if it is accurately 
predicting large moves, or ‘tail’ events, the model could still be profitable. We test for 
profitability of the order flow forecasts from the disaggregated forecasting model 
using three very simple trading rules. The first model triggers a buy order if the model 
forecasts a positive change and a sell order otherwise. Positions are assumed to be 
closed at the end of the day. In the second model, buys and sells are triggered in the 
same way, but positions are accumulated until an opposite signal is given by the 
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model. The third model is similar to the second, but in this case positions are not 
accumulated but held until an opposite signal is given. All three models are tested on 
the out-of-sample data, and are also run based on signals given only by movements in 
the exchange rate itself rather than on flows. The results are summarised in table 4-17 
below. The results are mixed, both across currency pairs and across trading rules. For 
EUR_USD the results are dismal, with huge trading losses seen, particularly for 
model B. We note however that there is very infrequent trading in models B and C. 
This appears to be a peculiarity of the flows in this particular sample. Performance is 
also bad for USD_JPY with the exception of model B, but for the remaining 
currencies the strategies are profitable over our sample period. At the same time 
however we note that the mean profit hovers around zero in the majority of cases, and 
the volatility is huge. 
 
Ultimately, the profitability measure of forecasting ability is far more promising than 
any of our other measures. The trading rules chosen are unrealistically simple, but we 
chose these rules for transparency rather than applicability. We wanted a measure of 
profitability that was determined solely on the ability of the flows models to generate 
trading signals, and so purposely did not implement models that include stop-loss or 
take-profit rules based on volatility or on the level of profits or losses for example. 
We also intentionally omit other inputs to our trading models that are unrelated to 
flows, as we are seeking as pure a measure of profitability based on flows alone as 
possible. More sophisticated models could therefore conceivably be more successful, 
and intelligent stop-loss and take-profit levels should decrease the volatility, although 
they could also increase trading and thus transactions costs.  
 
The development of trading strategies based around order flows seems at least 
initially to be a promising avenue for further research and deserves more attention. 
We leave this for a subsequent paper however, as we are currently left with the huge 
disparity in statistical results between our results and the existing literature that is yet 
to be explained, and which will be the subject of the rest of this document.   
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Table 4-11 – Cross-Currency Forecast Evaluation (daily freq.) 
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History Used: 1 5 10 15
Forecast Horizon:
1
49.87 
(1.008)
44.59 
(1.205)
56.25 
(1.041)
43.75 
(1.202)
2
51.31 
(1.005)
40.54 
(1.048)
62.50 
(1.045)
50.00 
(1.272)
3
50.00 
(1.004)
55.41 
(1.007)
40.63 
(0.989)
37.50 
(1.255)
4
44.59 
(1.016)
48.65 
(1.033)
50.00 
(1.013)
50.00 
(1.349)
5
50.00 
(1.015)
47.30 
(1.079)
46.88 
(0.999)
56.25 
(1.408)
6
-
45.95 
(1.137)
43.75 
(1.030)
50.00 
(1.199)
7
-
52.70 
(1.190)
43.75 
(1.104)
50.00 
(1.115)
8
-
43.24 
(1.134)
34.38 
(1.048)
56.25 
(1.028)
9
-
50.00 
(1.177)
46.88 
(1.128)
56.25 
(1.019)
10
-
51.35 
(1.150)
40.63 
(1.139)
50.00 
(1.037)
11
- -
53.13 
(1.167)
62.50 
(1.113)
12
- -
46.88 
(1.167)
56.25 
(1.113)
13
- -
37.50 
(1.216)
50.00 
(1.354)
14
- -
37.50 
(1.331)
50.00 
(1.287)
15
- -
37.50 
(1.290)
43.75 
(1.373)
16
- - -
50.00 
(1.224)
17
- - -
56.25 
(1.141)
18
- - -
43.75 
(1.174)
19
- - -
43.75 
(1.150)
20
- - -
62.50 
(1.140)
directional ability. I.e. Can the model predict direction if not magnitude. 
Directional Ability (% correct) of Micro 2 Forecasting Model
(Currency Pair Forecast: €/$)
Note: Number in brackets is RMSE ratio of the Micro 2 model to the random walk model.
This table evaluates the Micro 2 Model (using disaggregated customer flows) on the basis of
 
Table 4-12 – Directional Ability of Micro 2 Model 
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Simple Conditional Rules
1 Follow leveraged customers If leveraged clients buy then buy
if leveraged clients sell then sell
2 Contrary to corporate customers If corporate clients buy then sell
If corporate clients sell then buy
3 Follow unleveraged customers If unleveraged clients buy then buy
If unleveraged clients sell then sell
4 Follow financial customers (levered and unlevered) If leveraged clients AND unleveraged clients buy then buy
If leveraged clients AND unleveraged clients sell then sell
5 Follow corporates If corporate clients buy then buy
If corporate clients sell then sell
6 Contrary to financials If leveraged clients buy AND unleveraged clients buy then sell
If leveraged clients sell and unleveraged clients sell then buy
7 Contrary to corporates AND Follow leveraged Order Flow
If corporate clients sell AND leveraged clients buy then buy
If corporate clients buy AND leveraged clients sell then sell
8
Contrary to corporates AND Follow Financial (levereged 
and unleveraged) Order Flow If corporate clients sell AND leveraged clients buy AND unleveraged clients buy then buy
If corporate clients buy AND leveraged clients sell AND unleveraged clients sell then sell
9
Contrary to corporates AND follow leveraged, 
unleveraged and other Order Flow
If corporate clients buy AND leveraged clients sell AND unleveraged clients sell AND others sell then 
sell
If corporate clients sell AND leveraged clients buy AND unleveraged clients buy AND others buy then 
buy
10 Contrary to corporates and others, follow financials If corporate clients sell and others sell AND leveraged clients buy and unleveraged clients buy then buy
If corporate clients buy and others buy AND leveraged clients sell and unleveraged clients sell then sell
Rules for Conditional Models
Simple Conditional
 
Table 4-13 – Rules for Simple Conditional Trading Models 
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Threshold conditional
i.e. artificial band created : orders larger than negative absolute mean and smaller than absolute mean do not trigger a trade.
Rules same as simple conditional but trade only triggered if absolute size of net OF is larger than absolute mean of estimation sample (e.g. first 500 days in daily).
FREQUENCY REFERS TO HOW MANY DAYS OF ORDER FLOW ARE USED TO DECIDE ON A TRADE:
Daily freq. - observe one day O.F. and forecast 1 day ahead
5 day freq. - observe 5 days O.F. and forecast 1 day ahead.
Rules same as simple conditional but trade only triggered if size of order flow is larger than mean (buy) or smaller than mean (sell)
Rules same as simple conditional but trade only triggered if size of order flow is larger than mean plus 1 st. dev. (buy) or 
smaller than mean minus 1 st. dev. (sell). Mean and standard deviation calculated over estimation sample (e.g. first 500 days in daily)
INVESTMENT HORIZON IS ONE DAY
4
5
3
Mean calculated over estimation sample (e.g. first 500 days in daily)
Rules for Conditional Models with Added Threshold
Rules same as simple conditional but trade only triggered if absolute size of net OF is larger than mean of estimation sample (e.g. first 500 days in daily).
2
i.e. artificial band created : orders larger than negative absolute value of mean and smaller than absolute value of mean do not trigger a trade.
 
Table 4-14 – Rules for Conditional Models with added Threshold 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Follow 
leveraged  
O.F.
Contrary to 
corporates
Follow 
unleveraged 
O.F.
Follow 
financials
Follow 
corporates
Contrary to 
financials
Contrary to 
corporates + 
Follow 
leveraged 
O.F.
Contrary to 
corporates + 
Follow financials
Contrary to 
corporates + 
Follow 
financials & 
others
Contrary to 
corporates & 
others + 
Follow 
financials
 
Trading days 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387
Trades Triggered 386 386 384 190 386 190 208 97 51 46
% correct 49.48 44.3 51.3 51.05 54.92 47.89 44.71 51.55 58.82 43.48
#BUYS: 112 156 44 18 23 18 48 6 4 0
#SELLS 103 23 59 18 156 18 9 1 1 0
TOTAL TRADES: 215 179 103 36 179 36 57 7 5 0
%correct: 51.63 45.81 47.57 41.67 53.63 55.56 47.37 28.57 40 NA
#BUYS: 194 273 138 69 87 93 144 53 31 22
#SELLS 177 87 183 93 273 69 46 20 9 11
TOTAL TRADES: 371 360 321 162 360 162 190 73 40 33
%correct: 49.87 45.56 49.84 51.85 53.89 46.91 46.32 52.05 57.5 45.45
Conditional 3 with mean over first 500 days of data as threshold value creating artificial band at + and - absolute value of mean.
Conditional Models - Summary Results (A)
(Currency : €/$ , Frequency : Daily)
Simple Conditional Model - No threshold
Conditional 2 with absolute mean over first 500 days of data as threshold value creating artificial band at + and - value of absolute mean.
 
Table 4-15 – Conditional Models – Summary Results (A) 
 87 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Follow 
leveraged  
O.F.
Contrary to 
corporates
Follow 
unleveraged 
O.F.
Follow 
financials
Follow 
corporates
Contrary to 
financials
Contrary to 
corporates + 
Follow 
leveraged 
O.F.
Contrary to 
corporates + 
Follow financials
Contrary to 
corporates + 
Follow 
financials & 
others
Contrary to 
corporates & 
others + 
Follow 
financials
Conditional 4 with mean over first 500 days of data as threshold value.
#BUYS: 194 273 204 110 114 99 144 86 48 38
#SELLS 193 114 183 99 273 110 64 27 13 14
TOTAL TRADES: 387 387 387 209 387 209 208 113 61 52
%correct: 49.87 45.48 50.65 50.72 53.75 48.33 46.15 49.56 54.1 44.23
#BUYS: 77 87 16 8 15 3 13 0 0 0
#SELLS 81 15 16 3 87 8 6 0 0 0
TOTAL TRADES: 158 102 32 11 102 11 19 0 0 0
%correct: 53.8 47.06 28.13 18.18 51.96 72.73 57.89 NA NA NA
(Currency : €/$ , Frequency : Daily)
Conditional 5 with mean +/- 1st. dev. over first 500 days of data as threshold values.
Conditional Models - Summary Results (B)
 
Table 4-16 – Conditional Models – Summary Results (B) 
   [A]        
1 day 
trading 
horizon
 [B]         
accumulate 
position and 
wait for 
opposite 
signal
 [C]         
BUY(SELL) 
on signal 
and HOLD 
until 
opposite 
signal is 
given
  [A]        
1 day 
trading 
horizon
 [B]         
accumulate 
position and 
wait for 
opposite 
signal
 [C]         
BUY(SELL) 
on signal 
and HOLD 
until 
opposite 
signal is 
given
EURUSD
Profit/Loss -1.37 -1085.22 -0.96 -4.75 9.16 -0.67
# take profits 
/ losses
381 4 4 381 133 132
Mean 0.00 -2.85 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00
SD 0.56 52.75 0.22 0.56 1.12 0.47
EURGBP
Profit/Loss 5.27 2.88 2.71 8.15 1.96 1.99
# take profits 
/ losses
384 23 23 383 125 123
Mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
SD 0.35 2.69 0.24 0.35 0.71 0.30
EURJPY
Profit/Loss 8.86 18.24 5.49 -2.14 -11.30 -0.79
# take profits 
/ losses
378 75 75 378 123 123
Mean 0.02 0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.00
SD 0.49 2.37 0.43 0.49 0.66 0.36
GBPUSD
Profit/Loss 4.69 69.27 5.01 -9.43 -4.12 -4.35
# take profits 
/ losses
378 39 39 381 129 128
Mean 0.01 0.20 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
SD 0.52 6.56 0.50 0.52 0.90 0.43
USDJPY
Profit/Loss -5.23 33.78 -9.03 0.78 0.43 -5.91
# take profits 
/ losses
381 88 87 381 132 132
Mean -0.01 0.09 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02
SD 0.55 2.38 0.41 0.55 0.94 0.44
are based only on the movement of the exchange rate.
This table shows the profit or loss realized when following each of 3 simple trading strategies. 
Evaluation of Forecasts Using a Profit Measure
The left hand panel trading signals are based on order flows, while the right hand panel signals
 
Table 4-17 - Forecasting Ability based on Profitability 
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4.8 Conclusion 
 
To briefly recap, in this study we have replicated and extended the Evans and Lyons 
(2005b) forecasting experiment using a new three and a half year customer order flow 
dataset from the RBS. We first confirmed that our data shared the same 
contemporaneous properties as the Citibank dataset by running a series of 
contemporaneous OLS regressions. Having shown that these results were broadly 
comparable to those obtained by Evans and Lyons, we proceeded to replicate the 
E&L (2005b) paper, running both their Micro 1 and Micro 2 models on our own data, 
using the same history and forecast horizons, but also including both intermediate and 
longer forecast horizons. We could not replicate their 20-day forecasting window 
since we have a slightly shorter dataset, but in all other respects we followed their 
methodology exactly.  
 
Our results however were not the same. Where E&L (2005b) found significant 
forecasting power at longer horizons using the Micro 1 model and at all horizons 
using the Micro 2 model, we found no forecasting power whatsoever in our data, 
regardless of model, history used or forecast horizon. This lack of forecasting power 
was the same across all six currency pairs we tested the models on. 
 
Building on MacDonald and Marsh (2004) who suggest that exchange rates can be 
forecast if they are modelled together as a system, and wanting to fully exploit the 
cross-sectional advantages of the RBS dataset, we attempt to forecast exchange rates 
using both ‘own’ and ‘related’ flows, after first confirming that a contemporaneous 
relationship exists. Although the contemporaneous relationship is strengthened by the 
addition of ‘related’ flows, forecasting performance is not improved. 
 
Wanting to give the models the benefit of the doubt, and drawing on a growing body 
of literature pointing out the limitations of RMSE as a means of forecast evaluation 
(Leitch and Tanner, 1991, Granger and Pesaran 2000) we proceeded to evaluate all 
models on the basis of their ability to predict direction. Again we found lack of 
forecasting power across the board.  
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Lastly, we hypothesize that a forecasting relationship may not always be present, i.e. 
order flows may not convey information all the time as is implicitly assumed in the 
regression based forecasts. Instead, we test a series of conditional models in which 
trades are only triggered if certain conditions are satisfied.  Once again we find no 
evidence of forecasting power in the RBS flows.  
 
In the FX literature, a result showing that FX rates cannot be forecast is, in and of 
itself, uninteresting. Considering the Evans and Lyons (2005b) result however, this 
complete lack of forecasting power in the RBS data which is, for all intents and 
purposes, the equivalent data to that of Citibank, and moreover as we have shown 
shares the same contemporaneous properties, is curious, and we are left to speculate 
on the reasons for this discrepancy. 
 
E&L (2006a) states that 1/3 of order flow’s power to forecast FX comes from flow’s 
ability to forecast future flow, with the remaining 2/3 coming from flow’s ability to 
act as a conduit for information aggregation, letting dealers know about customer 
expectations of future fundamentals. This is done by regressing returns on concurrent 
flows and using the fitted values from the regression to separate the return series into 
a flow explained part (the fitted values) and the flow-unrelated part (the regression 
residual). This allows us to determine whether flow tends to forecast the flow-
explained part of the return or the flow-unrelated part (Lyons, 2003). The E&L  
empirical analysis shows that both aggregated and disaggregated Citibank customer 
flows are significantly positively auto-correlated, as well as cross-correlated across 
customer types. These correlations increase with time horizon. “Estimated 
autocorrelation coefficients are small but many are positive and highly statistically 
significant. These statistical patterns are repeated at the weekly and monthly 
frequency… At the daily frequency correlations between flow segments are small, but 
at the monthly frequency they range from approximately -0.95 to 0.95” (E&L 2005c). 
This is a statistical property of the Citibank data that RBS flows do not share, despite 
being the same type of data. 
 
Appendices B9-B12 show autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation coefficients for 
net order flows in all currency pairs and for all customer types. The results for RBS 
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autocorrelation are mixed. Although most series show no evidence of autocorrelation, 
some are autocorrelated to a limited extent. Namely EUR_JPY corporate, other 
financial and total order flow, EUR_GBP other financial and total order flow, 
EUR_USD corporate and other financial, and USD_JPY unleveraged financials and 
total order flow. Even in the cases where there is autocorrelation however, 
coefficients are small and there does not seem to be any discernible pattern in positive 
and negative coefficients. As flows are aggregated over longer time horizons, the 
number of order flow series that are autocorrelated decreases, with the notable 
exception of the EUR_USD order flows. Once again coefficients are small and 
alternate between positive and negative.  
 
Sections B13-B16 in the Appendix shows the cross-correlations between the RBS 
order flows of the four customer types in each currency pair. Order flows from 
different customer types are not typically highly correlated. The exception is flows 
from other financials, which in some cases are significantly negatively correlated with 
flows from other customer types. Note particularly the cross-correlation between 
other financials and unleveraged financials in the GBP_JPY market. Aggregating 
order flows over time does not seem to consistently affect the properties of the data 
and correlations remain low apart from the other financials category. 
 
 As the RBS data does not exhibit the significant positive autocorrelation of the 
Citibank data, we are obviously missing the 1/3 of forecasting power that comes from 
flows forecasting future flows. This takes us part of the way towards answering the 
question of why we find absolutely no forecasting power in RBS flows, but a 
significant 2/3 forecasting power still remains unaccounted for. Our results indicate 
that RBS flows do not forecast news, or put differently do not convey information 
about customers’ expectations of future fundamentals. We suggest two explanations 
for this. First we must at least consider the possibility that RBS flows simply do not 
have any information content. This seems unlikely, especially considering the results 
of the contemporaneous regressions, and it would also be hard to explain such a 
fundamental difference in the customer base of two otherwise relatively comparable 
banks. Alternatively, particularly considering that the Evans and Lyons data runs only 
up to 1999 and our RBS data spans the more recent 2002 – 2006 time period, a very 
plausible explanation is that information from order flows is being priced into the 
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market too quickly, so we are not able to capture any forecasting power at the daily 
frequency and beyond. The high-frequency properties of customer order flow will be 
the topic of the next chapters. 
 
In conclusion, the results of our study seem to indicate that, though striking, the 
Evans and Lyons results deserve a second look. The complete lack of forecasting 
power of the RBS flows brings into question not necessarily the validity of the E&L 
(2005b) findings, but how generaliseable they are. Irrespective of the reasons for the 
failure of the RBS flows to forecast exchange rates, the fact remains that an inability 
to replicate the Evans and Lyons result with an equivalent dataset, points to the 
possibility that their findings may be specific to the Citibank data.  
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5 The Pricing of Customer Transactions in the FX Market 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The complete lack of forecasting power in our daily order flow data described in the 
previous section indicates a number of possibilities for future research. One possible 
explanation for the inability of flows to forecast spot FX is that the information in the 
order flows is being priced in too quickly, so at daily and lower frequencies we are 
seeing no power to forecast. We propose to investigate this possibility by increasing 
the focus to intraday FX movements.  
 
Although trading in the euro-dollar pair alone averages over $840 billion per day (BIS 
2007) – over 10 times daily trading on all NYSE stocks – the details of the overall 
price discovery process remain largely unspecified. This chapter investigates the price 
discovery process in the foreign exchange market using a unique tick-by-tick dataset 
from a leading European Bank. 
 
The very heterogeneous nature of the market participants and their objectives when 
entering into currency transactions is the major reason for the hypothesis that order 
flow from different customer types will have different price impact. The fact that not 
all participants in the FX market base their trading decisions on the objective of profit 
maximization may make it possible for specialized portfolio managers to generate 
positive returns from managing currencies actively. It also implies that order flow 
from precisely this type of customer may have more value due to its information 
content. Previous literature such as Osler et al (2006a) suggests that dealers are 
willing to “pay” for informed order flow by quoting narrower bid-ask spreads.  
 
Microstructure theory, which is based mainly on studies of the equity market, tells us 
that the spreads quoted by dealers are functions of four components: (i) adverse 
selection, i.e. protection against potentially informed customers, (ii) inventory costs, 
(iii) fixed costs or order processing costs and (iv) monopoly power. Fixed costs are 
generally modelled as a constant and the monopoly power component is not relevant 
in a competitive market such as the FX market. (Osler et al, 2006) Asymmetric 
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information and inventory costs are the components of spread that we are most 
interested in. A dealer should widen spreads to protect himself against trades from 
informed customers – spreads increase with trade size. Larger trades also mean that 
the dealer takes on more risk by holding onto large positions that will need to be 
managed. This again implies that spreads should increase with trade size. 
 
However, price discovery in the FX market does not operate in the way predicted by 
the standard adverse selection theory of spreads. In fact, empirical evidence suggests 
that a dealer who does observe large volumes of customer order flow covets the 
information in large trades so would be willing to pay for this information by quoting 
narrower spreads for large trades. Adverse selection theory posits that the exact 
opposite should happen, however conversations with dealers suggest that this 
mechanism more closely reflects the realities of spreads in FX trading.  
 
Due to the opaque nature of decentralized foreign exchange markets, a dealer’s order 
flow clearly represents private information. Thus, FX dealers are not uninformed 
market makers as in Kyle (1985), and may exploit this private information for future 
trades in the interdealer market. Alternatively, the trader may consider order flow 
information when quoting future spreads in the customer market, which is intensively 
investigated in the microstructure literature (eg. Huang and Stoll, 1997; Madhavan 
and Smidt, 1991). Independently of the dealer’s decision on which market segment to 
choose in order to benefit from his private information, the logic of information 
aggregation in FX implies that customer order flow will consistently be more 
important in the determination of exchange rates than interdealer flow (Sager and 
Taylor, 2005). Indeed, Lyons (1995), Ito et al. (1998), and Bjønnes and Rime (2001) 
find that customer order flow is the primary source of private information in the FX 
market. Given that dealers maintain relationships with a broad range of different 
customers such as corporations, asset management firms, hedge funds, central banks, 
etc, it is natural to ask which group of customers provides the order flow that contains 
significant information (Evans and Lyons, 2005a). 
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5.2 Description of the Data  
 
We have access to data from a major European commercial bank that wishes to 
remain anonymous, describing every trade that took place through the banks’ own 
electronic trading platforms in Euro-Dollar over 25 trading days from October 10
th
 to 
November 11
th
 2005. This data include both customer orders and interdealer orders 
initiated by the counterparty. That is, the data excludes all deals initiated by the bank 
supplying the data, and all customer orders that were not routed through the bank’s 
electronic platform. Conversations with dealers suggest that non-electronic orders are 
only a small proportion of the total customer orders, so their exclusion should not 
have much impact. Counterparties are identified by a code, and we have the size of 
each trade, as well as the price and exact time at which it was executed. Although we 
cannot see the identity of individual counterparties, the codes allow us to differentiate 
between types of counterparty, which we break down into the following categories:  
corporate customers, financial customers, i.e. asset managers, interbank 
counterparties, and internal.  
 
Each trade record contains the following information: (1) currency pair, (2) date and 
time stamp of the trade, (3) direction, (4) transaction price, (5) market clearing price 
from EBS, (6) deal size, and (7) counterparty. Incoming trades are generally initiated 
by customers for whom the dealer will always be the supplier of liquidity, however, 
in interbank trades the dealer may also provide liquidity to other dealers. Consistent 
with existing literature, order flow variables are calculated from the perspective of the 
deal initiator, implying that customers’ buy orders have a positive sign, and sell 
orders have a negative sign. All overnight changes are removed from the sample, so 
that any price effects are related only to intraday order flow. In addition, any 
‘suspicious’ entries, such as trades with a dealt price entirely inconsistent with the 
market price which would indicate data entry error were deleted, as were trades with a 
settlement date shorter than two days as these orders are priced differently.  
 
This dataset is similar to other proprietary datasets used in Lyons (1995) and Bjonnes 
and Rime (2005), however it is unique in that it gives us the opportunity to examine 
pricing behaviour at a major FX dealing bank that sees a great deal of customer order 
flow. This contrasts sharply with the Lyons (1995) dealer who sees no customer order 
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flow and must continually shade his prices to induce interbank trades. In addition to 
this difference, our data sample is significantly longer than both Lyons (1995) and 
Bjonnes and Rime (2005) who analyze only 5 days of data. Although our sample is 
shorter than that of Osler et al (2006a) who analyze 87 days of trading of one dealer 
in euro-dollar, and Reitz et al (2007) who analyze 251 days of trading, our bank sees 
considerably higher transaction volume - 27,830 transactions (€100.1 billion) in 25 
days compared to 3,600 transactions (€4.3 billion) in 87 days and 11,830 transactions 
(€12.1) billion in 254 days for Osler et al and Reitz et al respectively. Perhaps the 
most significant advantage of our dataset however stems from the composition of our 
bank’s customer base, with 32% of transactions coming from financial customers, 
compared to only 5% of financial customer flow for Osler et al and 1.6% for Reitz et 
al. Bjonnes and Rime (2005) only differentiate between customer trades and 
interbank trades. The differences between our dataset and those of the two most 
comparable datasets from Osler et al and Reitz et al are summarized in Table 5-1 
below. 
Study Days Year Transactions Volume FinancialCorporate Interbank
(billions)
Own data 25 2005 27,830          € 100.10 32.00% 9.30% 51.90%
Osler et al (2006) 87 2001 3,600            € 4.30 5.00% 42.00% 44.00%
Reitz et all (2007) 251 2002 / 03 11,830          € 12.10 1.60% 44.00% 49.00%
This table summarizes some of the main characteristics of our high-frequency dataset, particularly how 
it compares to the two most similar datasets that have been studied in the literature.
Data Comparison with Similar Studies
 
Table 5-1 – Comparison of data features 
 
One drawback of our dataset is that it does not contain outgoing deals, i.e. deals 
initiated by the bank itself, so we cannot calculate the bank’s inventory position. 
However, Bjonnes and Rime (2005), Osler et al (2006a) and Reitz et al (2007) find no 
evidence of inventory control through dealers’ own prices. To understand the lack of 
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any price effect from inventory, it is important to remember the multiple dealer 
structure of the market. In a single dealer structure, such as the one in the Madhavan 
and Smidt (1991) model, which is described in detail in section 5.3.1, the dealer must 
wait for the next order to arrive. His only possibility for inventory adjustment is to 
shade his quotes to attract orders. On the other hand, in the hybrid structure of the FX 
market, inventory-based price shading has declined in importance since the 
introduction of electronic brokers. Using the interbank market to unload/manage 
inventory is both cheaper and faster than price shading. FX dealers also do not use 
currency options, futures or forward markets to hedge risk, finding it cheaper to use 
the interdealer spot market. (Fan and Lyons, 2002) In light of this therefore, we do 
not consider the lack of inventory data to be a major problem.  
 
Figure 5-1 below shows the tick-by-tick dealt €/$ rate for all the transactions that took 
place in this currency pair over the 25 trading days between 10/10/2005 and 
11/11/2005. For much of the sample no particular trend seems apparent, although in 
the last one-third there is a definite downward trend in the exchange rate. 
 
Figure 5-1 – Dealt price (€/$) 10/10/2005 – 11/11/2005 
 
The following section examines some of the characteristics of the data in more detail, 
breaking down the trading activity seen both in terms of transactions and by volume. 
Figures 5-2 and 5-3 show the bank’s cumulative Euro position over the sample period 
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in aggregate and broken down into individual counterparties respectively, in keeping 
with the hypothesis of heterogeneity among customer groups. 
 
 
Figure 5-2 - Bank’s Cumulative € position 10/10/2005 – 11/11/2005 
 
Figure 5-3 - Bank’s Cumulative € position by Counterparty Type 
 
Table 5-2 summarises the trading activity of our bank by number of transactions as 
well as by volume. The bank clearly sees a great deal of order flow from all 
counterparty types, with a large percentage as expected coming from interbank trades. 
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Order volume is very volatile, with large standard deviations seen. Interbank orders 
have a far smaller standard deviation, again as would be expected with a higher 
degree of standardization of order size for interbank trades. Interestingly, corporate 
flows are significantly larger on average than the trades of all other counterparties. 
Although the largest individual orders seen are from financial customers, the average 
corporate order is almost twice as large as the average financial order. It is also 
indicative that corporate orders make up only 9.28% of total flow in terms of number 
of transactions, but make up 19.50% of total volume seen, a difference that is also 
illustrated in Figures 5-4 and 5-5. This is in sharp contrast to the Reitz et al bank that 
sees a large number of corporate orders, but whose mean trade size is only 
approximately 20% of the mean trade size across all counterparties.  
 
Financials Corporates Internal Interbank Total
Transactions 8,898         2,584         1,905         14,443       27,830        
Per Trading Day 355.92       103.36       76.20         577.72       1,113.20     
Percent 31.97% 9.28% 6.85% 51.90% 100.00%
Net Flow (€  million) 534.84       88.00         -1445.38 384.02       -438.52
Volume (€  million) 34,555.07   18,479.44   8,927.60    37,123.33   100,085.44 
Average (€  million) 3.88           7.54           4.69           2.57           3.60            
St. Deviation 9.48           14.97         12.63         4.00           8.42            
Mode (€  million) 1.00           1.00           1.00           1.00           1.00            
Median (€  million) 2.00           2.52           2.00           1.00           2.00            
Minimum  (€  million) 0.50           0.50           0.50           0.50           0.50            
Maximum  (€  million) 500.00       228.64       220.00       137.28       500.00        
Percent by Volume 34.50% 19.50% 8.90% 37.10% 100.00%
volume. Descriptive statistics of volume of trading seen are given both in aggregate and broken 
down by counterparty.
Trading Activity of a Large European Bank
25 trading days - 10/10/2005 - 11/11/2005
This table summarises the trading activity of a major European Bank by transactions as well as by  
 
Table 5-2 – Summary of trading activity of a large European Bank 
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Figure 5-4 Transactions by Counterparty Type 
Pie-chart showing number of transactions by counterparty type seen over                    
the 25 trading days between 10/10/2005 and 11/11/2005 
 
 
 
Figure 5-5 – Counterparty Breakdown by Volume 
Pie-chart showing the volume of transactions attributable to each           
counterparty type over the 25 trading days between 10/10/2005 and              
11/11/2005 
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5.3 Price Impact of Order Flow – Theoretical Models 
 
Having examined the properties of our data, we proceed to describe the two 
theoretical models of price formation we will be using – the Madhavan-Smidt model, 
and the Huang-Stoll model.  
5.3.1 The Madhavan and Smidt (1991) Model  
 
 A Bayesian model of intraday price formation 
 
The Madhavan-Smidt (MS) model is standard in transactions-based studies in FX 
(Lyons 1995; Bjonnes and Rime 2005; Osler et al 2006). The model assumes a 
representative dealer in a competitive market whose counterparty has private 
information about the asset’s fundamental value. Agents are fully rational, and there 
is a detailed information setting. In this section we will examine the derivation of the 
MS model. 
 
The market microstructure literature has identified three mechanisms through which 
order flow can generate price movements. (i) Transaction costs produce ‘bid-ask 
bounce’ as buy and sell orders arrive randomly. (ii) Inventory carrying costs create 
incentives for market makers to shade their prices in order to manage their 
inventories. (iii) The existence of traders with private information implies that 
rational market makers adjust their beliefs, and hence prices, in response to order 
flow. Both the inventory effect and the information asymmetry effect predict that 
prices will move in the direction of order flow, although for different reasons. 
 
In the MS model, prices change when new public information reaches the market, as 
well as in response to trading. In the case of a public news announcement, prices can 
change without any trades occurring. Alternatively, the process of trading itself can 
cause price movement. The idea underlying the measure of information asymmetry in 
the MS model is simple. If a representative market maker uses Bayesian rules to 
update his beliefs, then the expected value of the stock can be represented as a 
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combination of the prior mean – representing public information – and the noisy 
signal regarding private information contained in order flow. 
 
Order flow conveys a noisy signal to market makers because of the heterogeneous 
nature of market participants. Some traders have private information about the asset 
value, while other traders deal for liquidity purposes. The weight placed on prior 
beliefs provides a natural measure of the degree of information asymmetry in the 
market. If order flow is uninformative, because the ratio of public to private 
information is small, the weight will be close to unity. Conversely, with severe 
information asymmetries, the market makers beliefs are very sensitive to order flow, 
therefore the weight placed on prior beliefs will be negligible. Madhavan and Smidt 
derive an estimating equation from which the weight the dealer places on the 
information content of order flow can be estimated, therefore enabling us to directly 
measure information asymmetry. The model also allows us to evaluate the relative 
importance of information asymmetry and inventory control in the price formation 
process, and provides a method of assessing the implicit costs of trading. 
5.3.2 The model framework: 
Madhavan and Smidt assume a multi-period model with two assets: a riskless bond 
and a stock which is traded at times t=1,2,…,T. In each period, given the quoted bid 
and ask prices of the market maker, the trader decides whether and how much to 
trade. Following the trade the market maker can revise his quotes based on new 
information. 
 
The time T price of the risky asset,  ?v , is composed of a series of zero mean iid 
increments or innovations, so that  
  
?v = d
i
i=0
T?
 (5.1) 
 
The increment d
t
is realized immediately after trading in period t, and the 
announcements of the increments represent the flow of information signals over time. 
Given a sequence of increments d
0
,....,d
t
, the value of the risky asset is v
t
= d
t
i=0
t? . 
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However at time t just before 
 
?d
t
 is realized, v
t
 is a random variable, 
 
?v
t
. In the 
absence of transaction costs or private information, the price would be modeled as a 
martingale, i.e. using p
t
to denote the price at time t, E p
t+1
p
t
?? ?? = pt . 
 
In reality, microstructure effects will cause prices to deviate from expected values. 
Inventory effects for example cause the market maker to adjust his pricing policy 
depending on the current level of his inventory. Intuitively, the market maker will 
raise or lower his prices to attract trades that will return his inventory position to a 
desired level. In inventory control models, the price set by Dealer i ( P
it
), is linearly 
related to the dealer’s conditional expectation about the true value µ
it
, and current 
inventory measured at the beginning of the period, I
it  
 
 P
it
= µ
it
? ? (I
it
? I
it
*
) +?D
t
 (5.2) 
 
I
it
*  is Dealer i’s desired inventory level, which is assumed to be constant, and the 
inventory response effect, ?  is negative to capture ‘‘quote shading’’.  A non-zero 
coefficient ?  suggests price shading, which would mean that the dealer changes 
prices in response to undesired inventory.  The term D
t
 is a direction dummy that 
takes the value +1 if Dealer i sells (trades at the ask) and -1 if Dealer i buys (trades at 
the bid). The constant ?  can be interpreted as compensation for per share execution 
costs, although it may also reflect price discreteness.  
5.3.3 The evolution of market maker beliefs 
Equation 5.2 cannot be estimated as we cannot observe µ
it
 - the market maker’s 
beliefs. Therefore in order to obtain a testable model, it is necessary to first describe 
the evolution of the market maker’s beliefs.  We assume that just before time t, all 
agents observe a noisy public information signal 
 
?y
t
concerning the value of the 
increment d
t
 at time t. The asset’s value at time t-1 is public information at time t, 
and 
 
?y
t
 can be expressed as: 
 
 
?y
t
= v
t
+ ?
t
?
t
? N(0,? ?2 )
 (5.3) 
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The dealer’s distribution over the asset’s value v
t
 is therefore Normal with mean 
y
t
and variance ? ?2 . 
 
The trader also receives a private signal, 
 
?w
t
 about the value of the asset, which takes 
the form: 
 
 
?w
t
= v
t
+ ??
t
??
t
? N(0,??2 )
 (5.4) 
 
Since the trader’s prior distribution of 
 
?v
t
, and the private signal is also drawn from a 
normal distribution, the posterior mean is given by: 
 
 
m
t
= ?w
t
+ (1??)y
t
? = ? ?2 (? ?2 +??2 )
 (5.5) 
 
The trader’s order quantity Q jt is a linear function of the perceived mispricing 
( m jt ? Pit ) and x jt  which is an idiosyncratic shock that represents liquidity trading: 
 
 Q jt = ?(m jt ? Pit ) ? x jt  (5.6) 
 
Here m jt  is agent j ’s expectation of the true currency value conditional on the public 
signal as well as his private signal. If traders have mean-variance utility functions, 
then equation 5.6 represents the optimal demand of the trader given the price-setting 
behavior of the market maker. 
 
The demand equation enables the market maker to extract information from Dealer j’s 
trade using Bayes’ rule, hence private information effects enter the pricing equation 
through the conditional expectation term µit. The price set by the dealer is regret-free 
in the sense that it reflects the dealer’s expectations conditional on the information as 
to whether the calling agent is buying or selling foreign currency. The trader’s 
liquidity shock is private information, so x
t
is regarded as the realization of the iid 
N(0,?
x
2
)  random variable 
 
?x
t
. Since the liquidity component of trade x
t
is not known 
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to the dealer, order flow conveys a noisy signal about the asset’s fundamental value, 
with the statistic  
 
 
 
?v(Qt ) ? ? pt +Qt ??(1??)yt??  (5.7) 
 
Substituting (5.5) and (5.6) and rearranging gives us: 
 
 
 
vˆ(Q
t
) = v
t
+?
t
? (??)?1x
t
vˆ(Q
t
) ? N(v
t
,?
s
2
)
where ?
s
2
= ??2 + (? x2 /?? )2
 (5.8) 
 
The Bayesian updating rule yields the dealer’s posterior mean, 
 
 
µt = ?yt + (1?? )vˆ(Qt )
where ? ? ? s2 / (? ?2 +? s2 ) is a constant
 (5.9) 
 
The posterior mean can be re-written using equation (5.7) as: 
 
 
µt = ? yt + (1? ? )(pt +? ?1Qt )
where ? ? (? +? ?1) /?
? ?(0,1)
 (5.10) 
 
Equation (5.10) shows that the posterior mean can be represented as a weighted 
average of prior information and the signal conveyed by order flow. The parameter 
? is the weight placed on prior beliefs. 
 
5.3.4 Information asymmetry and the parameter ?  
Expressing ?  using the definitions of ? and ?  shows us that the weight ? is 
inversely related to the degree of information asymmetry in the market: 
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 ? = 1? ? ?
2
? ?2 + (? x2 /? )2 (1+??2 /? ?2 )  (5.11) 
 
Expressing ? in this form clearly shows that ? is an increasing function of 3 
variables: 
 
The volume of liquidity trading (?
x
2 ) 
The imprecision of private information (??2 ) 
The accuracy of public information (? ??2 ) 
 
As such we need an econometric model whose parameter estimates can be used to 
infer the weight ? . 
 
Substituting the equation for the posterior mean (5.9) into the standard inventory 
control model (5.2), yields an equation that explicitly incorporates the effect of order 
flow Q on market maker beliefs µ
t
through Bayes’ rule: 
 
 pt = ? yt + (1? ? ) pt +? ?1Qt?? ?? ? ? (It ? Id ) +?Dt  (5.12) 
 
Since the variable y
t
representing dealer’s prior mean at time t is unobservable, it is 
necessary to find a proxy for the unobservable prior beliefs based on the previous 
price after adjusting for transaction costs and inventory effects. Using the inventory 
control model we write the prior mean as: 
 
 
yt = pt?1 + ? (It?1 ? Id ) ??Dt?1 +?t
where ?t ? yt ? µt?1  (5.13) 
 
The prior and posterior means differ because of public information signals, therefore 
?
t
represents the innovation in the dealer’s conditional expectations of the security’s 
value. This innovation cannot be predicted ex ante and is the source of the error term 
in the model. 
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5.3.5 The Econometric Model 
Substituting the proxy for prior beliefs into equation (5.12) yields the econometric 
model relating the change in price from trade to trade to current and lagged variables 
related to order flow. 
 
?pt =? + ?Qt ? ??
?
??
?
?? It + ? It?1 +
?
?
?
??
?
?? Dt ??Dt?1 +?t
where ?pt ? pt ? pt?1
? ? ?? (1?1 / ? )Id
? ? (1? ? ) / (?? )
 (5.14) 
 
Lambda captures the responsiveness of price to order flow, i.e the information effect, 
but the estimate of the weight ? also gives a measure of the significance of 
asymmetric information in price formation. Although (5.14) is a linear function of the 
independent variables, it must be noted that the econometric model is a nonlinear 
function of the parameters ? ,? ,? ,?, I
d
. Furthermore, the term ?
t
cannot be observed 
and is interpreted as the error term in the regression equation. 
5.3.6 Error Structure 
We can explicitly derive the properties of the error structure in the model. If the 
model is perfectly specified then errors represent unanticipated news events, so the R-
squared measures the percentage contribution of public information shocks to price 
variance, while 1-R
2
 measures the percentage of price volatility generated by trading. 
Using the definitions of the prior and posterior means and equation (5.8) for vˆ(Q
t?1)  
we see that 
 
 
?
t
= ?
t
???
t?1 + ut
where u
t
 is defined as:
u
t
= (v
t
? v
t?1) ? (1?? ) ? t?1 ? (??)?1xt?1?? ??
 (5.15) 
 
Under the assumptions about the stochastic process followed by innovations, 
 
E ?v
t
v
t?1?? ?? = vt?1 . By assumption,  E ?xt , ?xt '[ ] = E ?? t , ?? t '[ ] = 0?t ? t ' ,which coupled 
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with the martingale property of vˆ
t
implies that 
 
E ?u
t[ ] = 0,E ?ut ?ut?1[ ] = 0 . Taking 
expectations in (5.15) and using the martingale property yields: 
 
 
 
E ??
t[ ] = 0
E ??
t
??
t?1[ ] = ??? ?2
 (5.16) 
 
Therefore the error structure can be explicitly shown to follow an MA(1) process. 
Actually, ?
t
is composed of two moving average processes: the first MA process 
given by ?
t
???
t?1has parameter ? , and the second MA process is the one associated 
with u
t
, which (trivially) has a zero MA parameter.  
5.3.7 The Huang and Stoll (1997) Model  
 
 A Generalized Trade Indicator Model 
 
In the MS model, information costs increase with trade size. Although not obvious, 
this can be a natural assumption in a typical dealer market with bilateral trades. In a 
limit order-based market, however, it is less clear that trade size will affect 
information costs. For instance, in these systems it is Dealer i (submitter of the limit 
order) that determines trade size. A large market order may thus be executed against 
several limit orders. However, the dealer submitting a limit order must still consider 
the possibility that another dealer (or other dealers) trade at his quotes for 
informational reasons. Furthermore, on the electronic brokers, which represent the 
most transparent trading channel, only the direction of trade is observed at the 
market-wide level. In the baseline Huang-Stoll (HS) model, by assumption, it is the 
direction and not the size of the trade that is important. Hence, here Q equals Dt. As 
informed traders’ profits would surely decrease in the presence of learning dealers, 
there is a strong incentive to camouflage private information by splitting up orders 
into a number of (smaller) standardized transactions. Thus, dealers have lost a source 
of information and the trade direction is the remaining variable to capture the price 
impact of asymmetric information. In this section we will examine the derivation of 
the HS model. 
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The objective of the baseline HS model is to construct a basic trade indicator model 
of spread components. A distinguishing characteristic of trade indicator models is that 
they are driven solely by direction of trade, a characteristic that may make them 
ideally suited to studies of the FX market as noted above.   
5.3.8 The Basic Model 
In the basic HS framework, the unobservable fundamental value of the asset in the 
absence of transaction costs, V
t
, is determined just prior to posting bid and ask quotes 
at time t. The quote midpoint, M
t
, is calculated form the bid and ask quotes that 
prevail just before a transaction. The price of the transaction at time t is denoted P
t
, 
and the trade indicator variable D
t
is defined as before according to the initiator of the 
trade. The unobservable V
t
is modelled as: 
 
 V
t
= V
t?1 +? S
2
D
t?1 + ?t  (5.17) 
 
where S is the constant spread, ? is the percentage of the half-spread due to adverse 
selection, and ?
t
is the serially uncorrelated public information shock. Equation (5.17) 
is of course a hypothetical construct, however we do observe the midpoint of the bid-
ask spread. Inventory theories postulate that liquidity suppliers adjust the quote 
midpoint relative to fundamental value on the basis of accumulated inventory, in 
other words they shade their quotes to manage inventory. Under these models, the 
midpoint is related to fundamental value according to: 
 
 
M
t
= V
t
+ ? S
2
I
i
i=1
t?1?
 (5.18) 
where ? is the proportion of the half-spread due to inventory holding costs, and 
I
i
i=1
t?1? is the cumulated inventory until time t-1. In the absence of inventory holding 
costs, there would be a one-to-one mapping between the midpoint and the 
fundamental value.  
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The first difference of equation (5.18) combined with equation (5.17) implies that 
quotes adjust to reflect information revealed by the last trade as well as inventory cost 
of the last trade as follows: 
 
 ?M
t
= (? + ?) S
2
D
t?1 + ?t  (5.19) 
 
There is also a constant spread assumption, which is specified as: 
 
 P
t
= M
t
+
S
2
D
t
+?
t
 (5.20) 
where the error term captures the difference between the observed half-spread 
Pt ? M t and the constant half-spread, and includes rounding errors due to price 
discreteness.  
 
5.3.9 The Econometric Model 
Combining equations (5.19) and (5.20) yields the basic regression model: 
 
 
?P
t
=
S
2
(D
t
? D
t?1) + ? S
2
D
t?1 + et
where ?=?+?
and e
t
= ?
t
+ ??
t
 (5.21) 
 
This indicator variable model is a nonlinear equation with within-equation 
constraints, whose only determinant is the indicator variable D. The model provides 
estimates of the traded spread, S, and the total adjustment of quotes to trades, 
?(S / 2) . We can estimate the portion of the half-spread not due to adverse 
information or inventory as 1? ? , which can be considered as an estimate of order 
processing costs. It is impossible to separate the adjustment due to adverse selection 
(? ) and that due to inventory (? ) based on (5.21) alone. Given the multiple dealer 
structure of the FX market which makes it easy for dealers to manage inventory using 
the interbank market, coupled with the findings in the literature by Bjonnes and Rime 
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(2005), Osler et al (2006a) and Reitz et al (2007) who find no evidence of inventory 
control through price shading as discussed in a previous section, we can assume that 
? is a reasonable estimate of adjustment due to information. 
 
5.4 Empirical Results 
5.4.1 Estimating the Madhavan and Smidt Model 
 
As a starting point, we estimate the Madhavan and Smidt (1991) (MS) model, 
because, as described in sections 5.3.1 – 5.3.7, its structural equations are consistent 
with agents’ optimizing behavior and an informational setup is explicitly provided 
applying Bayesian expectations. The MS model is structural in the sense that the 
equations are consistent with those of optimizing models, they have an explicit 
informational setting, and agents’ expectations are formed by Bayes’ rule. 
 
To recap, in the Madhavan-Smidt framework, the econometric model relating the 
change in price from trade to trade to current and lagged variables related to order 
flow is as follows: 
 
?pt =? + ?Qt ? ??
?
??
?
?? It + ? It?1 +
?
?
?
??
?
?? Dt ??Dt?1 +?t
where ?pt ? pt ? pt?1
? ? ?? (1?1 / ? )Id
? ? (1? ? ) / (?? )
 (5.22) 
 
Lambda captures the responsiveness of price to order flow, i.e the information effect, 
but the estimate of the weight ?  also gives a measure of the significance of 
asymmetric information in price formation. Although (5.22) is a linear function of the 
independent variables, the econometric model is a nonlinear function of the 
parameters ? ,? ,? ,?, I
d
. Furthermore, the term ?
t
cannot be observed and is 
interpreted as the error term in the regression equation, explicitly modelled as an 
MA(1) process. 
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The empirical exchange rate equation that results from the MS model is as follows:  
  
  
?P
t
= ?
0
+ ?
1
Q
t
+ ?
2
D
t
+ ?
3
D
t?1 + ?4 It + ?5It?1 +?t
?
t
= ?
t
?? ?
t?1  (5.23) 
 
where ?P
t
is the change in the exchange rate between two incoming trades. The dealer 
is assumed to manage existing inventories by shading prices so that : 
 
 ?
4
< 0 < ?
5
 (5.24) 
 
Moreover, the model of anonymous currency trading predicts an asymmetric 
information effect on prices (?
1
> 0 ), because the dealer rationally infers the agent’s 
private signal about the true asset value from deal size. Lastly, the structure of the 
model expects the dummy coefficients to satisfy: 
 
 
?
3
< 0 < ?
2
and
?
2
> ?
3
 (5.25) 
 
the difference between the absolute values of the coefficients increasing in line with 
the information content of the deal flow. Thus, calculating the ratio ?
3
?
2
 gives us 
an estimate of the average weight put on prior information. The absolute value of the 
estimated coefficient of the lagged direction dummy ( ?
3
) gives us the average half 
spread. 
5.4.2 The Baseline Madhavan-Smidt Model 
We estimate the MS model with the inventory terms omitted, as we do not have 
inventory information in our dataset, making our regression specification: 
 
  
?P
t
= ?
0
+ ?
1
Q
t
+ ?
2
D
t
+ ?
3
D
t?1 +?t
?
t
= ?
t
?? ?
t?1  (5.26) 
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Essentially we are estimating the model with the assumption that ?
4
= ?
5
= 0 , an 
assumption that is borne out by previous studies as previously mentioned. All models 
are estimated using non-linear least squares, explicitly modelling an MA(1) error 
structure, and correcting for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of unknown form 
using the Newey-West correction.  
 
The results of the baseline Madhavan-Smidt model are presented in Table 5-3 below. 
Total order flow consists of the order flow from financial, corporate and internal 
customers. Interbank deals are estimated separately as counterparties with access to 
the interbank market would not be considered as customers, and would likely have a 
different price function. The coefficient on order flow is positive as expected, but not 
statistically significant. From equation (5.22) the coefficient on order flow 
corresponds to lambda (? ? (1? ? ) /?? ). Lambda captures the information effect, i.e. 
the responsiveness of price to order quantity, although estimates of lambda capture 
the effects of costs that vary with order size. If lambda is statistically zero, this 
implies either that alpha (i.e. cost) is very large, and/or that ? ? 1 . In the FX market 
very high costs are unrealistic, leading us to conclude that ? ? 1 , i.e. there is no 
information content in order flow. Coefficients on the directional and lagged 
directional variables are of the expected sign and are statistically significant. 
However, we would expect that ?
2
> ?
3
? ?? ?? . This is a necessary condition in 
order for ? ?(0,1)  which is not the case here, a result that is confirmed by a Wald test 
with a p-value of 0.0001. The baseline model is clearly misspecified, but insofar as 
any conclusions can be reached, it suggests that there is no price impact and therefore 
no perceived information in total customer order flow.  There is strong evidence that 
the error structure does indeed follow an MA(1) process, as the moving average 
parameter is of the correct sign and highly significant. Estimating the model without 
explicitly modelling the error structure results in a significant loss of explanatory 
power.  
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Table 5-3 – Baseline Madhavan-Smidt Model 
 
This result is not entirely unexpected. We know that different participants in the FX 
market trade for distinct reasons, and as such, aggregating the order flow from 
heterogeneous groups of customers is likely to blur any possible information content. 
Dealers may also react differently to different sized trades, and the perceived 
information content of trades at different times during the trading day may vary. To 
investigate variations in dealer behavior, we estimate the MS model including 
dummies for deal size, counterparty type, deal size and counterparty type, as well as a 
model incorporating counterparty type, time of day and a dummy variable to capture 
any effects due to FX relevant news announcements. The table of size cutoffs and 
news announcements is included in the appendix. As in the baseline case, all models 
are estimated using Newey-West correction for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. 
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5.4.3 Its not the size that counts… 
To investigate the possibility that dealers react differently to different sized orders, we 
interact the variables in equation (5.26) with size dummies. 
 
 
 
 
?Pt = ?0 + qi  ?1Qt + ?2Dt + ?3Dt?1[ ]
i=1
4? +?t
?t = ?t ?? ?t?1
q1?(0,1]     q3?(4,10)
q2 ?(1, 4]     q4 ?[10,?)
 (5.27) 
 
 
The results of this model, summarized in Table 5-4, are largely insignificant. Where 
coefficients are significant, their interpretation is counterintuitive. For example in the 
case of the modal size group (q1), the coefficient on order flow is negative and 
significant. Recall that this is the estimate of lambda, which from equation (5.14) is 
? ? (1? ? ) /?? . A negative lambda implies negative costs and/or ? > 1 , both of 
which are impossible. Coefficients on the directional and lagged directional variables 
are of the expected sign and are statistically significant for this size category, and 
?
2
> ?
3
, which would suggest information content, but we cannot reconcile this 
result with the negative coefficient on order flow. Results are similarly mixed for the 
remaining size categories, and we conclude that the model is again misspecified.   
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Table 5-4 – Madhavan-Smidt Model with Size Dummies 
 
5.4.4 …its who you’re trading with 
Once again, the results of the size specific model are not surprising, considering the 
fact that in FX, players with any informational advantage are likely to break up their 
orders to avoid the possibility of revealing any information. Counterparty type on the 
other hand is a distinction that should make a difference. As previously noted, 
different players trade FX for distinct reasons, so their trades could be expected to 
have different price impacts. Previous FX microstructure literature also supports this 
differentiation on the basis of customer type (Lyons 2001, Marsh and O’Rourke 
2005).   
 
To investigate this hypothesis at the transaction level, we estimate equation (5.26) 
again, this time interacting the variables of the MS model with dummies for the three 
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counterparty categories – financial, corporate and internal customers.  The results are 
shown in Table 5-5 below. The model specification is as follows: 
 
 
 
?P
t
= ?0 + CPi  ?1Qt + ?2Dt + ?3Dt?1[ ]
i=1
3? +?t
?
t
= ?
t
?? ?
t?1
CP1 - Financial;  CP2 - Corporate;  CP3 - Internal
 (5.28) 
 
The results of this model are interesting if initially unexpected. Traditionally in the 
FX microstructure literature it is the financial customers who are considered to have 
superior information. This hypothesis is intuitively appealing since hedge funds and 
financial institutions trade currencies with the primary objective of achieving 
speculative gains, so the trades of these customers should contain information. The 
results of the counterparty specific MS model do not support this idea however. The 
coefficient on order flow is positive but insignificant, and the coefficients on the 
directional and lagged directional variable are of the correct sign, but ?
2
< ?
3
which 
would suggest ? > 1which is impossible.  
 
Looking at the results for corporate customers however, although the coefficient on 
order flow is not statistically different from zero, the coefficients on D
t
and D
t?1 are 
of the correct sign and magnitude. Since the MS model is based on a rational market-
maker who sets regret-free prices, so that all adjustments are made in anticipation of a 
trade, if there is lagged price adjustment the estimates of the information effect ? may 
be understated. The estimate of ?  from the directional variables is a ‘cleaner’ 
estimate. We can conclude therefore that there is information content in corporate 
customer order flow.  
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Table 5-5 – Madhavan-Smidt Model with Counterparty Dummies. 
 
This is not as counterintuitive as one might at first believe. Corporate clients trade 
currencies for reasons directly related to the firm’s core business activities. If order 
flow is the medium through which information about the macro economy makes its 
way into FX prices, then it is precisely the trades of corporate clients that in aggregate 
contain this information. Furthermore, even within the class of financial customers, 
traditional asset managers’ currency transactions also tend not to be driven by 
currency forecasts. Since we cannot further differentiate within the class of financial 
customers, it is harder to pick out whose trades could possibly contain information. 
Within the class of corporate customers we do not have this problem, and in fact 
aggregating corporate orders may enhance rather than degrade the picture we can get 
from order flow, since macro numbers such as GDP are essentially made up of all the 
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aggregate actions of corporations. As a final consideration, even if we accept that 
hedge fund managers are the smartest guys in town, and that their trades should 
contain information, they are more likely than corporate clients to split their trades 
among multiple dealers so as not to reveal their strategies, and are also likely to have 
access to services such as EBS Prime, which allow them greater anonymity. It will 
not generally be possible for a dealer, who can only see his own order flow, to 
differentiate between a hedge fund purchasing currency to initiate, or to close out a 
position – two scenarios with different implications for currency movements. 
Corporate clients on the other hand tend to maintain relationships with banks for all 
their business activities, and since they are not primarily at least trading for 
speculative gain, they have far less reason to try to hide their trades.  
5.4.5 Disaggregating further  
Given the results for the counterparty-specific regression we then disaggregate the 
data further hoping to determine whether order flow from certain counterparties is 
perceived to be more or less informative depending on the size of the trade or 
depending on the time at which the trade is placed. One model is run interacting the 
MS variables with counterparty and size dummies, and another interacting the MS 
variables with time-of-day and counterparty dummies, as well as a dummy for FX-
related news announcements. The results of these two models are included in 
appendix K. Further disaggregation did not uncover any information content in the 
trades of financial or internal customers. For corporate trades however, the models 
show that very large trades of over €10M are perceived to be informative, as well as 
trades taking place between 14:00 and 16:00 and around news announcements.   
5.4.6 Robustness Checks 
All models were run including interbank orders in the initial database, as well as 
dropping internal customers from the initial database. This involves actually 
removing internal orders and recalculating price changes from trade to trade and 
setting the directional and lagged directional dummies, not simply dropping the 
variables from the regression. Neither change affects the results significantly. The 
time of day regression was also run without disaggregating by customer type to 
investigate the possibility that aggregate order flow is perceived to be informative 
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depending on the time the trade is placed. The model was found to be misspecified, so 
results are omitted for brevity. In addition, given the sensitivity of OLS estimation to 
outliers, all models were re-estimated with observations with large changes in price 
(50 pips, 20 pips, 10 pips) both dropped and Winsorized. There was no change in 
inference so the output of these estimations is not reported. 
 
5.4.7 Estimating the Huang and Stoll Model 
 
The results concerning the importance of deal size from the Madhavan-Smidt 
regressions, consistent with the results reported in Osler et al. (2006a) and Bjønnes 
and Rime (2005), suggest that deal size is relatively unimportant for pricing in foreign 
exchange markets. As discussed in section 5.3.7, this may be due to traders’ response 
to the strategy of dealers inferring information from order flow (Huang and Stoll, 
1997). Having verified this in our data, we proceed to estimate the Huang-Stoll (HS) 
model. As before HAC standard errors are used to correct for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation.  The econometric model in the Huang-Stoll framework is: 
 
 ?P
t
=
S
2
(D
t
? D
t?1) + ? S
2
D
t?1 + et  (5.29) 
 
The model provides estimates of the traded spread, S, and the total adjustment of 
quotes to trades, ?(S / 2) . We recall that ? represents the adjustment due to adverse 
selection (? ) as well as any adjustment due to inventory (? ).  Although we cannot 
separate ? into its components, given the multiple dealer structure of the FX market 
which makes it easy for dealers to manage inventory using the interbank market, 
coupled with the findings in the literature that inventory control through price shading 
is not a feature of FX dealers, we can assume that ? is a reasonable estimate of 
adjustment due to information. 
5.4.8 The Baseline Huang-Stoll Model 
As with the Madhavan-Smidt model we initially estimate the baseline case with total 
aggregated order flow. The regression specification is as follows: 
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?P
t
= ?
1
(D
t
? D
t?1) + ?2Dt?1 + et
where ?
1
:=
S
2
and ?
2
:= ? S
2
 (5.30) 
 
Results are presented in Table 5-6 below. Both coefficients are significant, and the 
model suggests a negative adjustment of quotes to trades. This would indicate that our 
dealer, faced with a buy order for example, would adjust his quotes downward. The 
simple model is not likely to be correctly specified given that we have already 
established a difference in the impact of different customer categories. We therefore 
interact the variables in equation (5.29) with counterparty dummies for financial and 
corporate customers, as well as dummies for time of day and news announcements. 
These results are examined in the following two sections. 
 
 
 
Table 5-6 – Baseline Huang-Stoll Model 
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5.4.9 Huang-Stoll Model with Counterparty Dummies 
In this variation of the baseline HS model we interact the variables with counterparty 
dummies for financial and corporate customers, which based on the results of the MS 
models are the two categories we are most interested in. The model is run including 
all four counterparty categories with no statistically significant difference in the 
result. The model to be estimated is as follows: 
 
 
?Pt = CPi
i=1
2? ?1(Dt ? Dt?1) + ?2Dt?1[ ]+ et
CP1 - Financial
CP2 - Corporate
 (5.31) 
 
We note that by specifying the model in this way we are allowing the spread to vary 
among customer categories as well as the adjustment of the quote due to information 
(i.e. ? ). This less restrictive version of the model seems to fit better with the 
hypothesis that spreads do vary in reality among customer types. Results of the 
counterparty specific model are summarised in Table 5-7. 
 
The results are very interesting for the corporate customer category, but the model 
seems to be badly specified for financial customers. The estimate of the half-spread 
for financials is statistically zero, though even if we were to take the coefficient of 
0.0749 as the estimate, this would imply that the half-spread for corporate customers, 
at 0.6755, is an order of magnitude larger, a conclusion that does not seem 
reasonable.  Given these results we can make no inference about the information 
content of financial orders.  In the case of corporate order flow on the other hand, the 
results are very encouraging, almost exactly matching the Madhavan-Smidt outcome. 
The estimate of ?  - i.e. the adjustment of the quote due to information, for corporate 
customers is 47%. In the equivalent Madhavan-Smidt model the average weight put 
on order flow information from corporates is estimated at 50% (with the other 50% 
being the weight put on prior information).  We note however that the two models are 
not entirely consistent, as the estimated half-spread is quite different – HS estimating 
it at 0.6755 pips for corporates, while the equivalent MS estimate is 0.2841 pips. This 
is not an insignificant difference, but we recognize that the two models are 
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sufficiently different – chiefly in the complete absence of a size effect in the HS 
model – to make this less of a concern. We now proceed to disaggregate further to 
look at differences within the trading day. 
 
 
Table 5-7 – Huang-Stoll Model with Counterparty Dummies 
 
 
5.4.10 Huang-Stoll Model with Counterparty, Time of Day and News Dummies 
In this second variation of the baseline HS model we interact the variables with 
counterparty dummies for financial and corporate customers, but also with dummies 
for six 2-hour periods during the day, to account for any differences in the perceived 
information content of trades at different times. In addition we include a dummy for 
FX specific news announcements, to test whether trades are considered to be more or 
less informative around news releases.  
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The model estimated is as follows: 
 
 
?Pt = TD jCPi
i=1
2? ?1(Dt ? Dt?1) + ?2Dt?1[ ]+ et
j=1
7?
CP1 - Financial;     CP2 - Corporate
TD1 - 06:00 - 08:00;     TD2 - 08:00 - 10:00
TD3 - 10:00 - 12:00;     TD4 - 12:00 - 14:00
TD5 - 14:00 - 16:00;     TD6 - 16:00 - 18:00
TD7 - News
 (5.32) 
 
 
Results are summarized in Table 5-8. Disaggregating further does not ‘rescue’ the 
specification for financial customers. The adjustment coefficients on financial trades 
are negative where they are significant, although most results are statistically zero. 
We are forced to conclude again that the model is not well specified for financial 
customers.  
 
The results for corporate trades are once more very encouraging. They have positive 
and significant adjustment coefficients, with one exception very early in the morning. 
We address this discrepancy first, by looking at the breakdown of trading activity by 
each customer type during each 2-hour window within the trading day. A summary 
can be found in Tables 5-10 and 5-11. We see that in the case of corporate orders, the 
time period from 06:00 – 08:00 is not an active one, with only 102 trades occurring 
over the 25 days. This would correspond to only about 4 trades per day in this time 
period, and may account for the wrongly signed coefficients in the Huang-Stoll 
model. In the remaining intervals, the biggest discrepancy with the Madhavan-Smidt 
results is for the interval 08:00 – 10:00. In the MS model, although the coefficients 
were of the correct sign, only the coefficient on the directional variable was 
significant. Calculating the weight placed on order flow information regardless would 
give us an estimate of 72%, compared to the HS ? of 82%. In the 14:00 – 16:00 
interval, which is significant in the MS model, giving an estimated weight put on 
information of 25%, the corresponding HS estimate is 30%. In this case it is the HS 
?
2
 that has the expected sign but is not statistically significant.  
  125
 
Both models find corporate flow to be informative around news announcements, with 
47% and 35% adjustment due to information assigned by MS and HS respectively, 
again with the caveat that the HS ?
2
has the expected sign but is not statistically 
significant. The section of the MS model with counterparty, time and news dummies 
corresponding to corporate customers only is reproduced in Table 5-9 below for 
comparison. 
 
The Huang-Stoll models therefore broadly support the conclusions reached using the 
Madhavan-Smidt models. We cannot confirm the MS result that assigns 41% weight 
to information in very large corporate trades using the HS model, as it disregards size 
by construction. In all other cases however, there are strong indications from both 
models that there is information in corporate trades. The results for financial trades on 
the other hand are, at best, inconclusive. 
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Table 5-8 – HS model with Counterparty, Time and News Dummies 
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Table 5-9 – MS Model with Counterparty, Time and News Dummies 
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Corporate Financial Internal Interbank All
06:00 - 07:59 102 494 96 797 1489
* 3.95% 5.55% 5.04% 5.52% 5.35%
** 6.85% 33.18% 6.45% 53.53% 100.00%
08:00 - 09:59 493 1928 390 3199 6010
19.08% 21.67% 20.47% 22.15% 21.60%
8.20% 32.08% 6.49% 53.23% 100.00%
10:00 - 11:59 410 1844 350 2876 5480
15.87% 20.72% 18.37% 19.91% 19.69%
7.48% 33.65% 6.39% 52.48% 100.00%
12:00 - 13:59 602 2008 443 3341 6394
23.30% 22.57% 23.25% 23.13% 22.98%
9.42% 31.40% 6.93% 52.25% 100.00%
14:00 - 15:59 728 2178 505 3473 6884
28.17% 24.48% 26.51% 24.05% 24.74%
10.58% 31.64% 7.34% 50.45% 100.00%
16:00 - 17:59 249 446 121 757 1573
9.64% 5.01% 6.35% 5.24% 5.65%
15.83% 28.35% 7.69% 48.12% 100.00%
Total (06:00 -
18:00): 2584 8898 1905 14443 27830
(over the 25 day data sample)
Number of transactions per 2-hour window within the trading day
* percentage of total flow from customer category
** percentage of total flow from all customers in the 2-hour window
 
Table 5-10 – Number of transactions per 2-hour window 
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Corporate Financial Internal Interbank All
06:00 - 07:59
* 5.9443 4.6818 5.7089 2.3962 3.6111
** (15.31) (19.49) (22.33) (3.72) (13.55)
*** 0.85 - 140.00 0.5 - 400.00 0.5 - 220.00 0.5 - 54.00 0.5 - 400.00
08:00 - 09:59
7.7642 3.5525 3.3952 2.4584 3.3054
(14.36) (5.69) (5.05) (3.74) (6.20)
0.5 - 115.85 0.5 - 75.00 0.5 - 50.00 0.5 - 100.00 0.5 - 115.85
10:00 - 11:59
7.3958 3.8236 3.3301 2.5859 3.4098
(12.00) (6.44) (5.11) (3.61) (5.90)
0.5 - 67.00 0.5 - 100.00 0.5 - 50.00 0.5 - 50.00 0.5 - 100.00
12:00 - 13:59
8.1759 3.7459 7.4691 2.6594 3.8532
(19.20) (6.17) (21.86) (4.59) (9.71)
0.5 - 228.64 0.5 - 100.00 0.6 - 197.99 0.5 - 137.28 0.5 - 228.64
14:00 - 15:59
7.3156 3.6107 3.645 2.6158 3.5031
(12.75) (5.46) (3.99) (4.14) (6.20)
0.5 - 128.20 0.5 - 96.00 0.5 - 50.00 0.5 - 101.78 0.5 - 128.20
16:00 - 17:59
7.0903 6.6286 6.1183 2.5657 4.7072
(14.58) (27.11 (9.70) (3.30) (16.09)
0.5 - 105.97 0.5 - 500.00 0.5 - 68.00 0.65 - 35.00 0.5 - 500.00
Total: 7.5385 3.8834 4.6864 2.5703 3.5963
(06:00 - 18:00) (14.97) (9.48) (12.63) (4.00) (8.42)
0.5 - 228.64 0.5 - 500.00 0.5 - 220.00 0.5 - 137.28 0.5 - 500.00
* Average
** Standard Deviation
*** Range
(over the 25 day data sample, in € million)
Descriptive Statistics (volume) per 2-hour window within the trading day
 
Table 5-11 – Descriptive statistics (volume) per 2-hour window 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have looked at a unique, ultra-high-frequency, large volume 
customer order flow database from a leading commercial bank. The dataset, while 
relatively short in time span, is significantly rich in volume, number and counterparty 
balance. We use this database in conjunction with two standard market microstructure 
models in order to gain an insight into the information content of customer order 
flow. 
 
The first model is the one by Madhavan and Smidt (1991). In its basic form, the 
model does not differentiate between trades in any way. All trades are considered to 
be the same, irrespective of the size of the trade, or what type of counterparty initiated 
it. The model can easily be extended however to allow for customer heterogeneity in 
these dimensions. Our results suggest that these extensions are important. In 
particular, while we are unable to find any evidence of information content from 
financial customer order flow, however partitioned, we find strong evidence that large 
corporate customer order flows are perceived to have statistically and economically 
significant information content. 
 
The second model, by Huang and Stoll, does not admit differences in size by 
construction. It is a less structural model, with fewer assumptions made about the 
particular trading mechanism, possibly making it more suitable for the FX market. 
Nevertheless, it too indicates that corporate order flow can contain meaningful 
information content.  
 
These results are in fairly stark contrast to the literature, where it is usually found that 
the information content in flows comes from financial customers. We have several 
explanations for this.  Firstly, we find that the information content in our data is 
concentrated in large corporate customer orders, i.e. orders greater than €10 million. 
Previous work has relied on transactions seen by much smaller banks than ours, 
where such deals are few and far between at best. For example, in the Reitz et al data, 
although approximately 44% of transactions seen are from corporate customers, the 
mean corporate order size is only €0.2 million. In fact, in their dataset, large orders 
are defined as orders larger than €0.5 million.   
  131
 
The informativeness of corporate flow therefore could have been missed in the 
existing literature simply because of a lack of data. This does not explain the lack of 
information in financial flows in our data however.  
 
One reason for the lack of any clear result from the financial customer trades may 
well be related to the time period from which our data comes. The original Evans and 
Lyons Citibank data is from the late 90’s, and the Osler et al data and Reitz et al data 
are from 2001 and 2002/03 respectively. Our data sample  - in late 2005 – may not 
seem to be that far removed, but in the FX market the last decade has been a time of 
tremendous change. In fact, the very change that spawned the field by making 
transactions data available – electronic trading – has caused an ongoing revolution of 
sorts in how FX is traded. FX has also established itself quite firmly as an asset class 
in its own right, a change that is likely to have further increased investor 
heterogeneity, and blurred the distinctions between different investor categories. As 
an example, global corporates with enough resources in their financial department to 
be directly trading in FX could be considered to have more in common with financial 
customers than corporates simply executing international trades. Heterogeneity is a 
major concept in the microstructure literature – market participants are active in FX 
for disparate reasons with different needs and ways to conduct transactions. Advances 
in technology and investor demand have meant that platforms are developing 
functionalities that meet their customer segment requirements. In the financials 
category there is a large degree of heterogeneity within the group itself, and the type 
of financial customer whose trades were assumed to carry information – large hedge 
funds, quantitative trading firms and active currency managers – increasingly have 
access to the interbank market directly as both EBS and Reuters provide prime 
brokerage services to large buy-side institutions. These changes mean that it is much 
more difficult to extract clear signals from financial trades. 
 
Furthermore, even though we do see substantial order flow, it is reasonable for 
financial customers with any informational advantage to try to hide this from the 
relatively sophisticated dealers at our bank. One indication of this is the apparent 
order splitting in the financials group. Very few orders are greater than €10 million – 
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less than 10% in fact, and about 40% of financial orders are for €1 million. Appendix 
I gives a breakdown of orders falling into various size groups by customer type.  
 
Nevertheless, we recognize the limitations of our analysis in this chapter, perhaps 
most importantly our lack of dealer’s inventory. The existing literature suggests that 
this is not a major issue because inventory effects are negligible. However, as argued 
above, much of the existing literature is based on data from small/medium-sized 
banks. It is conceivable that large corporate orders, which are driving our results, 
have an inventory effect that we are wrongly ascribing to information content.  Still, 
we take heart from the Lyons results, which also reveal no inventory effect from a 
large bank. 
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6 Information Content vs. Feedback Trading 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The results of the previous chapter show that there is no evidence of impact of 
customer trades on dealer quotes, and what little impact there is comes from corporate 
customers. In this chapter, we turn our attention to the relationship between customer 
flows seen by one bank, and market clearing prices. We aim to use the high-
frequency dataset to determine the causality in this relationship, i.e. is there 
meaningful information in the trades of customers that can forecast subsequent price 
moves, or is it that price moves themselves are providing the incentive to trade that 
results in order flow? 
6.2 Price Impact of Flows on Market Prices 
 
Microstructure theory suggests that trades carry information and hence have 
permanent effects on prices. The information content of these trades is normally 
quantified by examining their price impact. The greater the cumulated effect, or 
impulse response, the more information trades are argued to carry. To the extent that 
perhaps there is information content in the flows seen by our bank’s dealers, but it is 
getting impounded in market prices via dealer trades in the interbank market rather 
than by quote revisions, we estimate the price impact models used by Ito and 
Hashimoto (2006), matching the trades to the EBS market clearing rate rather than the 
dealt rate.  
6.2.1 Ito and Hashimoto (2006) 
 
Ito and Hashimoto (2006) use interbank data to examine the forecasting power of 
order flow. The data used in their analysis is extracted from EBS, and  spans the 
period from January 1999 to October 2003. The data includes all quotes and trades on 
the platform in EUR/USD and USD/JPY. Berger et al. (2005) also examine the 
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correlations between order flows and exchange rate movement on EBS at various 
time aggregations: 1 minute, 5 minutes, 10 minutes, 1 hour, and 1 day, and find 
strong positive association of order flows and exchange rate changes, i.e. buying 
pressure is associated with rising prices. They find that the contemporaneous 
relationship weakens as the time horizon increases. Despite the positive 
contemporaneous price impact of order flow, Berger et al. (2005) argue that there is 
little evidence for predictability, namely lagged trades impacting on the price change 
in the next minute.   
 
Ito and Hashimoto (2006) find that order flows resulting in buying pressure or selling 
pressure do move the exchange rate, and the effect is strong up to, at least, the 
following 5 minutes. The predictability is already very weak at 15 minutes, and 
predictability definitely disappears by 30 minutes. To test exactly how long the 
predictive power persists, the lagged effects of flows on price changes are measured 
cumulatively, to see how long order flow information remains valuable.  To this end, 
the following specification is estimated at a 1-minute frequency: 
  
 
 
?s
t
= ? + ?
i
x
t? i
i=1
30? + ?t
where ?s
t
 :=  log return
and x
t? i:= order flow
 (6.1) 
 
This specification therefore examines the cumulative effect of order flows on 
exchange rate changes. Price impact is defined as ?i
i=0
p? , and in this case price impact 
is calculated up to 30 minutes. Results show that overall, the contemporaneous price 
impact is small but positive, the past one minute impact is the largest and then the 
cumulative price impact gradually decreases. Repeating the experiment for every year 
in the sample however they find that the duration of positively significant returns 
following order flows is getting shorter recently. In fact, for EURUSD, the price 
impact becomes significantly negative in recent years.  
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6.2.2 Estimating the Price Impact Model 
 
Following the same methodology, we estimate the following model for each customer 
category in our dataset.  
 
 
?s
t
= ? + ?
i
x
t? i
i=1
30? + ?t  (6.2) 
 
Including the contemporaneous effect (i.e. lag 0) implies that causality runs strictly 
from flows to the exchange rate. Since we cannot confirm this assumption, and to 
avoid endogeneity issues we omit lag 0 in our estimation. The results for corporate 
and financial customers are plotted in Figure 6-1 and Figure 6-2 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 6-1 – Price Impact Plot for Corporate Trades 
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Figure 6-2 – Price Impact Plot for Financial Trades 
 
 
Once again, we see a striking difference between the two customer categories. In the 
case of corporate trades, we see a positive price impact that stabilizes after 20-25 
minutes. For financials on the other hand there is a very small initial positive impact, 
but then the price impact becomes negative, dying out to zero within about half an 
hour. A negative price impact from financial trades seems counterintuitive and is hard 
to explain, however the ‘long-term’ impact here is really zero.  
 
These results appear consistent with the models of the previous chapter, suggesting 
that there is some information in corporate flows that is having a permanent impact 
on the market-clearing rate. We must introduce some important caveats here however. 
First, there is a distinction to be made between our study and the Ito and Hashimoto 
(2006) study; Ito and Hashimoto are looking at the whole market – albeit the 
interbank market. Our data represents one section of the market – the orders seen by 
one bank. This introduces a certain amount of difficulty interpreting price-impact 
from these regressions. Even Deutsche Bank – the largest FX dealing bank in the 
Euromoney 2009 survey - only sees a fraction of total order flow (20.96%), and as 
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such, customer flows may be representative of the flows seen by other large dealers, 
but they do not represent the means through which information gets impounded in 
prices. Customer order flows are one factor driving interdealer flows, which in turn 
are also a source of information to dealers if we recall the model of trading introduced 
in chapter 3.  
 
Furthermore, we don’t know what the transmission mechanism is from this bank 
receiving a customer order and the interbank market price. We know from the 
literature that the bank would not alter its quotes for fear of revealing private 
information to the market. We also know that this bank, due to the high volume of 
customer orders it sees, can attempt to offset customer trades without recourse to the 
interbank market.  
 
The previous chapter suggests that some orders – specifically very large orders over 
€10 million from corporates – have the expected positive impact on the bank’s quoted 
price. This price however refers to the price quoted to customers, which is not 
necessarily the same as that quoted on the interbank market. To determine whether 
the price quoted to customers is significantly different to interbank prices we compare 
the two and find that the average absolute deviation is only 1.27 pips. A plot of the 
market price and the dealt price can be seen in Figure 6-3 below, and we can see that 
the two series track extremely closely. 
 
Figure 6-3 – Dealt Price vs. Market Price  
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There seems to be some evidence of price impact of flows on prices, but the picture is 
still not quite clear. In the following section, we proceed to estimate the relationship 
in the opposite direction, to investigate the impact of price changes on customer 
trades. 
 
6.3 Feedback Trading  
 
A significant unresolved issue in the Micro FX literature, is the relationship between 
flows and exchange rates is the direction of causality. It is difficult to determine with 
certainty whether order flow leads spot FX changes or whether it is changes in spot 
rates that are themselves inducing order flow. Using this high frequency flows data, 
we can now attempt to resolve the question of whether the contemporaneous 
relationship between flows and exchange rates is due to information or simply due to 
feedback trading. 
 
Danielsson and Love (2006) examine the spot USD/EUR (US dollar per euro) foreign 
exchange market and compare the price impact/informativeness of order flow shocks 
with and without feedback trading. Their results suggest that positive feedback 
trading is present in the spot USD/EUR market and significant at high frequencies. 
Intra-minute feedback trading is significant but not large, possibly because of the time 
it takes for traders to react to the price movements. 
 
The existence and profitability of feedback trading strategies has been considered in a 
number of papers. De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) build a model 
of feedback trading with rational speculators who will buy (sell) when the price rises 
(falls). The profitability of a number of feedback trading strategies in stock markets is 
considered in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and the existence of high frequency 
positive feedback trading in the US treasury market is documented in Cohen and Shin 
(2003). Momentum trading strategies are widely used in FX, and are increasingly 
being used even by traditional asset managers. Significant trending in FX rates over 
the time period covered by our dataset is likely to have made such strategies 
especially popular.  
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6.3.1 Estimating a feedback model 
 
To test the cumulative effects of lagged exchange rate changes on order flows, we 
estimate the following regression: 
 
 
 
X
t
= ?
t
+ ?
t
?S
t? i
i=1
30? + ?t
where X
t
:=  order flow
?S
t? i := lagged FX change
 (6.3) 
 
Results for corporate and financial customers are plotted in Figures 6-4 and 6-5 
below. We see a strong feedback relationship in both customer categories. In the case 
of corporates there is clear indication of widespread trend following. In the financials 
category we again see a positive feedback relationship, although it is not as clear-cut 
as in the corporates case. This is quite natural as financials probably follow a variety 
of trading strategies in addition to trend following, and the resulting overall pattern 
would not be likely to follow any one specific trend. 
 
Figure 6-4 – Feedback Trading – Corporate Customers 
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Figure 6-5 – Feedback Trading – Financial Customers 
 
 
The indication from both customer categories is that there is significant positive 
feedback occurring. This cannot account for the negative coefficient on corporate 
order flow found in the contemporaneous daily regressions (Table 4-2), and also 
commonly found in the literature. Aggregating the high frequency data to lower 
frequencies to re-estimate the contemporaneous regression does result in a positive 
coefficient on corporate order flow, but we are wary of drawing conclusions based on 
such a short sample – only 25 observations at a daily frequency.  
 
Our results so far are inconclusive. There is evidence of feedback trading, but also 
some indication of price impact of flows on market prices. The literature is all based 
on the positive contemporaneous relationship at a daily frequency between order flow 
and exchange rate movements. Using our high frequency database, we now use the 
cointegration and error correction approach to illuminate causation, which is difficult 
to infer from low frequency data. 
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6.4 Cointegration and a Vector Error Correction Model 
 
The order flow data of a single dealer is unlikely to significantly predict next period’s 
order flow in the interdealer market, where exchange rates are actually set. However, 
dispersed information about unobservable fundamentals is slowly compounded in 
every dealer’s customer order flow. Thus, a single dealer’s customer order flow has 
long-run forecasting power, because it is correlated with future market-wide order 
flow that dealers use to set prices. To provide evidence for this complex mechanism 
we first test for the equilibrium relationship by means of cointegration analysis. 
Second, the adjustment process of deviations from equilibrium is investigated by 
estimating the related vector error correction model. 
 
Before estimating the model, we must first account for the fact that because our 
dataset covers only London trading hours, there will be a jump in the exchange rate 
series corresponding to overnight price changes that would affect our model. One way 
of accounting for the jumps would be to use dummy variables corresponding to the 
overnight changes, effectively removing the effect of the jumps from the sample 
without deleting the observations. Given that the Johansen cointegration test does not 
take into account exogenous variables in testing for the number of cointegrating 
relationships, making the test statistics invalid unless bootstrapped, we account for the 
jumps by indexing the exchange rate. Figure 6-7 below shows the adjustment for the 
1-minute aggregation at the first overnight change. 
 
As a robustness check we estimate all models using the unadjusted exchange rate, as 
well as using dummy variables to account for jumps in the series, and find no change 
in inference. Output for these models is not reported for brevity.  
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Figure 6-6 – Adjusting the FX rate for overnight jumps by indexing 
 
 
 
Before analyzing cointegration relationships we test for stationarity of the individual 
cumulated order flow series and the exchange rate. The results of unit root tests 
suggest non-stationarity of cumulative incoming order flow of the different 
counterparty types, as well as the level of the exchange rate as expected. Results of 
unit-root tests are summarized in Table 6-1 below. 
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Series ADF test statistic   p-value*
€/$ index -0.9159 0.7838
Cumulated (Financials) -1.5717 0.4970
Cumulated (Corporates) -1.5793 0.4931
Cumulated (Internal) -0.6865 0.8482
Cumulated (Interbank) -2.1322 0.2321
Null Hypothesis: series has a unit root
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Unit-Root Tests
 
Table 6-1 – Unit-Root Tests  
 
 We follow the Johansen procedure in order to test for cointegration of the exchange 
rate and the different types of order flow. First, the unrestricted VAR model is 
estimated. 
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where  X := cumulated order flow
P :=  FX rate
 (6.4) 
 
 
The lag order of the system is set to two according to the recommendation of the 
information criteria. Table 6-2 summarizes the various criteria examined. We select a 
lag order of two – selected by the Hainan-Quinn, Akaike and Final Prediction Error 
criteria. Log-Likelihood selects a longer lag length of four, but we prefer the more 
parsimonious two lags.  
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 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 -82418.540 NA 5.870E+13 45.893 45.901 45.896
1 -35054.160 94570.520 209.606 19.535   19.59* 19.553
2 -34981.800 144.288   204.15*   19.51* 19.603   19.54*
3 -34961.020 41.376 204.630 19.511 19.648 19.560
4 -34941.580   38.64* 205.266 19.514 19.695 19.578
5 -34927.780 27.400 206.550 19.520 19.744 19.600
6 -34913.240 28.837 207.756 19.526 19.793 19.621
7 -34899.570 27.067 209.071 19.532 19.842 19.643
8 -34887.930 23.022 210.632 19.539 19.893 19.665
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
 FPE: Final prediction error
 AIC: Akaike information criterion
 SC: Schwarz information criterion
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
 
Table 6-2 – VAR Lag-length Criteria 
 
 
 
Subsequently, Maximum Eigenvalue statistics and trace statistics are calculated to test 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Results are presented in Table 6-3. Both 
statistics indicate one cointegrating relationship at the 5% level, suggesting a 
relationship between end-user order flow and market prices.  
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Hypothesized Trace
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Prob.**
None * 0.012272 83.63065 0.0027
At most 1 0.007267 39.21675 0.2517
At most 2 0.002893 12.98188 0.8924
At most 3 0.000624 2.558985 0.9833
At most 4 8.72E-05 0.313745 0.5754
Hypothesized Max-Eigen
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Prob.**
None * 0.012272 44.4139 0.002
At most 1 0.007267 26.23488 0.0736
At most 2 0.002893 10.42289 0.7043
At most 3 0.000624 2.24524 0.984
At most 4 8.72E-05 0.313745 0.5754
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Maximum Eigenvalue Test
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Tests
Trace Test
 
Table 6-3 – Cointegration Rank Tests 
 
 
Given this result, we then proceed to estimate a Vector Error Correction model, now 
setting the lag length at one. The model is estimated at the 1, 2 and 5-minute 
aggregation levels, and results are shown in Table 6-4. 
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Table 6-4 – Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 
The coefficients of the cointegrating vector, which represent the equilibrium 
relationship between the variables, are all positive and statistically significant. In the 
case of financial customers, this confirms the standard result in market microstructure 
that cumulative order flow is positively correlated with the exchange rate. 
Interestingly, this is also true for order flow from corporate customers. This result is 
consistent with our previous results, but contradicts results in the literature that find 
that buying pressure from corporate customers increases when the spot rate decreases 
and vice versa. (Evans and Lyons (2005b), Bjønnes et al. (2005), Osler et al. (2006a)) 
 
We are particularly interested in which variables adjust to restore equilibrium, thus 
the most important part of Table 6-4 is the second panel, which shows the adjustment 
Cointegrating Equation:
FX FINANCIAL CORPORATE INTERNAL INTERBANK
1 minute -1 0.000102 0.000088 0.000075 0.000055
[7.17429] [7.33421] [7.69634] [4.31175]
2 minute -1 0.000100 0.000089 0.000074 0.000056
[6.57827] [6.89157] [7.09695] [4.11630]
5 minute -1 0.000104 0.000082 0.000072 0.000050
[6.74728] [6.92592] [7.50519] [4.00043]
Error Correction:
FX FINANCIAL CORPORATE INTERNAL INTERBANK
1 minute 0.000127 25.88434 15.04383 11.22708 12.67451
[0.84375] [ 5.02333] [ 3.23040] [ 3.63993] [ 2.99285]
2 minute 0.000331 50.65535 26.62391 17.03988 26.53992
[1.09341] [ 4.84148] [ 2.83453] [ 2.76734] [ 3.04835]
5 minute 0.000930 134.3445 69.26282 45.0416 71.61118
[1.14360] [ 4.81401] [ 2.71393] [ 2.72140] [ 2.94013]
 Vector Error Correction Estimates
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dynamics of the cointegrated system. These numbers show the reaction of the denoted 
variable to a disequilibrium between price and order flow. In each case, we see that 
the exchange rate does not significantly adjust to restore equilibrium. Conversely, in 
every case, order flows do adjust in the expected direction. The ECM coefficients 
suggest that the adjustment is driven by the order flow, with the coefficient on 
financial order flow being significantly larger than the other categories.  
 
The results of the error correction model are supportive of the picture that has 
emerged from the results of previous sections, namely little evidence of information 
in flows, and evidence of feedback trading, however they strongly contradict the 
Killeen, Lyons and Moore (2002), henceforth KLM, results. KLM estimate a VAR 
consisting of the FX rate, cumulative order flow and the interest differential, as well 
as a constant and a trend, and find one cointegrating vector in the system. The KLM 
results indicate that the burden of adjustment falls to the exchange rate. They also find 
no evidence of Granger causality from the FX rate to order flow, and taken together 
with the conclusions from the ECM they conclude that cumulative order flow is 
strongly exogenous. This conclusion can seem somewhat counterintuitive, as order 
flow might be considered to be almost by definition endogenous. Most importantly 
however, the study is done using daily data, which is unlikely to be a high enough 
frequency to determine causality. Froot and Ramadorai (2001) use a VAR and the 
Cambell-Shiller return decomposition to examine the dynamic interactions of flows, 
returns and measures of fundamentals. They conclude that there is no clear link 
between order flow and permanent components of exchange rates, and any positive 
impact of order flow on the FX rate is transitory and unrelated to fundamental 
information. 
 
Clearly we are far from any consensus on this issue, so we proceed to test for 
cointegration using our daily dataset in the hope of enriching the current picture. 
6.5 Cointegration and Error Correction at Low Frequency 
 
We follow the same procedure as in the previous section to test for cointegration and 
subsequently estimate the VECM. Of course there are some differences in the 
counterparty categories for the daily data; we have no interbank category, the 
  148
financials are separated into levered (e.g. mutual funds) and unlevered (e.g. hedge 
funds), and we also have an ‘others’ category, which we omit in this estimation for 
maximum comparability. There is no need to adjust the exchange rate for overnight 
jumps as the daily data runs 24-hours. We create a financials category by adding 
together the flows for levered and unlevered customers, and estimate the model in 
both ways. We begin by estimating the unrestricted VAR – equation 6.5. The lag-
length is chosen, as before, using selection criteria, and is set to 1. The lag-length 
selection criteria are summarized in Table 6-7. 
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where  X := cumulated order flow
P :=  FX rate
 (6.5) 
 
We test for a unit root by looking at the inverted AR roots and find that at least one 
root lies outside the unit circle. As expected therefore the VAR is non-stationary, and 
we can test for cointegration.  Maximum eigenvalue and trace tests indicate one 
cointegrating relationship. Figure 6-8 shows the results of the cointegration test for 
the VAR with financial flows separated into levered and unlevered client trades.  
Output for the remaining VAR models estimated is omitted for brevity, but reaches 
the same conclusions. 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 -31694.08 NA 3.22E+23 68.31698 68.3430 68.3269
1 -19569.19   24093.0*   1.52e+12*   42.239*   42.397*   42.299*
2 -19552.57 32.8364 1.55E+12 42.2577 42.5441 42.3670
3 -19540.74 23.2590 1.59E+12 42.2861 42.7027 42.4450
4 -19532.45 16.2013 1.65E+12 42.3221 42.8689 42.5307
5 -19523.7 17.0071 1.71E+12 42.3571 43.0342 42.6154
6 -19511.53 23.5219 1.76E+12 42.3848 43.1920 42.6927
7 -19504.89 12.7649 1.83E+12 42.4243 43.3618 42.7819
8 -19493.31 22.1420 1.88E+12 42.4533 43.5209 42.8605
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
 FPE: Final prediction error
 AIC: Akaike information criterion
 SC: Schwarz information criterion
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
 
Table 6-5 – VAR Lag Length Criteria – Daily Frequency 
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Hypothesized Trace
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Prob.**
None * 0.1276 161.3724 0.0000
At most 1 0.0188 33.8461 0.0694
At most 2 0.0105 16.1217 0.1688
At most 3 0.0066 6.2230 0.1742
Hypothesized Max-Eigen
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Prob.**
None * 0.1276 127.5263 0.0000
At most 1 0.0188 17.7245 0.1929
At most 2 0.0105 9.8986 0.3437
At most 3 0.0066 6.2230 0.1742
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Tests
Trace Test
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Maximum Eigenvalue Test
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at the 0.05 level
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 
Table 6-6 – Cointegration Rank Tests – Daily Frequency 
 
 
Table 6-7 below summarises the main results of the VECM model, specified with 
zero lags. We estimate the error correction model with financial trades aggregated 
(model A in Table 6-7) as well as disaggregated into levered and unlevered (model 
B).  In both cases we see that only corporate flow retains a long-run relationship with 
the exchange rate. We therefore estimate the error correction model with corporate 
flow only (model C). 
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Cointegrating Equation:
FX CORPORATE FINANCIAL* LEVEREDUNLEVERED
A -1 0.000014 -0.000003 - -
[4.07024] [ 0.05264]
B -1 0.000020 - 0.000086 -0.000038
[4.41561] [1.56351] [- 0.90555]
C -1 0.000014 - - -
[5.24553]
Error Correction:
FX CORPORATE FINANCIAL* LEVEREDUNLEVERED
A 0.000407 147.453 4.723 - -
[0.52527] [11.374] [0.357]
B 0.000595 179.972 - -16.298 17.715
[0.63414] [11.489] [ -1.351] [1.788]
C 0.000402 147.055 - - -
[0.51973] [11.374]
 Vector Error Correction Estimates - Daily Frequency
* FINANCIAL category is made up of LEVERED + UNLEVERED customers
 
Table 6-7 - Vector Error Correction Estimates – Daily Frequency 
 
 
Again, we are particularly interested in which variables adjust to restore equilibrium, 
and looking at the second panel of Table 6-7 we see that the exchange rate does not 
significantly adjust to restore equilibrium, with the adjustment is driven by the 
corporate order flow. 
 
The VECM results at a daily frequency are different than those in the high frequency 
data. There are a few reasons this could be the case, chief among which is the fact that 
we are unable to include exactly equivalent counterparty categories. Every customer 
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category is found to be important in the high frequency VECM, so the omission of the 
interbank group could skew the results. Capturing a long-run relationship is no easy 
task, but despite the other differences in inference between high and low frequency, 
one key finding does remain, namely that the exchange rate does not react to restore 
equilibrium.  
 
Given the results of this chapter so far, the case for information content in order flow 
seems weak. If flows do contain information, we should be able to use flow to 
forecast exchange rate movements, so to this end we conduct a high-frequency 
forecasting experiment in the following section. 
 
6.6 High Frequency Forecasting 
 
The objective of this section is to analyze the forecasting power of order flows on 
future exchange rate movements at various horizons. The analysis can be conducted 
in transaction time also, but for forecasting we feel it more useful to aggregate trades 
over certain time periods, e.g. 1 second, 5 seconds, 30 seconds, 1 minute… 1 hour. 
Similarly to our previous forecasting exercise in chapter 6, for each period of order 
flow history used a number of forecasting horizons are examined since we don’t 
know how fast information is impounded in prices.  The following model is 
estimated: 
 
The Forecasting Model 
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= Disaggregated  order flow (1 of 4 separate customer segments)  
{j = 1 sec, 5 sec,15sec, 30sec, 1min, 5 min, 10min, 30min} 
{k = 1 sec, 5 sec,15sec, 30sec, 1min, 5 min, 10min, 30min, 1 hour} 
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Figure 6-7 shows a graphical representation of the forecasting experiment. 
 
 
 
Figure 6-7 – A Forecasting Experiment  
 
In all cases, a true out of sample forecasting exercise is performed. We retain 2/3 of 
our data sample to estimate the model and use the remaining 1/3 to perform the out of 
sample forecasts. In the high frequency dataset this translates to estimating the model 
using the data from 10/10/2005 – 31/10/2005, and retaining the sample from 
01/11/2005 – 11/11/2005 for out-of-sample forecasts.  
 
Forecasting model performance was evaluated on the basis of the Root Mean Squared 
Error (RMSE) ratio of each model to that of a simple random walk, i.e. a naïve 
forecast of no change.  This is the standard benchmark in FX forecasting. We also 
report the Theil Inequality coefficient – a scaled measure of forecast accuracy ranging 
from 0 to 1, with 0 implying perfect forecasts. Lastly, in keeping with the 
methodology of chapter 4, we also use directional accuracy to evaluate the forecasts.  
 
The ability of a forecasting model to forecast direction if not magnitude is certainly a 
less stringent requirement, but it is also not lacking in theoretical merit. Leitch and 
Tanner (1991) find that statistical measures of forecast accuracy have little correlation 
to profit. “The only conventional measure of forecast quality that is related to profits 
is directional accuracy, and it is infrequently used” Leitch and Tanner (1991). 
Realistically, a trader cares far less whether a forecasting model can give exact point 
forecasts, as long as the model is providing accurate directional forecasts. This 
suggests that directional ability may serve as a more realistic evaluation of the 
usefulness of a forecasting model. Figures 6-8, 6-9 and 6-10 summarize the various 
measures of forecast accuracy for each model. 
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1 sec. 5 sec. 15 sec. 30 sec. 1min. 5min.
1 second RMSE ratio* 0.99998 0.99992 1.00006 0.99998 0.99996 0.99989
Theil inequality 
coef. 0.99764 0.99690 0.99697 0.99745 0.99749 0.99480
Direction % correct 8.15% 20.38% 28.64% 33.88% 38.71% 45.97%
Direction % wrong 7.63% 20.80% 30.22% 35.31% 39.21% 44.62%
% no move** 84.22% 58.82% 41.14% 30.81% 22.08% 9.41%
5 seconds RMSE ratio* 1.00003 1.00001 1.00002 0.99998 0.99999 0.99992
Theil inequality 
coef. 0.99493 0.99407 0.99551 0.99531 0.99593 0.99181
Direction % correct 8.18% 20.59% 29.78% 34.01% 39.20% 46.02%
Direction % wrong 8.36% 20.64% 29.07% 35.32% 38.82% 44.52%
% no move** 83.46% 58.78% 41.15% 30.67% 21.98% 9.46%
15 seconds RMSE ratio* 0.9999 1.0001 1.0001 1.0000 1.0000 0.9999
Theil inequality 
coef. 0.9899 0.9902 0.9954 0.9945 0.9947 0.9885
Direction % correct 8.22% 20.63% 29.89% 35.03% 39.37% 46.13%
Direction % wrong 8.13% 20.63% 29.14% 34.43% 38.72% 44.41%
% no move** 83.65% 58.74% 40.97% 30.55% 21.91% 9.46%
30 seconds
RMSE ratio* 1.0001 1.0003 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9999
Theil inequality 
coef. 0.9906 0.9809 0.9906 0.9915 0.9963 0.9845
Direction % correct 8.24% 20.68% 30.20% 35.33% 39.46% 46.17%
Direction % wrong 8.39% 20.36% 28.68% 34.44% 38.58% 44.32%
% no move** 83.37% 58.97% 41.12% 30.23% 21.96% 9.52%
** % observations when FX rate did not change
Forecast Evaluation - High Frequency (A)
* Ratio of RMSE of model to RMSE of naïve Random Walk
Forecast horizon:
History used:
 
Table 6-8 – Forecast Evaluation: RMSE Ratio and Directional Accuracy (A)
 1 sec. 5 sec. 15 sec. 30 sec. 1 min. 5 min. 10 min. 30 min. 1 hour
1 minute RMSE ratio* 1.0001 1.0003 1.0003 1.0004 1.0000 1.0001 0.9999 0.9993 0.9994
Theil inequality 
coef. 0.9809 0.9810 0.9863 0.9893 0.9912 0.9803 0.9818 0.9764 0.9679
Direction % correct 8.17% 20.80% 28.33% 34.30% 39.55% 45.88% 47.68% 49.07% 49.45%
Direction % wrong 8.42% 19.77% 30.35% 35.40% 38.32% 44.47% 46.30% 47.37% 47.27%
% no move** 83.42% 59.43% 41.32% 30.30% 22.13% 9.65% 6.02% 3.57% 3.28%
5 minutes RMSE ratio* 1.0012 1.0006 0.9999 1.0002 1.0022 1.0008 0.9994 1.0000 1.0024
Theil inequality 
coef. 0.9575 0.9868 0.9677 0.9839 0.9747 0.9670 0.9543 0.9506 0.9317
Direction % correct 8.33% 23.17% 28.75% 36.33% 36.25% 44.83% 47.00% 49.17% 49.92%
Direction % wrong 8.50% 18.92% 29.58% 34.33% 42.33% 46.17% 46.83% 47.50% 46.75%
% no move** 83.17% 57.92% 41.67% 29.33% 21.42% 9.00% 6.17% 3.33% 3.33%
** % observations when FX rate did not change
* Ratio of RMSE of model to RMSE of naïve Random Walk
Forecast Evaluation - High Frequency (B)
Forecast horizon:
History used:
 
Table 6-9 - Forecast Evaluation: RMSE Ratio and Directional Accuracy (B) 
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1 sec. 5 sec. 15 sec. 30 sec. 1 min. 5 min. 10 min. 30 min. 1 hour
10 minutes RMSE ratio* 1.0006 1.0021 1.0025 1.0025 1.0040 1.0012 1.0012 1.0013 1.0069
Theil inequality 
coef. 0.9644 0.9644 0.9715 0.9664 0.9652 0.9557 0.9595 0.9553 0.9158
Direction % correct 7.33% 19.83% 29.83% 34.33% 36.50% 47.83% 47.50% 48.50% 50.00%
Direction % wrong 6.50% 19.83% 31.50% 38.17% 42.00% 44.33% 46.33% 48.83% 46.00%
% no move** 86.17% 60.33% 38.67% 27.50% 21.50% 7.83% 6.17% 2.67% 4.00%
30 minutes
RMSE ratio* 1.0000 1.0010 1.0009 1.0014 1.0024 1.0267 1.0216 1.0274 1.0222
Theil inequality 
coef. 0.9620 0.9751 0.9389 0.9286 0.9481 0.9077 0.9148 0.8989 0.8942
Direction % correct 10.00% 29.00% 34.00% 34.50% 42.50% 43.00% 46.50% 45.00% 52.00%
Direction % wrong 10.00% 18.00% 30.50% 37.50% 38.00% 48.00% 48.00% 51.50% 44.00%
% no move** 80.00% 53.00% 35.50% 28.00% 19.50% 9.00% 5.50% 3.50% 4.00%
** % observations when FX rate did not change
* Ratio of RMSE of model to RMSE of naïve Random Walk
Forecast Evaluation - High Frequency (C)
Forecast horizon:
History used:
 
Table 6-10 - Forecast Evaluation: RMSE Ratio and Directional Accuracy (C)  
 Clearly there is little evidence of forecasting power here, even intra-day. In our first 
forecasting experiment using daily customer order flow data, despite confirming the 
contemporaneous relationship between flow and exchange rates – for six different 
exchange rates no less – we found a complete lack of forecasting power. At the time, 
one explanation offered was that flows do contain information, but the information is 
getting priced in too quickly within the day, so we were finding no forecasting power 
at the daily frequency and lower. A glance at the numbers in the 3 tables above 
quickly shows that this is not the case. A RMSE ratio below 1 would indicate that the 
model is outperforming the random walk. We see that in every case, the RMSE ratio 
is essentially 1 – the model is performing as well – or as badly if you prefer – as the 
random walk. Theil inequality coefficients stay resolutely in the high nineties. There 
is no statistical evidence of forecasting power. 
 
Mindful of the criticism of statistical measures of forecast accuracy, discussed briefly 
above and in more detail in chapter 4, we could choose to focus on the directional 
accuracy of the model, i.e. does order flow contain information that can predict the 
subsequent direction of change in the FX rate? Taking the symmetric 1 second of 
order flow forecasting 1 second ahead case in Table 8-8 above as an example, the first 
number to note is the last one – percent no move: 84.22%. The naïve model of no 
change seems to be not so naïve in this case.  The model predicts the change in 
direction correctly only about 8% of the time, though it gets the direction completely 
wrong only 7.63% of the time. When there is a change therefore the model correctly 
predicts the direction about half the time. This pattern is identical across all histories 
and forecast horizons. Hardly a ringing endorsement when the model performs about 
as well as flipping a coin. We are forced to conclude that we find no evidence of 
forecasting power, regardless of the evaluation criteria we choose.  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
The entire FX microstructure literature is based on the strong, and well-documented 
contemporaneous correlation between exchange rate movements and order flow. 
There is no consensus as to what is driving this relationship however, and in this 
chapter we use a unique, ultra-high-frequency, large volume customer order flow 
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database from a leading commercial bank, significantly rich in volume, number and 
counterparty balance to determine causality.  
 
The two main competing theories are information and feedback. If flows contain 
information, they should have a permanent impact on prices, and we should be able to 
use flows to forecast subsequent moves in exchange rates. If on the other hand it is 
changes in the exchange rate itself that are creating incentives to trade at the intra-day 
frequency, thus generating order flow, we would see this at a daily frequency as a 
contemporaneous correlation, but there would be no expectation of flows forecasting 
FX movements.  
 
We initially estimate a distributed lag model as in Ito and Hashimoto (2006), to 
determine the price impact of flows on market rates. We find some indication of 
corporate flows having a small positive price impact, but in the case of financial 
trades the impact dies out to zero within half an hour. We then reverse the causality in 
the model in order to test the impact of past changes in the exchange rate on 
subsequent customer orders. These regressions show strong evidence of positive 
feedback trading in both corporate and financial customer categories.   
 
Momentum trading strategies are especially popular in FX, but the presence of 
positive feedback does not explain the negative coefficient on corporate order flow 
commonly found in the literature. We therefore proceed to test for cointegration 
between the exchange rate and cumulated customer flows, hoping the resulting error 
correction model can clarify the long-run dynamics of the system. The results of the 
high frequency VECM are particularly illuminating. We find that all counterparty 
types have a positive equilibrium relationship with the exchange rate, but most 
importantly, the adjustment dynamics show that all of the weight of adjustment to 
restore equilibrium after a shock falls to flows. We repeat the experiment at a daily 
frequency using the RBS dataset, and although in the low frequency VECM only 
corporate trades are found to be significant, once again the exchange rate bears none 
of the burden of adjustment to equilibrium.   
 
Despite the evidence favouring the feedback version of causality, we also perform a 
series of high-frequency forecasting experiments, wanting to give the information 
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theory the benefit of the doubt. The forecasting performance was uniformly poor, 
whether evaluated using the standard benchmark of RMSE ratio to the random walk 
model, or using directional ability as a measure. We find no forecasting power in 
flows, and by extension no support for the informational role of order flow. 
 
The results of this chapter point to feedback as the driving force of the 
contemporaneous relationship between order flow and exchange rates. Again this 
result is in contrast to some of the results in the literature. Evans and Lyons (2002a) 
reject feedback trading at a daily frequency, as do Killeen, Lyons and Moore (2002). 
These results are not in fact all that troubling since the analysis was done at a daily 
frequency, and it is unlikely that the issue of causality in FX could be elucidated at 
anything other than ultra-high-frequency. What does remain to be reconciled however 
is the success of the Evans and Lyons Citibank data in forecasting. In this, one could 
certainly argue that the quality of Citibank’s customers is hard to match, and that their 
trades do in fact contain information. Our data comes from a major player in the FX 
market however, so we find the argument that the FX market itself has changed 
significantly since the late 90s to be a more compelling reason for the different 
results. As discussed in chapter 5, increased competition among electronic trading 
platforms, access granted to large hedge funds and active currency managers to EBS 
and Reuters through prime brokerage services, and a rather staggering increase in 
participation in FX has changed the playing field. Ironically, the success of the Evans 
and Lyons research may also have made market participants more wary of revealing 
their trading strategies.  
 
Realistically, it is the nature of this research that there will be discrepancies in results 
that are hard to reconcile, since the data used is not public. Each researcher can only 
draw conclusions from their own data, and unfortunately each dataset itself represents 
only a small fraction of the overall information set. We feel that our dataset is of 
sufficiently high quality to draw conclusions, and the results have shown internal 
consistency, with corporate flows emerging as important in different models. The true 
overall picture can only reveal itself incrementally as more datasets are analyzed, and 
in this we feel our results make this incremental contribution. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
The foreign exchange literature is replete with research showing that exchange rates 
cannot be effectively explained, let alone forecast. Macroeconomic models of 
exchange rate determination, while elegant and intuitively appealing, have been 
shown repeatedly to be an empirical failure at horizons shorter than three months. A 
series of influential papers by Meese and Rogoff in the 1980’s showed that at shorter 
horizons, structural models of exchange rates perform no better at out-of-sample 
forecasting than the naïve random walk. Decades of research have failed to overturn 
this result, and even now this remains in large part the accepted wisdom in 
international finance. In the last ten years however, exchange rate researchers were 
offered a much-needed glimmer of hope, in the form of the microstructure approach 
to exchange rate determination.      
 
Pioneered by Richard Lyons and Charles Goodhart, the microstructure approach 
studies how dispersed information about fundamentals gets impounded into exchange 
rates via trading decisions, effectively shifting the focus, not away from fundamentals 
per se, but to the mechanism through which fundamentals affect prices. FX 
microstructure argues that the market’s expectations about future fundamentals are 
mirrored in their aggregated trading decisions, and in this sense order flow is said to 
contain information. 
 
The seminal paper that started the micro FX ‘revolution’ was Evans and Lyons 
(2002a) in which, using daily interdealer data from Reuters D2000-1 on DEM/USD 
and JPY/USD, they demonstrated a striking contemporaneous relationship between 
order flow and changes in the exchange rate, with R
2
 values unheard of in the FX 
literature - 64% for the DEM equation and 45% for the JPY equation. They backed up 
these results with a simplified model of trading, providing a very plausible theoretical 
basis for the empirical results, and a new chapter in exchange rate modelling was 
born. 
 
The contemporaneous relationship between exchange rates and order flow has been 
verified empirically in a number of papers (Payne, 2003, Marsh and O’Rourke, 2005), 
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but micro FX remains a very new field, and many questions remain unanswered. 
Using two unique datasets, one at a daily frequency from the Royal Bank of Scotland 
spanning three and a half years (2002/06) and including six currency pairs, and 
another tick-by-tick dataset in €/US$ spanning 25 trading days in late 2005 from a 
major European bank, we attempt to add to the growing body of knowledge in this 
topic that has proved remarkably resistant to explanation. 
 
To briefly recap, in our first empirical chapter, we replicate and extend the Evans and 
Lyons (2005b) forecasting experiment using the daily data from RBS. We confirm the 
contemporaneous properties once again, but in the forecasting experiments we find no 
forecasting power whatsoever in our data, regardless of model, history used, forecast 
horizon or currency pair. Building on MacDonald and Marsh (2004) who suggest that 
exchange rates can be forecast if they are modelled together as a system, and wanting 
to fully exploit the cross-sectional advantages of the RBS dataset, we attempt to 
forecast exchange rates using both ‘own’ and ‘related’ flows. Although we find the 
contemporaneous relationship is strengthened by the addition of ‘related’ flows, 
forecasting performance is not improved. 
 
Wanting to give the models the benefit of the doubt, and drawing on a growing body 
of literature pointing out the limitations of RMSE as a means of forecast evaluation 
(Leitch and Tanner, 1991, Granger and Pesaran 2000) we proceed to evaluate all 
models on the basis of their ability to predict direction. Again we find lack of 
forecasting power across the board.  
 
Lastly, we hypothesize that a forecasting relationship may not always be present, i.e. 
order flows may not convey information all the time as is implicitly assumed in the 
regression based forecasts. Instead, we test a series of conditional models in which 
trades are only triggered if certain conditions are satisfied.  Once again we find no 
evidence of forecasting power in the RBS flows. Testing forecasting ability via 
profitability using simple trading rules yielded mixed but slightly more promising 
results, albeit with huge volatility. 
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In the FX literature, a result showing that FX rates cannot be forecast is, in and of 
itself, uninteresting. Considering the Evans and Lyons (2005b) result however, this 
complete lack of forecasting power in the RBS data which is, for all intents and 
purposes, the equivalent data to that of Citibank, and moreover shares the same 
contemporaneous properties, is curious, and we are left to speculate on the reasons for 
this discrepancy. 
 
One of the main reasons we consider for the failure of the RBS data to forecast 
exchange rates is that, since the data comes from a more recent time period, the 
forecasting power could be concentrated intra-day. In the next two empirical chapters 
therefore we focus on the high frequency data. In the second empirical chapter we use 
the tick-by-tick data in conjunction with two standard market microstructure models  
- Madhavan-Smidt and Huang-Stoll - in order to gain an insight into the information 
content of customer order flow. In stark contrast to the literature, while we are unable 
to find any evidence of information content from financial customer order flow, 
however partitioned, we find strong evidence that large corporate customer order 
flows are perceived to have statistically and economically significant information 
content. 
 
In the last empirical chapter we turn our attention to the issue of causality. Although 
the contemporaneous relationship is undisputed, the underlying reasons for this 
relationship remain unclear. The ultra-high-frequency data provides an excellent tool 
to shed some light on this matter. We approach this issue from a number of angles. If 
there is an informational component to flows, then flows should have a permanent 
impact on interbank prices. We investigate this using a distributed-lag model. 
Corporate orders are again found to have a small long-term impact. We then turn the 
model around to examine the effect of exchange rate changes on subsequent flows, 
and find significant evidence of positive feedback trading in both corporate and 
financial customers.  
 
Most importantly, we estimate a vector error correction model to clarify the long-run 
dynamics of the system. We find that all counterparty types have a positive 
equilibrium relationship with the exchange rate, but crucially, the adjustment 
dynamics show that all of the weight of adjustment to restore equilibrium after a 
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shock falls to flows. Lastly, if exchange rates are determined by macroeconomic 
fundamentals, but order flow gradually conveys information on heterogeneous beliefs 
about these fundamentals, then order flow should provide forecasting power for 
exchange rates. Despite the growing evidence of feedback rather than information as 
the driver of the contemporaneous relationship, we conduct a high frequency 
forecasting experiment, but as in the daily RBS data we find no evidence of 
forecasting power. 
 
What overall conclusions can we draw from our results, and how do we reconcile 
what we have learned with the existing literature? Since this entire field is necessarily 
data driven, replication of results is very important, but also problematic as the 
required data is very difficult to get. This has resulted in a literature that is in fact 
dominated by one dataset – the Evans and Lyons Citibank data. Most other studies on 
customer order flow are based on data from small to medium sized banks that are at 
best marginal players in the enormous FX market. In this respect our research is given 
a great deal of credibility due to the quality of our data. RBS is currently ranked 
number 4 in the 2009 Euromoney FX poll, and even at the time of our data sample 
was one of the top FX dealing banks. The source of our high frequency data prefers to 
remain anonymous, but the volume and composition of the dataset speak for 
themselves.  
 
Replication of results is of the utmost importance in research, and in this respect 
economic and financial research can be found severely lacking compared to other 
disciplines. In order to replicate a study on financial data, a researcher needs access to 
the data itself, but often also needs to know precisely what steps were taken in 
collecting and ‘cleaning’ the data. Compounding these problems, in the FX 
microstructure literature, order flow data is closely guarded by the banks making it 
very difficult to come by. Even the Evans and Lyons Citibank data has not been 
updated, so not only do other researchers not have access to the same data to attempt 
to replicate the results, the authors themselves are unable to update their study to 
establish whether their findings continue to be valid.  
 
It would not be an over-statement to say that the Evans and Lyons results caused a 
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revolution of sorts in the FX literature. However that single data set has served as the 
basis for the majority of the literature in FX microstructure, and while we in no way 
question the quality of the research, we must question the wisdom of basing universal 
conclusions on a single data set, from a single bank, at a single point in time.  
 
The first conclusion we draw is one that permeates all three empirical chapters – the 
relationship between flows and exchange rates, while striking, is not as simple as 
initially believed. This is perhaps not the most encouraging of conclusions, but it is 
nonetheless important. The microstructure approach to FX seems inherently logical – 
it is extremely appealing, and in a field characterized by so many negative results it is 
almost seductive. This must not stop us from questioning its results however, 
particularly considering the current over-reliance on one dataset. 
 
The next conclusion is very much reflected in the contrast between the results of all 
three chapters with the results in the literature that are based on data not as recent as 
ours. The original Evans and Lyons Citibank data is from the late 90’s, and the Osler 
et al data and Reitz et al data are from 2001 and 2002/03 respectively. Our data 
sample  - in late 2005 – may not seem to be that far removed, but in the FX market 
the last decade has been a time of tremendous change. In fact, the very change that 
spawned the field by making transactions data available – electronic trading – has 
caused an ongoing revolution of sorts in how FX is traded.  
 
FX has established itself quite firmly as an asset class in its own right, a change that is 
reflected in the huge growth in daily turnover in the global foreign exchange market 
revealed in the BIS 2007 survey. This is likely to have further increased investor 
heterogeneity, and blurred the distinctions between different investor categories, and 
the changing demands of market participants is naturally gradually changing the 
structure of the FX market itself. 
 
Unlike the equity or bond markets, the foreign exchange market is highly fragmented, 
with more than 20 dealer-to-client spot platforms, two interdealer spot platforms and 
three interdealer options platforms - and with the spot currency dealer-to-client 
platforms also trying to expand into options. EBS allowed hedge funds to trade on its 
platform in 2004 and Reuters followed suit in July 2005. (Jung 2007) In 1995, 64% of 
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the foreign exchange trades were executed on interdealer platforms; by 2007, that 
figure had dropped to 43% despite an increase in the overall market. (BIS 2007) 
Reuters and EBS continue to be at the centre of FX trading, but their share has 
reduced as alternative liquidity providers have emerged. Multi bank platforms allow 
customers to access prices and to trade with any of the participating dealers with 
whom they have an established credit relationship, thus facilitating investors’ access 
to market-makers, and also providing tools for algorithmic trading.  
 
The distinction between banks that are market makers in the interbank market and 
other financial institutions continues to become less apparent as these other financial 
institutions increasingly provide market liquidity. The Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York pointed to the greater role of hedge funds "behaving more like dealers with 
regard to pricing and the liquidity they are willing to provide to the market". This 
trend is underpinned by the consolidation in the banking industry, the growth of 
banking organizations that play a number of different roles in foreign exchange 
markets, the strong growth in prime brokerage and the granting of access to electronic 
brokers in the interbank market to hedge funds (Jung (2007)).  
 
It is difficult to assess exactly the impact of these changes, but it does suggest that the 
ability to characterize the behaviour of different counterparty types may be more 
difficult, and these features of the FX market are likely to complicate attempts at 
modelling and forecasting exchange rates. 
 
Heterogeneity is a major concept in the microstructure literature – market participants 
are active in FX for disparate reasons with different needs and ways to conduct 
transactions. Advances in technology and investor demand have meant that platforms 
are developing functionalities that meet their customer segment requirements. In the 
financials category in particular, there is a large degree of heterogeneity within the 
group itself. The type of financial customer whose trades might be assumed to carry 
information – large hedge funds, quantitative trading firms and active currency 
managers – increasingly have access to the interbank market directly as both EBS and 
Reuters provide prime brokerage services to large buy-side institutions.  
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These changes in market structure mean that it is much more difficult to extract clear 
signals from trades. Furthermore, it is reasonable for customers with any 
informational advantage to try to hide this from relatively sophisticated dealers. 
Perhaps ironically, the success of the Evans and Lyons research may have made 
market participants more wary of revealing their intentions through trading, and the 
changing structure of the market has made it particularly easy to ‘hide’ trades by 
breaking them up among multiple banks and/or platforms. Tight spreads in FX also 
mean that there will be little impact due to increased transaction costs associated with 
such a strategy. This hiding of information simply reflects the fact that agents learn, 
and trading strategies evolve to maximise any advantage, and this is to be expected in 
a market as competitive as FX. 
 
Clearly the playing field has changed, and we must note here that we are not alone in 
finding a decline in forecastability of FX based on flows. Of particular note are the Ito 
and Hashimoto (2006) results that show that the duration of positively significant 
returns following order flows is getting shorter in recent years, in fact becoming 
significantly negative in the case of EURUSD.  
 
These first conclusions represent the more ‘conceptual’ contributions of our research. 
On a more specific front, two important themes emerge from the high-frequency 
investigation. The first is the importance of corporate customers – a category that was 
largely overlooked in previous studies. The picture is not entirely clear, as we do not 
claim our results are without limitations, but the findings of the second chapter are 
suggestive of an informational role for extremely large corporate order flow, as it is 
shown to be the only category to have an impact on dealer quotes. This outcome is 
not as surprising as it might first seem, as the aggregate trades of corporate customers 
can be thought of as indicative of future macroeconomic variables such as industrial 
production or GDP. Despite the fact that this is a reasonable and even intuitive 
explanation, we must admit that perhaps it wouldn’t be expected at ultra-high-
frequencies. This, coupled with the fact that the price impact is concentrated in 
extremely large trades, and then furthermore considered alongside the results of the 
third empirical study that finds no real evidence of forecasting power for market 
prices, could suggest an inventory effect that we cannot account for in our data. 
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This brings us to the last, and possibly most important contribution, which is the 
evidence from the error correction model of the direction of causality in the exchange 
rate / order flow relationship. We find no evidence of the exchange rate adjusting to 
restore equilibrium, with the entire burden of adjustment left to customer flows from 
all four counterparty types. This finding, together with the results of the distributed 
lag models which show significant evidence of positive feedback trading, implies that 
the direction of causality runs not from flows to exchange rates, but from exchange 
rates to flows.   
 
Our results perhaps seem quite cautious, even negative compared to the bulk of the 
micro FX literature. We must acknowledge however, that in the end we are limited in 
our understanding of exchange rate determination by our data, as is everyone else in 
this field. The FX market is vast, fast moving, highly competitive and constantly 
evolving. As researchers, much like the blind men and the elephant, we have access to 
only a tiny fraction of the information set, what amounts to a snapshot in time, and 
from one bank’s perspective only no less. Given this information we try to elucidate 
an entire structure, and we must be careful not to draw too far-reaching conclusions.  
As more datasets are analysed from the perspective of different players in the market, 
the picture should slowly come into clearer focus, and in this sense at least we feel 
that our findings have a small but definite contribution to make towards 
understanding 
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Appendix A – FX Market Statistics and Recent Trends
2
 
 
BIS Survey 2007: Statistics on the FX Market  
 
We summarize some of the key findings from the latest BIS Central Bank survey of 
foreign exchange and derivatives market activity, which took place in April 2007.  
Global FX Turnover 
 
The 2007 survey shows a substantial rise in activity in traditional foreign exchange 
markets compared to 2004. Average daily turnover rose to $3.2 trillion in April 2007, 
an increase of 69% at current exchange rates and 63% at constant exchange rates. The 
expansion in FX swap turnover was particularly strong and made the largest 
contribution to aggregate growth, in sharp contrast to the period between 2001 and 
2004. 
 
 
The ratio of foreign exchange turnover to the value of international trade and capital 
flows has increased over the past three years, recovering some of the decline observed 
in the 2001 triennial survey. This can be seen in the graph below. 
                                                
2 Source for all statistics, tables and graphs in this appendix is the BIS 2007 Central Bank Survey on 
Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity. 
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Turnover by Counterparty 
 
 
 
Financial customers were the main drivers of the strong rise in global turnover. 
Growth in this segment has accounted for half of the increase in total turnover over 
the past three years, compared with 29% for interbank trading and 21% for the non-
financial customer segment. 
 
Turnover between reporting dealers and non-financial customers also more than 
doubled between the 2004 and 2007 surveys. This is likely to be related to the 
substantial growth in international trade in goods and services between 2004 and 
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2007, and possibly to an expansion in hedging activity. 
 
Even while the interbank market contributed almost one third of the growth in 
aggregate turnover, the share of the interbank market in total turnover fell to 43% 
from 53% in 2004, largely because the growth in turnover for the other segments was 
so rapid. Consolidation of the banking system was one reason put forth in the past to 
explain a reduction in the share of the interbank market, since consolidation would 
result in efficiency gains as well as allowing the netting of trades within an 
organization. Although it appears that consolidation in the banking sector has 
continued, the rate at which this is occurring has slowed significantly, so it probably 
was not a major driver of the reduction in interbank turnover. 
 
 
 
The spread of electronic broking platforms is a factor that represents an important 
driver of efficiency gains and could be contributing to the falling share of interbank 
foreign exchange transactions. While it is difficult to assess the impact of changes in 
execution methods on trading volumes, it is clear that electronic broking systems play 
a very important role in some interbank markets. For example, for Germany and 
Switzerland 55% and 44%, respectively, of total interbank transactions are executed 
through electronic broking platforms. These shares rise to 67% and 58% when 
electronic trading systems are included in the calculation.  
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Most Traded Currencies 
 
 
Currency % of all transactions 
  
USD 86.3% 
Euro 37.0% 
JPY 16.5% 
GBP 15.0% 
 
USD/Euro: most traded currency pair (27% global turnover – 
US$840 billion average daily volume) 
 
USD/JPY: 13% global turnover 
USD/GBP: 12% global turnover 
 
 
 
The share of turnover accounted for by currency pairs among the US dollar, euro and 
yen has declined by 6% since 2004. Most of this fall can be explained by the decline 
in the share of the US dollar/yen pair. More broadly, there appears to have been an 
increase in the share of emerging market currencies in total turnover: in April 2007, 
emerging market currencies were involved in almost 20% of all transactions.  
 
Geographical Distribution 
 
The geographical distribution of FX trading has remained largely unchanged, 
although of the major financial centers Singapore, Switzerland and the UK gained 
market share, while the shares of Japan and the United States dropped.  
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Trading Centre % share 
  
UK 34.1% 
US 16.6% 
Switzerland 6.1% 
Japan 6% 
Trading Centre % share 
Singapore 5.8% 
Hong Kong SAR 4.4% 
Australia 4.3% 
France 3.0% 
Germany 2.5% 
 
Interpreting the Statistics – Trends and Implications 
 
The increasing recognition and acceptance of foreign exchange as an asset class in its 
own right has led to a surge in global FX activity as more players seek access to this 
highly attractive market. The significant growth in global FX trading volumes is 
attributed in part to increased activity from the non-interbank market, particularly 
hedge funds, fund managers and commodity trading advisors. The appeal of FX is 
that it is non-cyclical, highly liquid and shows no strict correlation to other asset 
classes.  
 
Over the three years since the 2004 survey, exchange rates were broadly trending and 
financial market volatility was at historically low levels, therefore FX offered 
investors with short-term horizons relatively attractive risk-adjusted returns.  
Strategies such as the carry trade and momentum trading, which are attractive in a 
low volatility environment, have been profitable over the past three years. In addition, 
there is evidence that longer-term investors, such as pension funds, have contributed 
to the increase in turnover by systematically diversifying their portfolios 
internationally, but also because even ‘traditional’ money managers are increasingly 
viewing FX as a distinct asset class and are taking a more active approach to 
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managing currency exposure. Both these avenues are creating direct and indirect 
demand for foreign exchange. Furthermore, the value of funds managed by these 
investors has grown significantly as can be seen in the graph below, which amplifies 
the effects of changing approaches to FX.  
 
Market commentary suggests that leveraged investors such as hedge funds have been 
primary players in foreign exchange market activity in recent years. Although it is 
difficult to obtain precise numbers, it is clear that hedge fund activity, measured by 
either estimates of assets under management or the number of funds, has increased 
significantly over the past six years. Hedge fund growth in foreign exchange markets 
has benefited from the development of prime brokerage services. With prime 
brokerage, a customer, for example a hedge fund, can obtain liquidity from a variety 
of sources while at the same time maintaining a credit relationship, placing collateral 
and settling transactions with a single bank – the prime broker (Foreign Exchange 
Committee (2005)). 
 
 
 
 
Finally, an increase in high frequency algorithmic trading by some investors, mostly 
investment banks, facilitated by the spread of electronic trading platforms, has also 
increased turnover, particularly in the spot market. Electronic trading platforms have 
also provided significantly more access to retail investors. Leveraged retail investors 
appear to be a growing presence in FX markets, albeit still with a relatively small 
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impact on global turnover (Galati et al (2007)). 
 
Some of the drivers of these results seem to reflect structural changes and are 
therefore likely to continue affecting developments in foreign exchange turnover. For 
example, the increase in portfolio diversification by longer-term fund managers 
appears to be the result of a fundamental shift in approach. The expansion of activity 
by leveraged retail traders could also add momentum to this trend. In contrast, the 
potential role for investors with a shorter-term horizon, such as those following carry 
trade strategies, is more dependent on factors such as financial market volatility that 
affect the attractiveness of foreign exchange as an asset class.  
 
Further above average growth in turnover in emerging market currencies is also likely 
going forward, although this is dependent on emerging market economies continuing 
to experience robust growth, as well as a further deepening and opening of their 
domestic financial markets. 
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Appendix B – Descriptive Statistics 
Appendix B1      
Descriptive Statistics on actual values of net (buy-sell) order flow - Daily Frequency. 
(all values * 10^9)     
      
USD_JPY      
 Corporate Levered Unlevered Other Total 
 Mean 0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.009 -0.004 
 Median 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.009 
 Maximum 0.517 0.286 0.371 0.914 0.923 
 Minimum -0.694 -0.264 -0.359 -0.824 -0.936 
 Std. Dev. 0.072 0.061 0.053 0.180 0.210 
 Skewness -0.583 -0.032 0.527 0.029 0.170 
 Kurtosis 17.758 6.074 11.467 6.924 5.457 
      
 Jarque-Bera 8017.514 345.740 2663.663 563.523 225.141 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 1.321 2.956 0.545 -8.197 -3.375 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 4.524 3.238 2.486 28.513 38.601 
      
 Observations 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 
      
      
Euro_USD      
 Corporate Levered Unlevered Other Total 
 Mean -0.036 0.004 -0.005 0.025 -0.013 
 Median -0.032 0.000 -0.003 0.017 -0.018 
 Maximum 0.536 0.467 0.810 1.609 1.679 
 Minimum -0.629 -0.343 -0.576 -0.788 -0.919 
 Std. Dev. 0.128 0.096 0.079 0.217 0.269 
 Skewness 0.162 0.209 0.531 0.735 0.517 
 Kurtosis 5.727 5.496 29.147 7.955 6.028 
      
 Jarque-Bera 275.973 234.366 25052.760 977.389 374.610 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum -31.947 3.189 -4.493 21.737 -11.514 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 14.273 8.039 5.435 41.152 63.428 
      
 Observations 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 
      
      
Euro_GBP      
 Corporate Levered Unlevered Other Total 
 Mean 0.019 -0.001 0.000 0.016 0.034 
 Median 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.037 
 Maximum 0.498 0.323 0.287 0.568 0.717 
 Minimum -0.660 -0.701 -0.474 -0.689 -0.634 
 Std. Dev. 0.071 0.049 0.037 0.114 0.142 
 Skewness -1.648 -4.094 -2.359 -0.682 -0.465 
 Kurtosis 22.184 71.841 49.859 12.460 7.833 
      
 Jarque-Bera 13861.540 175822.600 81141.660 3342.157 886.253 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 16.558 -0.941 0.200 14.121 29.937 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 4.435 2.117 1.229 11.375 17.668 
      
 Observations 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 
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Appendix B1 cont/d     
Descriptive Statistics on actual values of net (buy-sell) order flow - Daily Frequency. 
(all values * 10^9)     
      
Euro_JPY      
 Corporate Levered Unlevered Other Total 
 Mean -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.005 -0.006 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.006 
 Maximum 0.217 0.152 0.257 0.357 0.503 
 Minimum -0.483 -0.115 -0.097 -0.833 -0.820 
 Std. Dev. 0.040 0.023 0.020 0.099 0.109 
 Skewness -4.540 0.104 3.262 -1.654 -1.024 
 Kurtosis 56.775 12.373 39.088 15.608 12.595 
      
 Jarque-Bera 108805.000 3215.318 49201.700 6216.015 3521.288 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum -0.912 -0.272 0.600 -4.499 -5.084 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1.415 0.476 0.363 8.670 10.358 
      
 Observations 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 
      
      
GBP_USD      
 Corporate Levered Unlevered Other Total 
 Mean 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.011 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 
 Maximum 0.535 0.274 0.353 1.225 1.109 
 Minimum -0.335 -0.407 -0.222 -0.517 -0.664 
 Std. Dev. 0.070 0.048 0.038 0.101 0.133 
 Skewness 0.734 -0.899 1.974 1.984 0.888 
 Kurtosis 10.437 15.068 20.984 28.681 10.564 
      
 Jarque-Bera 2102.121 5446.032 12401.420 24703.390 2208.293 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 2.616 0.657 2.419 4.163 9.856 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 4.324 1.999 1.284 8.953 15.598 
      
 Observations 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 
      
      
GBP_JPY      
 Corporate Levered Unlevered Other Total 
 Mean 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
 Maximum 0.307 0.075 0.107 0.496 0.294 
 Minimum -0.066 -0.200 -0.506 -0.517 -0.521 
 Std. Dev. 0.016 0.009 0.019 0.032 0.033 
 Skewness 11.312 -11.623 -19.827 -0.416 -3.132 
 Kurtosis 209.048 290.176 519.281 142.603 79.005 
      
 Jarque-Bera 1571896.000 3036790.000 9808672.000 713002.000 212769.400 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 0.638 -0.182 -1.106 -1.577 -2.227 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.211 0.071 0.332 0.914 0.982 
      
 Observations 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 
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Appendix B2      
Descriptive Statistics on absolute values of net (buy-sell) order flow - Daily Frequency. 
(all values * 10^9)     
      
USD_JPY      
 Corporate(A) Levered(A) Unlevered(A) Other(A) Total(A) 
 Mean 0.046 0.041 0.033 0.123 0.151 
 Median 0.030 0.026 0.020 0.083 0.111 
 Maximum 0.694 0.286 0.371 0.914 0.936 
 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Std. Dev. 0.055 0.045 0.041 0.132 0.146 
 Skewness 4.002 1.927 3.055 2.279 1.935 
 Kurtosis 33.772 7.464 17.034 9.699 7.851 
      
 Jarque-Bera 36985.830 1272.454 8570.737 2401.237 1408.873 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 40.724 35.848 29.285 108.208 132.657 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.637 1.784 1.510 15.253 18.571 
      
 Observations 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 
      
      
      
Euro_USD      
 Corporate(A) Levered(A) Unlevered(A) Other(A) Total(A) 
 Mean 0.097 0.066 0.043 0.155 0.197 
 Median 0.074 0.046 0.024 0.112 0.147 
 Maximum 0.629 0.467 0.810 1.609 1.679 
 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Std. Dev. 0.090 0.069 0.066 0.153 0.183 
 Skewness 1.858 1.822 5.154 2.568 2.060 
 Kurtosis 7.957 7.059 42.443 15.832 10.432 
      
 Jarque-Bera 1404.089 1088.452 60801.210 6988.231 2641.686 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 85.602 58.307 37.884 136.098 173.209 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 7.090 4.179 3.823 20.594 29.409 
      
 Observations 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 
      
      
      
Euro_GBP      
 Corporate(A) Levered(A) Unlevered(A) Other(A) Total(A) 
 Mean 0.047 0.021 0.017 0.069 0.100 
 Median 0.033 0.009 0.007 0.042 0.066 
 Maximum 0.660 0.701 0.474 0.689 0.717 
 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Std. Dev. 0.056 0.044 0.034 0.092 0.107 
 Skewness 4.335 7.713 6.427 3.203 2.318 
 Kurtosis 33.587 92.947 62.744 15.192 9.603 
      
 Jarque-Bera 36976.030 304679.200 136623.600 6938.573 2381.455 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 41.492 18.659 14.522 60.345 87.480 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.786 1.722 0.989 7.455 9.972 
      
 Observations 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 
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Appendix B2 cont/d     
Descriptive Statistics on absolute values of net (buy-sell) order flow - Daily Frequency. 
(all values * 10^9)     
      
Euro_JPY      
 Corporate(A) Levered(A) Unlevered(A) Other(A) Total(A) 
 Mean 0.018 0.013 0.010 0.061 0.070 
 Median 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.036 0.044 
 Maximum 0.483 0.152 0.257 0.833 0.820 
 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Std. Dev. 0.036 0.019 0.017 0.078 0.083 
 Skewness 7.271 3.065 5.548 3.761 3.419 
 Kurtosis 72.778 14.835 57.562 25.661 20.964 
      
 Jarque-Bera 185856.800 6498.775 113413.100 20856.320 13516.020 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 15.661 11.375 9.213 53.995 61.487 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1.137 0.329 0.267 5.372 6.081 
      
 Observations 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 
      
      
      
GBP_USD      
 Corporate(A) Levered(A) Unlevered(A) Other(A) Total(A) 
 Mean 0.047 0.029 0.022 0.066 0.093 
 Median 0.032 0.016 0.013 0.045 0.064 
 Maximum 0.535 0.407 0.353 1.225 1.109 
 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Std. Dev. 0.052 0.038 0.031 0.077 0.096 
 Skewness 3.065 3.443 4.449 5.288 3.090 
 Kurtosis 18.089 23.466 32.089 64.690 22.271 
      
 Jarque-Bera 9704.319 17057.090 33852.540 143314.600 14983.280 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 41.332 25.522 19.398 57.954 82.000 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.386 1.258 0.863 5.147 8.051 
      
 Observations 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 
      
      
      
GBP_JPY      
 Corporate(A) Levered(A) Unlevered(A) Other(A) Total(A) 
 Mean 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.013 0.017 
 Median 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.009 
 Maximum 0.307 0.200 0.506 0.517 0.521 
 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Std. Dev. 0.014 0.009 0.019 0.030 0.029 
 Skewness 13.951 14.894 21.438 11.416 8.358 
 Kurtosis 260.751 308.411 549.081 179.066 119.311 
      
 Jarque-Bera 2458906.000 3444797.000 10976574.000 1153133.000 505134.500 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 5.095 1.763 3.534 11.273 14.736 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.182 0.067 0.319 0.772 0.740 
      
 Observations 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 878.000 
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Appendix B3      
Descriptive Statistics on actual values of net (buy-sell) order flow - 5 Day Frequency. 
(all values * 10^9)     
       
       
 USD_JPY      
  Corporate(5) Levered(5) Unlevered(5) Other(5) Total(5) 
 Mean 0.007 0.017 0.003 -0.046 -0.019 
 Median 0.007 0.008 -0.002 -0.046 -0.057 
 Maximum 0.616 0.574 0.414 1.594 1.804 
 Minimum -0.833 -0.295 -0.321 -1.112 -1.258 
 Std. Dev. 0.161 0.137 0.130 0.410 0.505 
 Skewness -0.187 0.447 0.386 0.436 0.592 
 Kurtosis 8.442 4.461 3.840 5.195 4.446 
       
 Jarque-Bera 218.204 21.523 9.547 40.892 25.613 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 
       
 Sum 1.299 2.951 0.507 -8.151 -3.395 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 4.513 3.265 2.961 29.386 44.643 
       
 Observations 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 
       
       
 Euro_USD      
  Corporate(5) Levered(5) Unlevered(5) Other(5) Total(5) 
 Mean -0.182 0.018 -0.026 0.124 -0.066 
 Median -0.191 0.031 -0.015 0.063 -0.095 
 Maximum 0.775 0.919 0.862 2.953 2.487 
 Minimum -1.273 -0.734 -0.756 -1.034 -1.524 
 Std. Dev. 0.320 0.221 0.186 0.531 0.639 
 Skewness 0.159 0.328 -0.212 1.618 0.777 
 Kurtosis 3.663 4.597 8.614 8.669 5.165 
       
 Jarque-Bera 3.966 21.853 232.448 312.455 52.087 
 Probability 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
 Sum -32.060 3.189 -4.496 21.811 -11.557 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 17.889 8.556 6.041 49.256 71.422 
       
 Observations 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 
       
       
 Euro_GBP      
  Corporate(5) Levered(5) Unlevered(5) Other(5) Total(5) 
 Mean 0.094 -0.005 0.001 0.080 0.170 
 Median 0.104 -0.005 0.004 0.074 0.186 
 Maximum 0.813 0.399 0.302 1.213 1.250 
 Minimum -0.660 -0.843 -0.351 -1.433 -1.218 
 Std. Dev. 0.175 0.114 0.079 0.295 0.357 
 Skewness -0.025 -2.455 -0.759 -0.400 -0.414 
 Kurtosis 5.914 21.691 8.186 8.628 4.622 
       
 Jarque-Bera 62.276 2738.721 214.146 236.949 24.318 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
 Sum 16.523 -0.941 0.172 14.114 29.868 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 5.334 2.277 1.081 15.280 22.296 
       
 Observations 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 
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Appendix B3 cont/d     
Descriptive Statistics on actual values of net (buy-sell) order flow - 5 Day Frequency. 
(all values * 10^9)     
       
 Euro_JPY      
  Corporate(5) Levered(5) Unlevered(5) Other(5) Total(5) 
 Mean -0.005 -0.001 0.003 -0.026 -0.029 
 Median -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.019 -0.010 
 Maximum 0.361 0.211 0.285 0.671 0.789 
 Minimum -0.473 -0.164 -0.124 -1.319 -1.320 
 Std. Dev. 0.087 0.050 0.049 0.278 0.289 
 Skewness -1.755 0.484 2.025 -1.329 -0.866 
 Kurtosis 14.233 5.786 11.673 8.447 6.983 
       
 Jarque-Bera 1015.723 63.800 671.885 269.368 138.324 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
 Sum -0.943 -0.243 0.582 -4.511 -5.114 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1.318 0.433 0.416 13.485 14.634 
       
 Observations 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 
       
       
       
 GBP_USD      
  Corporate(5) Levered(5) Unlevered(5) Other(5) Total(5) 
 Mean 0.014 0.004 0.014 0.023 0.055 
 Median -0.004 0.001 0.006 0.012 0.051 
 Maximum 0.882 0.417 0.360 1.160 0.961 
 Minimum -0.496 -0.318 -0.320 -0.515 -1.044 
 Std. Dev. 0.162 0.101 0.090 0.219 0.269 
 Skewness 0.773 0.237 0.623 0.681 0.103 
 Kurtosis 7.540 4.850 6.298 6.489 4.725 
       
 Jarque-Bera 168.701 26.737 91.160 102.857 22.129 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
 Sum 2.524 0.706 2.424 3.983 9.638 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 4.584 1.790 1.418 8.426 12.651 
       
 Observations 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 
       
       
       
 GBP_JPY      
  Corporate(5) Levered(5) Unlevered(5) Other(5) Total(5) 
 Mean 0.004 -0.001 -0.006 -0.009 -0.013 
 Median 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.007 -0.009 
 Maximum 0.290 0.068 0.107 0.497 0.310 
 Minimum -0.077 -0.224 -0.503 -0.551 -0.571 
 Std. Dev. 0.034 0.022 0.044 0.074 0.077 
 Skewness 4.646 -5.658 -8.552 -0.505 -1.870 
 Kurtosis 38.023 62.294 97.761 30.119 18.882 
       
 Jarque-Bera 9628.188 26721.220 67995.820 5400.687 1952.335 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
 Sum 0.638 -0.182 -1.106 -1.577 -2.228 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.199 0.085 0.334 0.964 1.047 
       
 Observations 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 
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Appendix B4      
Descriptive Statistics on absolute values of net (buy-sell) order flow - 5 Day Frequency. 
(all values * 10^9)     
      
      
USD_JPY      
 Corporate(5A) Levered(5A) Unlevered(5A) Other(5A) Total(5A) 
 Mean 0.110 0.102 0.095 0.293 0.375 
 Median 0.076 0.080 0.063 0.210 0.285 
 Maximum 0.833 0.574 0.414 1.594 1.804 
 Minimum 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 Std. Dev. 0.117 0.092 0.089 0.290 0.338 
 Skewness 2.742 1.635 1.300 1.710 1.546 
 Kurtosis 13.545 7.116 4.046 6.168 5.980 
      
 Jarque-Bera 1036.122 202.653 57.569 159.324 135.257 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 19.384 18.019 16.663 51.504 66.017 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.388 1.470 1.385 14.691 19.946 
      
 Observations 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 
      
      
EURO_USD      
 Corporate(5A) Levered(5A) Unlevered(5A) Other(5A) Total(5A) 
 Mean 0.294 0.171 0.126 0.370 0.485 
 Median 0.257 0.142 0.094 0.280 0.377 
 Maximum 1.273 0.919 0.862 2.953 2.487 
 Minimum 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 
 Std. Dev. 0.221 0.141 0.139 0.399 0.419 
 Skewness 1.004 1.874 2.776 3.007 1.851 
 Kurtosis 4.400 8.554 12.554 15.784 8.031 
      
 Jarque-Bera 43.953 329.147 895.536 1463.755 286.120 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 51.753 30.059 22.088 65.159 85.447 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 8.511 3.480 3.384 27.836 30.697 
      
 Observations 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 
      
      
EURO_GBP      
 Corporate(5A) Levered(5A) Unlevered(5A) Other(5A) Total(5A) 
 Mean 0.153 0.066 0.050 0.203 0.310 
 Median 0.130 0.037 0.029 0.140 0.251 
 Maximum 0.813 0.843 0.351 1.433 1.250 
 Minimum 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
 Std. Dev. 0.126 0.093 0.061 0.229 0.244 
 Skewness 1.850 4.590 2.491 2.394 1.299 
 Kurtosis 8.288 33.211 10.165 10.195 4.973 
      
 Jarque-Bera 305.482 7311.038 558.471 547.766 78.047 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 26.886 11.536 8.757 35.766 54.587 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.779 1.526 0.645 9.144 10.434 
      
 Observations 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 
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Appendix B4 cont/d     
Descriptive Statistics on absolute values of net (buy-sell) order flow - 5 Day Frequency. 
(all values * 10^9)     
      
EURO_JPY      
 Corporate(5A) Levered(5A) Unlevered(5A) Other(5A) Total(5A) 
 Mean 0.048 0.035 0.032 0.185 0.199 
 Median 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.128 0.142 
 Maximum 0.473 0.211 0.285 1.319 1.320 
 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 
 Std. Dev. 0.072 0.035 0.037 0.208 0.211 
 Skewness 3.610 1.937 3.461 2.757 2.375 
 Kurtosis 18.096 7.946 20.574 13.141 10.822 
      
 Jarque-Bera 2053.582 289.486 2616.109 977.048 614.194 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 8.511 6.148 5.648 32.495 35.030 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.912 0.219 0.236 7.601 7.811 
      
 Observations 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 
      
      
      
GBP_USD      
 Corporate(5A) Levered(5A) Unlevered(5A) Other(5A) Total(5A) 
 Mean 0.116 0.075 0.063 0.161 0.210 
 Median 0.089 0.057 0.045 0.124 0.160 
 Maximum 0.882 0.417 0.360 1.160 1.044 
 Minimum 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 
 Std. Dev. 0.113 0.068 0.066 0.150 0.176 
 Skewness 2.592 1.794 2.256 2.296 1.912 
 Kurtosis 14.641 7.429 8.742 13.074 7.919 
      
 Jarque-Bera 1190.836 238.327 391.024 898.765 284.702 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 20.443 13.194 11.001 28.389 37.020 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.245 0.804 0.764 3.937 5.392 
      
 Observations 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 
      
      
      
GBP_JPY      
 Corporate(5A) Levered(5A) Unlevered(5A) Other(5A) Total(5A) 
 Mean 0.017 0.008 0.014 0.038 0.049 
 Median 0.010 0.003 0.006 0.018 0.034 
 Maximum 0.290 0.224 0.503 0.551 0.571 
 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Std. Dev. 0.029 0.020 0.042 0.064 0.061 
 Skewness 6.405 7.351 9.593 5.365 4.408 
 Kurtosis 53.742 73.000 109.401 39.190 33.254 
      
 Jarque-Bera 20084.990 37517.990 85720.470 10449.030 7282.166 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 3.016 1.468 2.513 6.705 8.584 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.149 0.073 0.305 0.722 0.656 
      
 Observations 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 176.000 
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Appendix B5      
Descriptive Statistics on actual values of net (buy-sell) order flow - 10 Day Frequency. 
(all values * 10^9)     
      
USD_JPY      
 Corporate(10) Levered(10) Unlevered(10) Other(10) Total(10) 
 Mean 0.015 0.034 0.006 -0.093 -0.039 
 Median 0.011 0.018 -0.009 -0.112 -0.038 
 Maximum 0.714 0.614 0.598 1.580 1.758 
 Minimum -0.746 -0.448 -0.607 -1.399 -1.428 
 Std. Dev. 0.236 0.185 0.200 0.598 0.736 
 Skewness -0.195 0.112 0.187 0.324 0.327 
 Kurtosis 4.418 3.766 4.095 3.257 2.783 
      
 Jarque-Bera 7.931 2.337 4.907 1.785 1.743 
 Probability 0.019 0.311 0.086 0.410 0.418 
      
 Sum 1.299 2.951 0.507 -8.151 -3.395 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 4.854 2.969 3.465 31.101 47.123 
      
 Observations 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 
      
      
      
Euro_USD      
 Corporate(10) Levered(10) Unlevered(10) Other(10) Total(10) 
 Mean -0.364 0.036 -0.051 0.248 -0.131 
 Median -0.476 0.038 -0.059 0.072 -0.134 
 Maximum 0.903 0.761 0.875 3.916 2.992 
 Minimum -1.675 -0.602 -1.382 -1.387 -2.399 
 Std. Dev. 0.527 0.251 0.276 0.870 0.973 
 Skewness 0.354 0.230 -0.464 1.608 0.437 
 Kurtosis 2.796 3.515 9.795 6.813 3.731 
      
 Jarque-Bera 1.987 1.750 172.439 91.219 4.757 
 Probability 0.370 0.417 0.000 0.000 0.093 
      
 Sum -32.060 3.189 -4.496 21.811 -11.557 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 24.187 5.485 6.629 65.826 82.443 
      
 Observations 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 
      
      
      
Euro_GBP      
 Corporate(10) Levered(10) Unlevered(10) Other(10) Total(10) 
 Mean 0.188 -0.011 0.002 0.160 0.339 
 Median 0.178 -0.012 0.013 0.125 0.367 
 Maximum 1.214 0.397 0.322 1.372 1.779 
 Minimum -0.773 -0.740 -0.377 -0.629 -0.694 
 Std. Dev. 0.275 0.166 0.108 0.370 0.498 
 Skewness 0.186 -1.146 -0.682 0.728 0.086 
 Kurtosis 5.475 7.918 6.173 4.183 2.922 
      
 Jarque-Bera 22.971 107.968 43.732 12.900 0.131 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.936 
      
 Sum 16.523 -0.941 0.172 14.114 29.868 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 6.567 2.409 1.010 11.921 21.614 
      
 Observations 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 
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Appendix B5 cont/d     
Descriptive Statistics on actual values of net (buy-sell) order flow - 10 Day Frequency. 
(all values * 10^9)     
      
Euro_JPY      
 Corporate(10) Levered(10) Unlevered(10) Other(10) Total(10) 
 Mean -0.011 -0.003 0.007 -0.051 -0.058 
 Median -0.004 -0.007 0.002 -0.041 -0.055 
 Maximum 0.351 0.158 0.277 1.060 0.989 
 Minimum -0.510 -0.185 -0.130 -1.479 -1.402 
 Std. Dev. 0.126 0.063 0.066 0.363 0.383 
 Skewness -1.182 0.004 1.014 -0.615 -0.259 
 Kurtosis 8.031 3.211 5.519 5.775 4.290 
      
 Jarque-Bera 113.312 0.164 38.341 33.785 7.079 
 Probability 0.000 0.921 0.000 0.000 0.029 
      
 Sum -0.943 -0.243 0.582 -4.511 -5.114 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1.376 0.345 0.384 11.450 12.758 
      
 Observations 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 
      
      
      
GBP_USD      
 Corporate(10) Levered(10) Unlevered(10) Other(10) Total(10) 
 Mean 0.029 0.008 0.028 0.045 0.110 
 Median -0.002 0.010 0.014 0.023 0.086 
 Maximum 0.717 0.450 0.442 1.238 1.158 
 Minimum -0.569 -0.330 -0.411 -0.970 -1.511 
 Std. Dev. 0.226 0.143 0.133 0.334 0.416 
 Skewness 0.152 0.543 0.243 0.327 -0.462 
 Kurtosis 3.457 4.110 4.440 4.589 4.772 
      
 Jarque-Bera 1.106 8.841 8.467 10.823 14.644 
 Probability 0.575 0.012 0.014 0.004 0.001 
      
 Sum 2.524 0.706 2.424 3.983 9.638 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 4.434 1.777 1.542 9.682 15.060 
      
 Observations 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 
      
      
      
GBP_JPY      
 Corporate(10) Levered(10) Unlevered(10) Other(10) Total(10) 
 Mean 0.007 -0.002 -0.013 -0.018 -0.025 
 Median 0.000 0.000 -0.007 -0.010 -0.019 
 Maximum 0.278 0.075 0.097 0.514 0.288 
 Minimum -0.055 -0.220 -0.495 -0.550 -0.546 
 Std. Dev. 0.046 0.031 0.060 0.109 0.108 
 Skewness 3.366 -3.875 -6.128 -0.096 -1.269 
 Kurtosis 18.982 29.403 49.684 13.954 8.836 
      
 Jarque-Bera 1102.724 2776.337 8541.671 440.138 148.511 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 0.638 -0.182 -1.106 -1.577 -2.228 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.181 0.084 0.312 1.037 1.006 
      
 Observations 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 
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Appendix B6      
Descriptive Statistics on absolute values of net (buy-sell) order flow - 10 Day Frequency. 
(all values * 10^9)     
      
USD_JPY      
 Corporate(10A) Levered(10A) Unlevered(10A) Other(10A) Total(10A) 
 Mean 0.172 0.142 0.148 0.459 0.586 
 Median 0.127 0.121 0.114 0.333 0.447 
 Maximum 0.746 0.614 0.607 1.580 1.758 
 Minimum 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.002 0.012 
 Std. Dev. 0.162 0.122 0.133 0.391 0.443 
 Skewness 1.534 1.360 1.480 0.908 0.802 
 Kurtosis 5.324 4.954 5.279 2.909 2.814 
      
 Jarque-Bera 54.305 41.122 51.165 12.123 9.553 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.008 
      
 Sum 15.136 12.524 13.060 40.427 51.545 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.269 1.285 1.529 13.284 17.062 
      
 Observations 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 
      
      
Euro_USD      
 Corporate(10A) Levered(10A) Unlevered(10A) Other(10A) Total(10A) 
 Mean 0.546 0.197 0.190 0.587 0.739 
 Median 0.506 0.178 0.138 0.389 0.549 
 Maximum 1.675 0.761 1.382 3.916 2.992 
 Minimum 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 Std. Dev. 0.333 0.158 0.206 0.686 0.642 
 Skewness 0.605 1.348 3.122 2.459 1.131 
 Kurtosis 3.360 5.242 16.095 10.225 3.954 
      
 Jarque-Bera 5.849 45.071 771.649 280.080 22.088 
 Probability 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 48.020 17.340 16.735 51.635 65.032 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 9.664 2.183 3.676 40.934 35.903 
      
 Observations 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 
      
      
Euro_GBP      
 Corporate(10A) Levered(10A) Unlevered(10A) Other(10A) Total(10A) 
 Mean 0.253 0.112 0.071 0.296 0.497 
 Median 0.198 0.081 0.045 0.236 0.440 
 Maximum 1.214 0.740 0.377 1.372 1.779 
 Minimum 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.034 
 Std. Dev. 0.216 0.123 0.081 0.273 0.340 
 Skewness 1.531 2.678 2.031 1.731 1.093 
 Kurtosis 6.300 12.150 6.907 6.359 4.630 
      
 Jarque-Bera 74.305 412.159 116.469 85.295 27.275 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 22.230 9.867 6.236 26.053 43.719 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 4.053 1.313 0.568 6.471 10.031 
      
 Observations 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 
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Appendix B6 cont/d     
Descriptive Statistics on absolute values of net (buy-sell) order flow - 10 Day Frequency. 
(all values * 10^9)     
      
Euro_JPY      
 Corporate(10A) Levered(10A) Unlevered(10A) Other(10A) Total(10A) 
 Mean 0.075 0.049 0.048 0.260 0.288 
 Median 0.037 0.041 0.035 0.197 0.196 
 Maximum 0.510 0.185 0.277 1.479 1.402 
 Minimum 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.009 0.002 
 Std. Dev. 0.101 0.039 0.046 0.257 0.257 
 Skewness 2.510 1.054 2.098 2.117 1.579 
 Kurtosis 9.100 3.899 9.534 8.963 6.238 
      
 Jarque-Bera 228.821 19.273 221.100 196.155 74.988 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 6.602 4.297 4.247 22.868 25.358 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.891 0.136 0.183 5.738 5.748 
      
 Observations 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 
      
      
GBP_USD      
 Corporate(10A) Levered(10A) Unlevered(10A) Other(10A) Total(10A) 
 Mean 0.175 0.105 0.099 0.248 0.320 
 Median 0.132 0.076 0.075 0.180 0.265 
 Maximum 0.717 0.450 0.442 1.238 1.511 
 Minimum 0.008 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.001 
 Std. Dev. 0.144 0.096 0.092 0.226 0.286 
 Skewness 1.265 1.543 1.621 1.721 1.401 
 Kurtosis 4.526 5.187 5.890 6.692 5.650 
      
 Jarque-Bera 32.025 52.477 69.139 93.434 54.541 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 15.423 9.284 8.753 21.809 28.173 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1.804 0.803 0.738 4.458 7.096 
      
 Observations 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 
      
      
GBP_JPY      
 Corporate(10A) Levered(10A) Unlevered(10A) Other(10A) Total(10A) 
 Mean 0.025 0.014 0.023 0.067 0.075 
 Median 0.014 0.006 0.011 0.037 0.050 
 Maximum 0.278 0.220 0.495 0.550 0.546 
 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
 Std. Dev. 0.039 0.028 0.056 0.088 0.081 
 Skewness 4.419 5.174 6.945 3.606 2.962 
 Kurtosis 26.219 36.594 57.028 18.839 15.709 
      
 Jarque-Bera 2263.121 4530.591 11410.260 1110.615 720.981 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 2.174 1.269 2.064 5.878 6.613 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.132 0.066 0.277 0.673 0.565 
      
 Observations 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 88.000 
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Appendix B7      
Descriptive Statistics on actual values of net (buy-sell) order flow - 15 Day Frequency. 
(all values * 10^9)     
      
USD_JPY      
 Corporate(15) Levered(15) Unlevered(15) Other(15) Total(15) 
 Mean 0.022 0.050 0.009 -0.138 -0.058 
 Median 0.028 0.069 -0.007 -0.151 0.047 
 Maximum 0.915 0.654 0.960 1.648 2.340 
 Minimum -0.764 -0.558 -0.620 -1.598 -2.036 
 Std. Dev. 0.285 0.221 0.265 0.732 0.904 
 Skewness -0.213 -0.209 0.631 0.185 0.026 
 Kurtosis 4.778 3.627 4.748 2.909 3.041 
      
 Jarque-Bera 8.221 1.397 11.436 0.358 0.011 
 Probability 0.016 0.497 0.003 0.836 0.994 
      
 Sum 1.299 2.951 0.507 -8.151 -3.395 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 4.702 2.844 4.059 31.063 47.406 
      
 Observations 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 
      
      
      
Euro_USD      
 Corporate(15) Levered(15) Unlevered(15) Other(15) Total(15) 
 Mean -0.543 0.054 -0.076 0.370 -0.196 
 Median -0.710 0.095 -0.129 0.159 -0.254 
 Maximum 0.805 0.918 0.940 3.313 2.474 
 Minimum -1.717 -0.696 -0.886 -2.074 -2.851 
 Std. Dev. 0.626 0.329 0.300 1.052 1.157 
 Skewness 0.428 -0.041 0.315 0.827 0.044 
 Kurtosis 2.230 3.007 4.430 3.798 2.582 
      
 Jarque-Bera 3.264 0.017 6.002 8.298 0.447 
 Probability 0.196 0.992 0.050 0.016 0.800 
      
 Sum -32.060 3.189 -4.496 21.811 -11.557 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 22.729 6.267 5.221 64.198 77.580 
      
 Observations 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 
      
      
      
Euro_GBP      
 Corporate(15) Levered(15) Unlevered(15) Other(15) Total(15) 
 Mean 0.280 -0.016 0.003 0.239 0.506 
 Median 0.259 -0.023 0.031 0.162 0.581 
 Maximum 1.163 0.435 0.289 1.723 1.940 
 Minimum -0.595 -0.839 -0.581 -1.915 -1.541 
 Std. Dev. 0.353 0.220 0.158 0.551 0.683 
 Skewness 0.306 -1.417 -1.348 -0.133 -0.408 
 Kurtosis 3.376 7.724 6.340 6.614 3.299 
      
 Jarque-Bera 1.265 74.598 45.304 32.275 1.853 
 Probability 0.531 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.396 
      
 Sum 16.523 -0.941 0.172 14.114 29.868 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 7.232 2.814 1.448 17.582 27.037 
      
 Observations 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 
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Appendix B7 cont/d     
Descriptive Statistics on actual values of net (buy-sell) order flow - 15 Day Frequency. 
(all values * 10^9)     
      
Euro_JPY      
 Corporate(15) Levered(15) Unlevered(15) Other(15) Total(15) 
 Mean -0.016 -0.004 0.010 -0.076 -0.087 
 Median -0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.080 -0.076 
 Maximum 0.348 0.225 0.293 1.083 1.154 
 Minimum -0.492 -0.184 -0.179 -1.266 -1.259 
 Std. Dev. 0.148 0.075 0.086 0.405 0.438 
 Skewness -1.042 0.205 0.725 -0.528 -0.140 
 Kurtosis 5.727 3.616 3.936 4.884 3.752 
      
 Jarque-Bera 28.954 1.346 7.321 11.469 1.581 
 Probability 0.000 0.510 0.026 0.003 0.454 
      
 Sum -0.943 -0.243 0.582 -4.511 -5.114 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1.276 0.331 0.425 9.521 11.127 
      
 Observations 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 
      
      
      
GBP_USD      
 Corporate(15) Levered(15) Unlevered(15) Other(15) Total(15) 
 Mean 0.043 0.012 0.041 0.068 0.163 
 Median 0.031 0.016 0.032 0.069 0.153 
 Maximum 0.823 0.597 0.584 1.015 1.120 
 Minimum -0.521 -0.461 -0.429 -1.485 -1.844 
 Std. Dev. 0.268 0.184 0.168 0.404 0.514 
 Skewness 0.158 0.368 0.555 -0.627 -0.743 
 Kurtosis 3.162 4.550 4.936 5.566 5.422 
      
 Jarque-Bera 0.311 7.235 12.236 20.056 19.854 
 Probability 0.856 0.027 0.002 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 2.524 0.706 2.424 3.983 9.638 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 4.151 1.955 1.639 9.459 15.324 
      
 Observations 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 
      
      
      
GBP_JPY      
 Corporate(15) Levered(15) Unlevered(15) Other(15) Total(15) 
 Mean 0.011 -0.003 -0.019 -0.027 -0.038 
 Median 0.001 -0.002 -0.011 -0.011 -0.025 
 Maximum 0.337 0.084 0.111 0.503 0.309 
 Minimum -0.111 -0.201 -0.494 -0.535 -0.512 
 Std. Dev. 0.062 0.036 0.072 0.133 0.135 
 Skewness 2.893 -2.591 -4.926 -0.066 -0.665 
 Kurtosis 15.446 16.614 33.211 9.236 5.680 
      
 Jarque-Bera 463.072 521.627 2482.389 95.640 22.005 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 0.638 -0.182 -1.106 -1.577 -2.228 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.226 0.077 0.304 1.018 1.063 
      
 Observations 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 
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Appendix B8      
Descriptive Statistics on absolute values of net (buy-sell) order flow - 15 Day Frequency. 
(all values * 10^9)      
      
USD_JPY      
 Corporate(15A) Levered(15A) Unlevered(15A) Other(15A) Total(15A) 
 Mean 0.199 0.177 0.196 0.578 0.709 
 Median 0.123 0.148 0.153 0.408 0.572 
 Maximum 0.915 0.654 0.960 1.648 2.340 
 Minimum 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.025 0.047 
 Std. Dev. 0.203 0.140 0.176 0.464 0.557 
 Skewness 1.573 1.247 1.745 0.798 1.032 
 Kurtosis 5.328 4.581 7.572 2.503 3.378 
      
 Jarque-Bera 37.655 21.448 81.309 6.863 10.817 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.004 
      
 Sum 11.755 10.450 11.541 34.077 41.811 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.388 1.141 1.806 12.507 17.972 
      
 Observations 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 
      
      
      
Euro_USD      
 Corporate(15A) Levered(15A) Unlevered(15A) Other(15A) Total(15A) 
 Mean 0.716 0.264 0.242 0.766 0.953 
 Median 0.738 0.210 0.216 0.496 0.763 
 Maximum 1.717 0.918 0.940 3.313 2.851 
 Minimum 0.000 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.026 
 Std. Dev. 0.414 0.200 0.191 0.806 0.672 
 Skewness 0.159 1.012 1.688 1.509 0.787 
 Kurtosis 2.340 3.724 6.464 4.539 2.928 
      
 Jarque-Bera 1.321 11.356 57.537 28.204 6.107 
 Probability 0.517 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.047 
      
 Sum 42.215 15.582 14.279 45.180 56.245 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 9.946 2.325 2.108 37.664 26.226 
      
 Observations 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 
      
      
      
Euro_GBP      
 Corporate(15A) Levered(15A) Unlevered(15A) Other(15A) Total(15A) 
 Mean 0.353 0.148 0.106 0.396 0.704 
 Median 0.321 0.097 0.074 0.225 0.630 
 Maximum 1.163 0.839 0.581 1.915 1.940 
 Minimum 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.007 0.028 
 Std. Dev. 0.279 0.163 0.116 0.449 0.472 
 Skewness 1.115 2.710 2.105 1.761 0.626 
 Kurtosis 3.949 11.609 7.840 5.447 2.725 
      
 Jarque-Bera 14.449 254.397 101.179 45.205 4.036 
 Probability 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.133 
      
 Sum 20.807 8.715 6.280 23.363 41.542 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 4.522 1.541 0.780 11.708 12.907 
      
 Observations 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 
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Appendix B8 cont/d      
Descriptive Statistics on absolute values of net (buy-sell) order flow - 15 Day Frequency. 
(all values * 10^9)      
      
Euro_JPY      
 Corporate(15A) Levered(15A) Unlevered(15A) Other(15A) Total(15A) 
 Mean 0.094 0.057 0.063 0.297 0.339 
 Median 0.052 0.048 0.049 0.221 0.282 
 Maximum 0.492 0.225 0.293 1.266 1.259 
 Minimum 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.014 0.000 
 Std. Dev. 0.116 0.049 0.058 0.284 0.287 
 Skewness 1.949 1.186 1.439 1.986 1.399 
 Kurtosis 6.164 4.369 5.578 6.596 5.004 
      
 Jarque-Bera 61.980 18.446 36.698 70.558 29.129 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 5.524 3.361 3.723 17.511 20.007 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.774 0.140 0.196 4.669 4.786 
      
 Observations 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 
      
      
      
GBP_USD      
 Corporate(15A) Levered(15A) Unlevered(15A) Other(15A) Total(15A) 
 Mean 0.214 0.135 0.123 0.301 0.412 
 Median 0.157 0.089 0.086 0.228 0.384 
 Maximum 0.823 0.597 0.584 1.485 1.844 
 Minimum 0.018 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.007 
 Std. Dev. 0.164 0.124 0.121 0.275 0.344 
 Skewness 1.177 1.754 1.898 1.886 1.597 
 Kurtosis 4.589 6.031 6.608 7.671 6.759 
      
 Jarque-Bera 19.841 52.848 67.445 88.601 59.820 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 12.607 7.938 7.238 17.774 24.329 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1.565 0.895 0.851 4.373 6.866 
      
 Observations 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 
      
      
      
GBP_JPY      
 Corporate(15A) Levered(15A) Unlevered(15A) Other(15A) Total(15A) 
 Mean 0.035 0.020 0.031 0.082 0.096 
 Median 0.021 0.012 0.012 0.041 0.072 
 Maximum 0.337 0.201 0.494 0.535 0.512 
 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Std. Dev. 0.053 0.030 0.068 0.107 0.102 
 Skewness 4.001 4.020 5.655 2.584 2.039 
 Kurtosis 21.419 23.140 38.058 10.432 7.663 
      
 Jarque-Bera 991.393 1156.002 3335.864 201.463 94.356 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 Sum 2.069 1.205 1.821 4.822 5.691 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.160 0.053 0.268 0.666 0.598 
      
 Observations 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 59.000 
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Appendix B9 – Autocorrelation in €/$ Net Flows (Daily) 
EUR_USD Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.020 0.020 0.337 0.562
2 0.052 0.052 2.742 0.254
3 0.092 0.090 10.140 0.017
4 0.055 0.050 12.831 0.012
5 0.068 0.058 16.900 0.005
6 0.059 0.045 19.974 0.003
7 0.024 0.008 20.471 0.005
8 0.077 0.060 25.767 0.001
9 0.030 0.013 26.578 0.002
10 0.009 -0.009 26.647 0.003
EUR_USD Uneveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.039 0.039 1.327 0.249
2 0.014 0.013 1.504 0.472
3 -0.002 -0.003 1.508 0.680
4 0.000 0.000 1.508 0.825
5 0.020 0.020 1.856 0.869
6 0.030 0.028 2.651 0.851
7 0.013 0.010 2.799 0.903
8 0.002 0.000 2.802 0.946
9 -0.015 -0.016 3.011 0.964
10 0.000 0.001 3.011 0.981
EUR_USD Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.043 -0.043 1.635 0.201
2 0.001 -0.001 1.635 0.441
3 -0.041 -0.041 3.094 0.377
4 0.010 0.007 3.186 0.527
5 -0.039 -0.038 4.514 0.478
6 -0.041 -0.046 5.994 0.424
7 -0.028 -0.031 6.681 0.463
8 -0.058 -0.065 9.712 0.286
9 -0.036 -0.046 10.879 0.284
10 0.030 0.022 11.656 0.309
EUR_USD Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.040 0.040 1.399 0.237
2 0.013 0.011 1.548 0.461
3 0.086 0.085 8.010 0.046
4 0.016 0.009 8.232 0.083
5 0.039 0.036 9.549 0.089
6 0.102 0.092 18.698 0.005
7 0.128 0.120 33.169 0.000
8 0.031 0.017 34.044 0.000
9 -0.010 -0.030 34.142 0.000
10 0.053 0.033 36.653 0.000
EUR_USD Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.039 0.039 1.374 0.241
2 0.022 0.021 1.815 0.404
3 0.050 0.049 4.043 0.257
4 0.024 0.020 4.574 0.334
5 0.058 0.054 7.507 0.186
6 0.031 0.024 8.342 0.214
7 0.041 0.036 9.865 0.196
8 -0.006 -0.015 9.895 0.272
9 -0.019 -0.025 10.232 0.332
10 0.038 0.033 11.540 0.317
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Appendix B9 – Autocorrelation in €/£ Net Flows (Daily) 
EUR_GBP Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.068 0.068 4.069 0.044
2 0.039 0.035 5.427 0.066
3 0.046 0.041 7.299 0.063
4 0.020 0.014 7.668 0.105
5 0.053 0.048 10.124 0.072
6 0.091 0.083 17.524 0.008
7 0.034 0.019 18.554 0.010
8 0.023 0.010 19.005 0.015
9 0.021 0.009 19.399 0.022
10 -0.005 -0.015 19.424 0.035
EUR_GBP Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.020 -0.020 0.366 0.545
2 -0.025 -0.025 0.916 0.632
3 -0.079 -0.080 6.461 0.091
4 0.036 0.033 7.634 0.106
5 -0.006 -0.009 7.671 0.175
6 0.058 0.053 10.620 0.101
7 -0.033 -0.026 11.580 0.115
8 0.014 0.013 11.744 0.163
9 0.007 0.015 11.785 0.226
10 0.013 0.006 11.941 0.289
EUR_GBP Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.005 0.005 0.020 0.889
2 0.001 0.001 0.021 0.989
3 0.022 0.022 0.451 0.930
4 0.007 0.007 0.491 0.974
5 -0.027 -0.027 1.135 0.951
6 -0.034 -0.034 2.159 0.905
7 0.044 0.044 3.841 0.798
8 -0.081 -0.081 9.734 0.284
9 0.052 0.056 12.177 0.204
10 -0.016 -0.019 12.392 0.260
EUR_GBP Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.138 0.138 16.817 0.000
2 0.038 0.020 18.119 0.000
3 0.002 -0.006 18.122 0.000
4 -0.021 -0.022 18.524 0.001
5 0.094 0.102 26.417 0.000
6 -0.054 -0.082 29.026 0.000
7 -0.052 -0.041 31.438 0.000
8 -0.002 0.016 31.441 0.000
9 -0.026 -0.021 32.058 0.000
10 -0.042 -0.052 33.600 0.000
EUR_GBP Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.136 0.136 16.369 0.000
2 -0.004 -0.023 16.387 0.000
3 0.024 0.028 16.897 0.001
4 0.002 -0.005 16.901 0.002
5 0.091 0.094 24.228 0.000
6 0.000 -0.027 24.228 0.000
7 -0.022 -0.015 24.642 0.001
8 0.010 0.011 24.739 0.002
9 -0.022 -0.024 25.169 0.003
10 -0.026 -0.028 25.784 0.004
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Appendix B9 – Autocorrelation in €/¥ Net Flows (Daily) 
 
EUR_JPY Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.019 0.019 0.312 0.576
2 -0.059 -0.060 3.397 0.183
3 -0.094 -0.092 11.219 0.011
4 -0.007 -0.007 11.258 0.024
5 0.067 0.057 15.189 0.010
6 0.034 0.023 16.187 0.013
7 0.001 0.006 16.189 0.023
8 -0.056 -0.042 18.945 0.015
9 -0.056 -0.050 21.771 0.010
10 0.018 0.012 22.070 0.015
EUR_JPY Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.029 -0.029 0.723 0.395
2 0.045 0.044 2.471 0.291
3 -0.031 -0.029 3.343 0.342
4 -0.005 -0.009 3.369 0.498
5 -0.030 -0.028 4.163 0.526
6 -0.008 -0.010 4.218 0.647
7 0.024 0.026 4.724 0.694
8 -0.003 -0.003 4.731 0.786
9 0.009 0.006 4.809 0.851
10 -0.003 -0.002 4.816 0.903
EUR_JPY Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.041 0.041 1.457 0.227
2 0.004 0.003 1.474 0.478
3 -0.026 -0.026 2.078 0.556
4 -0.006 -0.004 2.111 0.715
5 -0.031 -0.031 2.987 0.702
6 0.038 0.040 4.295 0.637
7 -0.039 -0.043 5.670 0.579
8 -0.030 -0.029 6.472 0.595
9 0.007 0.012 6.517 0.687
10 -0.058 -0.062 9.487 0.487
EUR_JPY Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.208 0.208 38.285 0.000
2 0.068 0.026 42.387 0.000
3 -0.039 -0.061 43.738 0.000
4 -0.037 -0.019 44.919 0.000
5 -0.035 -0.019 46.027 0.000
6 -0.043 -0.033 47.688 0.000
7 0.015 0.032 47.892 0.000
8 0.012 0.003 48.012 0.000
9 0.017 0.006 48.259 0.000
10 -0.031 -0.038 49.099 0.000
EUR_JPY Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.162 0.162 23.050 0.000
2 0.058 0.032 25.990 0.000
3 -0.055 -0.071 28.657 0.000
4 -0.031 -0.013 29.480 0.000
5 -0.017 -0.003 29.727 0.000
6 -0.033 -0.032 30.686 0.000
7 0.017 0.026 30.952 0.000
8 -0.027 -0.033 31.589 0.000
9 0.008 0.011 31.642 0.000
10 -0.036 -0.036 32.809 0.000
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Appendix B9 – Autocorrelation in $/¥ Net Flows (Daily) 
 
USD_JPY Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.054 0.054 2.577 0.108
2 -0.001 -0.004 2.578 0.276
3 0.032 0.033 3.488 0.322
4 -0.017 -0.020 3.729 0.444
5 -0.022 -0.019 4.139 0.530
6 0.047 0.049 6.136 0.408
7 -0.034 -0.039 7.181 0.410
8 -0.054 -0.049 9.790 0.280
9 -0.025 -0.024 10.366 0.322
10 -0.011 -0.006 10.483 0.399
USD_JPY Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.055 0.055 2.642 0.104
2 0.069 0.066 6.799 0.033
3 0.071 0.065 11.313 0.010
4 -0.048 -0.060 13.381 0.010
5 0.029 0.026 14.125 0.015
6 0.049 0.049 16.210 0.013
7 0.045 0.044 17.979 0.012
8 -0.006 -0.024 18.012 0.021
9 0.019 0.012 18.348 0.031
10 -0.029 -0.030 19.099 0.039
USD_JPY Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.019 -0.019 0.305 0.581
2 0.011 0.011 0.412 0.814
3 -0.057 -0.057 3.287 0.350
4 -0.004 -0.006 3.301 0.509
5 -0.010 -0.009 3.386 0.641
6 -0.004 -0.007 3.399 0.757
7 -0.030 -0.030 4.177 0.759
8 -0.022 -0.024 4.602 0.799
9 -0.040 -0.041 6.038 0.736
10 0.025 0.020 6.600 0.763
USD_JPY Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.067 0.067 3.908 0.048
2 0.033 0.029 4.895 0.086
3 -0.045 -0.049 6.674 0.083
4 0.053 0.059 9.177 0.057
5 0.000 -0.004 9.177 0.102
6 0.062 0.057 12.577 0.050
7 -0.001 -0.004 12.578 0.083
8 0.001 -0.006 12.579 0.127
9 -0.034 -0.028 13.613 0.137
10 -0.007 -0.010 13.658 0.189
USD_JPY Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.095 0.095 7.912 0.005
2 0.045 0.036 9.662 0.008
3 -0.043 -0.051 11.294 0.010
4 0.033 0.041 12.283 0.015
5 0.006 0.003 12.317 0.031
6 0.060 0.055 15.558 0.016
7 -0.049 -0.058 17.708 0.013
8 -0.017 -0.013 17.962 0.022
9 -0.040 -0.028 19.397 0.022
10 -0.018 -0.020 19.680 0.032
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Appendix B9 – Autocorrelation in £/$ Net Flows (Daily) 
 
GBP_USD Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.047 0.047 1.917 0.166
2 -0.006 -0.008 1.949 0.377
3 0.038 0.039 3.257 0.354
4 -0.028 -0.032 3.962 0.411
5 0.003 0.007 3.972 0.554
6 -0.020 -0.022 4.312 0.635
7 0.011 0.015 4.412 0.731
8 0.042 0.039 5.945 0.653
9 -0.081 -0.083 11.718 0.230
10 -0.016 -0.010 11.949 0.289
GBP_USD Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.010 -0.010 0.080 0.778
2 0.037 0.036 1.257 0.534
3 0.017 0.018 1.526 0.676
4 0.003 0.002 1.534 0.821
5 0.039 0.038 2.869 0.720
6 -0.008 -0.008 2.925 0.818
7 0.029 0.026 3.671 0.817
8 0.015 0.015 3.866 0.869
9 0.031 0.030 4.725 0.858
10 0.004 0.002 4.742 0.908
GBP_USD Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.062 -0.062 3.344 0.067
2 -0.015 -0.019 3.548 0.170
3 -0.018 -0.020 3.823 0.281
4 -0.019 -0.022 4.140 0.387
5 -0.047 -0.050 6.085 0.298
6 0.041 0.034 7.597 0.269
7 0.053 0.055 10.050 0.186
8 0.014 0.020 10.216 0.250
9 -0.011 -0.008 10.328 0.325
10 0.005 0.006 10.352 0.410
GBP_USD Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.044 -0.044 1.702 0.192
2 0.039 0.037 3.025 0.220
3 -0.008 -0.005 3.080 0.379
4 -0.016 -0.018 3.304 0.508
5 0.009 0.008 3.372 0.643
6 0.020 0.022 3.742 0.712
7 0.008 0.009 3.794 0.803
8 0.007 0.006 3.840 0.871
9 0.013 0.014 4.001 0.911
10 0.043 0.045 5.684 0.841
GBP_USD Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.038 -0.038 1.304 0.253
2 -0.016 -0.017 1.525 0.467
3 -0.002 -0.004 1.530 0.675
4 0.003 0.002 1.538 0.820
5 -0.015 -0.015 1.727 0.885
6 0.053 0.052 4.246 0.643
7 -0.008 -0.004 4.299 0.745
8 -0.022 -0.021 4.735 0.786
9 -0.041 -0.042 6.200 0.720
10 0.038 0.033 7.464 0.681  
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Appendix B9 – Autocorrelation in £/¥ Net Flows (Daily) 
 
 
GBP_JPY Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.005 -0.005 0.019 0.892
2 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.991
3 -0.010 -0.010 0.112 0.990
4 -0.024 -0.024 0.622 0.961
5 0.008 0.008 0.675 0.984
6 0.037 0.037 1.887 0.930
7 -0.002 -0.002 1.889 0.966
8 -0.008 -0.008 1.944 0.983
9 0.010 0.011 2.028 0.991
10 -0.048 -0.046 4.039 0.946
GBP_JPY Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.014 0.014 0.161 0.688
2 -0.005 -0.005 0.181 0.914
3 -0.008 -0.008 0.237 0.971
4 -0.005 -0.005 0.261 0.992
5 -0.007 -0.007 0.305 0.998
6 -0.008 -0.008 0.367 0.999
7 -0.019 -0.019 0.689 0.998
8 0.030 0.031 1.499 0.993
9 -0.051 -0.052 3.791 0.925
10 0.010 0.012 3.883 0.952
GBP_JPY Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.043 0.043 1.638 0.201
2 0.082 0.081 7.633 0.022
3 -0.034 -0.041 8.628 0.035
4 0.002 -0.002 8.631 0.071
5 0.000 0.006 8.631 0.125
6 -0.011 -0.013 8.740 0.189
7 -0.032 -0.031 9.630 0.211
8 -0.016 -0.012 9.865 0.275
9 0.003 0.009 9.874 0.361
10 -0.014 -0.014 10.040 0.437
GBP_JPY Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.033 0.033 0.946 0.331
2 0.016 0.015 1.162 0.559
3 -0.001 -0.002 1.163 0.762
4 0.007 0.007 1.206 0.877
5 0.025 0.025 1.767 0.880
6 -0.013 -0.015 1.911 0.928
7 0.016 0.016 2.124 0.953
8 0.024 0.023 2.623 0.956
9 0.027 0.025 3.284 0.952
10 -0.010 -0.013 3.368 0.971
GBP_JPY Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.030 0.030 0.802 0.370
2 0.019 0.018 1.112 0.573
3 -0.010 -0.012 1.209 0.751
4 0.035 0.035 2.271 0.686
5 0.010 0.008 2.355 0.798
6 0.000 -0.002 2.355 0.884
7 0.000 0.001 2.355 0.938
8 0.057 0.056 5.262 0.729
9 0.006 0.002 5.295 0.808
10 -0.022 -0.024 5.721 0.838
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Appendix B10 – Autocorrelation in €/$ Net Flows (5 Day) 
 
EUR_USD Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.215 0.215 8.285 0.004
2 0.136 0.094 11.633 0.003
3 0.206 0.169 19.353 0.000
4 0.184 0.111 25.493 0.000
5 0.305 0.243 42.518 0.000
EUR_USD Uneveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.055 0.055 0.540 0.462
2 -0.086 -0.090 1.884 0.390
3 -0.177 -0.169 7.560 0.056
4 -0.058 -0.050 8.175 0.085
5 0.076 0.054 9.231 0.100
EUR_USD Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.245 -0.245 10.779 0.001
2 -0.025 -0.090 10.887 0.004
3 -0.047 -0.081 11.290 0.010
4 0.017 -0.020 11.345 0.023
5 -0.013 -0.022 11.374 0.044
EUR_USD Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.236 0.236 9.940 0.002
2 0.103 0.051 11.862 0.003
3 0.180 0.154 17.730 0.001
4 0.333 0.279 37.957 0.000
5 0.198 0.074 45.159 0.000
EUR_USD Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.151 0.151 4.091 0.043
2 -0.017 -0.040 4.140 0.126
3 0.073 0.083 5.094 0.165
4 0.300 0.283 21.446 0.000
5 0.106 0.029 23.520 0.000
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Appendix B10 – Autocorrelation in €/£ Net Flows (5 Day) 
 
EUR_GBP Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.196 0.196 6.906 0.009
2 0.117 0.081 9.350 0.009
3 0.095 0.061 10.993 0.012
4 -0.011 -0.050 11.014 0.026
5 0.054 0.053 11.551 0.041
EUR_GBP Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.009 0.009 0.013 0.909
2 0.100 0.100 1.823 0.402
3 -0.051 -0.053 2.288 0.515
4 0.137 0.130 5.701 0.223
5 0.050 0.058 6.158 0.291
EUR_GBP Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.141 -0.141 3.565 0.059
2 0.064 0.045 4.294 0.117
3 -0.054 -0.04 4.822 0.185
4 0.029 0.014 4.974 0.29
5 -0.064 -0.054 5.713 0.335
EUR_GBP Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.009 0.009 0.015 0.903
2 -0.185 -0.185 6.200 0.045
3 0.025 0.029 6.310 0.097
4 0.019 -0.017 6.374 0.173
5 0.031 0.042 6.549 0.256
EUR_GBP Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.079 0.079 1.121 0.29
2 -0.097 -0.104 2.807 0.246
3 -0.036 -0.019 3.036 0.386
4 0.091 0.087 4.553 0.336
5 -0.011 -0.032 4.574 0.47
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Appendix B10 – Autocorrelation in €/¥ Net Flows (5 Day) 
 
EUR_JPY Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.998
2 -0.067 -0.067 0.816 0.665
3 0.036 0.036 1.054 0.788
4 -0.067 -0.072 1.873 0.759
5 -0.072 -0.068 2.829 0.726
EUR_JPY Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.081 -0.081 1.173 0.279
2 -0.010 -0.017 1.191 0.551
3 0.091 0.090 2.694 0.441
4 -0.082 -0.069 3.933 0.415
5 0.012 0.002 3.959 0.555
EUR_JPY Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.078 0.078 1.090 0.297
2 -0.200 -0.207 8.289 0.016
3 -0.048 -0.014 8.711 0.033
4 0.076 0.042 9.765 0.045
5 0.009 -0.016 9.779 0.082
EUR_JPY Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.127 -0.127 2.902 0.088
2 0.049 0.033 3.333 0.189
3 -0.024 -0.014 3.437 0.329
4 -0.205 -0.214 11.054 0.026
5 0.048 -0.003 11.469 0.043
EUR_JPY Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.119 -0.119 2.552 0.110
2 0.011 -0.003 2.576 0.276
3 0.007 0.008 2.584 0.460
4 -0.139 -0.140 6.116 0.191
5 0.030 -0.003 6.279 0.280
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Appendix B10 – Autocorrelation in $/¥ Net Flows (5 Day) 
 
USD_JPY Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.086 0.086 1.324 0.250
2 -0.097 -0.106 3.033 0.219
3 -0.160 -0.144 7.641 0.054
4 0.185 0.209 13.850 0.008
5 0.020 -0.049 13.923 0.016
USD_JPY Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.164 0.164 4.827 0.028
2 -0.037 -0.066 5.078 0.079
3 0.015 0.033 5.118 0.163
4 -0.007 -0.019 5.128 0.274
5 -0.083 -0.079 6.386 0.270
USD_JPY Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.154 -0.154 4.260 0.039
2 0.084 0.061 5.516 0.063
3 -0.097 -0.078 7.234 0.065
4 0.002 -0.029 7.235 0.124
5 -0.004 0.004 7.238 0.204
USD_JPY Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.179 0.179 5.727 0.017
2 -0.089 -0.125 7.155 0.028
3 -0.141 -0.106 10.748 0.013
4 -0.144 -0.115 14.548 0.006
5 -0.111 -0.096 16.806 0.005
USD_JPY Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.100 0.100 1.799 0.180
2 -0.113 -0.125 4.112 0.128
3 -0.077 -0.053 5.197 0.158
4 -0.039 -0.040 5.480 0.241
5 -0.082 -0.092 6.724 0.242
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Appendix B10 – Autocorrelation in £/$ Net Flows (5 Day) 
 
GBP_USD Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.031 0.031 0.173 0.677
2 -0.142 -0.144 3.829 0.147
3 -0.044 -0.035 4.172 0.244
4 0.086 0.069 5.512 0.239
5 0.068 0.054 6.37 0.272
GBP_USD Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.044 0.044 0.340 0.56
2 0.083 0.082 1.589 0.452
3 -0.032 -0.039 1.774 0.621
4 0.02 0.016 1.844 0.764
5 -0.029 -0.025 2.001 0.849
GBP_USD Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.013 -0.013 0.031 0.86
2 -0.081 -0.082 1.222 0.543
3 -0.088 -0.09 2.610 0.456
4 -0.061 -0.071 3.279 0.512
5 -0.028 -0.047 3.422 0.635
GBP_USD Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.013 -0.013 0.032 0.858
2 0.032 0.032 0.220 0.896
3 -0.097 -0.096 1.928 0.587
4 -0.104 -0.109 3.903 0.419
5 -0.006 -0.003 3.909 0.563
GBP_USD Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.056 0.056 0.565 0.452
2 -0.066 -0.069 1.342 0.511
3 -0.124 -0.117 4.117 0.249
4 -0.049 -0.041 4.562 0.335
5 -0.123 -0.137 7.313 0.198
 
  201
Appendix B10 – Autocorrelation in £/¥ Net Flows (5 Day) 
 
GBP_JPY Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.039 0.039 0.279 0.597
2 -0.068 -0.070 1.118 0.572
3 0.032 0.038 1.303 0.728
4 0.098 0.091 3.053 0.549
5 0.008 0.005 3.066 0.69
GBP_JPY Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.040 -0.040 0.290 0.590
2 -0.006 -0.007 0.296 0.862
3 -0.004 -0.004 0.298 0.96
4 0.026 0.025 0.417 0.981
5 0.003 0.005 0.419 0.995
GBP_JPY Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.057 -0.057 0.587 0.444
2 -0.08 -0.083 1.737 0.42
3 -0.105 -0.116 3.728 0.292
4 0.004 -0.018 3.731 0.444
5 0.027 0.007 3.862 0.569
GBP_JPY Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.105 0.105 1.960 0.162
2 -0.052 -0.064 2.456 0.293
3 0.024 0.037 2.563 0.464
4 -0.027 -0.038 2.699 0.609
5 -0.192 -0.184 9.444 0.093
GBP_JPY Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.097 0.097 1.696 0.193
2 -0.050 -0.06 2.142 0.343
3 0.024 0.036 2.250 0.522
4 -0.008 -0.017 2.261 0.688
5 0.070 0.077 3.151 0.677
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Appendix B11 – Autocorrelation in €/$ Net Flows (10 Day) 
 
EUR_USD Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.200 0.200 3.626 0.057
2 0.325 0.297 13.340 0.001
3 0.301 0.224 21.768 0.000
4 0.254 0.121 27.830 0.000
5 0.475 0.365 49.359 0.000
EUR_USD Uneveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.169 -0.169 2.603 0.107
2 -0.016 -0.046 2.628 0.269
3 -0.060 -0.073 2.967 0.397
4 -0.120 -0.150 4.335 0.363
5 0.104 0.052 5.360 0.374
EUR_USD Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.089 -0.089 0.721 0.396
2 -0.052 -0.060 0.970 0.616
3 -0.033 -0.044 1.072 0.784
4 -0.129 -0.141 2.637 0.620
5 0.058 0.028 2.959 0.706
EUR_USD Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.197 0.197 3.546 0.060
2 0.363 0.337 15.696 0.000
3 0.384 0.316 29.404 0.000
4 0.319 0.183 39.020 0.000
5 0.252 0.028 45.070 0.000
EUR_USD Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.095 0.095 0.815 0.367
2 0.354 0.348 12.352 0.002
3 0.212 0.181 16.545 0.001
4 0.190 0.063 19.934 0.001
5 0.238 0.123 25.327 0.000
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Appendix B11 – Autocorrelation in €/£ Net Flows (10 Day) 
 
EUR_GBP Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.186 0.186 3.146 0.076
2 0.105 0.073 4.166 0.125
3 0.053 0.022 4.425 0.219
4 0.070 0.052 4.892 0.299
5 0.016 -0.011 4.916 0.426
EUR_GBP Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.127 0.127 1.465 0.226
2 0.120 0.105 2.782 0.249
3 0.204 0.182 6.677 0.083
4 0.021 -0.034 6.716 0.152
5 -0.011 -0.051 6.727 0.242
EUR_GBP Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.130 -0.130 1.533 0.216
2 -0.029 -0.047 1.612 0.447
3 -0.178 -0.192 4.570 0.206
4 0.154 0.107 6.803 0.147
5 0.011 0.029 6.814 0.235
EUR_GBP Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.037 0.037 0.122 0.727
2 -0.092 -0.093 0.894 0.640
3 -0.059 -0.053 1.220 0.748
4 -0.055 -0.060 1.503 0.826
5 0.253 0.251 7.603 0.180
EUR_GBP Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.021 -0.021 0.042 0.838
2 0.048 0.047 0.252 0.881
3 -0.070 -0.068 0.708 0.871
4 -0.036 -0.041 0.830 0.934
5 0.117 0.124 2.145 0.829
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Appendix B11 – Autocorrelation in €/¥ Net Flows (10 Day) 
 
EUR_JPY Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.079 -0.079 0.571 0.450
2 -0.075 -0.082 1.089 0.580
3 0.072 0.060 1.579 0.664
4 0.054 0.060 1.850 0.763
5 -0.013 0.006 1.867 0.867
EUR_JPY Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.037 0.037 0.125 0.724
2 -0.051 -0.052 0.364 0.834
3 -0.035 -0.032 0.481 0.923
4 -0.119 -0.120 1.814 0.770
5 -0.076 -0.072 2.363 0.797
EUR_JPY Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.079 0.079 0.567 0.451
2 -0.091 -0.098 1.335 0.513
3 0.006 0.022 1.338 0.720
4 0.184 0.176 4.533 0.339
5 -0.155 -0.192 6.822 0.234
EUR_JPY Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.005 -0.005 0.002 0.964
2 -0.299 -0.299 8.260 0.016
3 -0.043 -0.051 8.432 0.038
4 0.130 0.043 10.016 0.040
5 0.004 -0.022 10.018 0.075
EUR_JPY Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.044 -0.044 0.177 0.674
2 -0.164 -0.166 2.661 0.264
3 -0.042 -0.060 2.826 0.419
4 0.044 0.012 3.010 0.556
5 -0.068 -0.084 3.451 0.631
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Appendix B11 – Autocorrelation in $/¥ Net Flows (10 Day) 
 
USD_JPY Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.035 -0.035 0.114 0.736
2 0.053 0.051 0.369 0.832
3 -0.024 -0.020 0.422 0.936
4 -0.018 -0.022 0.451 0.978
5 -0.130 -0.129 2.055 0.841
USD_JPY Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.034 0.034 0.108 0.743
2 -0.043 -0.044 0.274 0.872
3 -0.145 -0.143 2.245 0.523
4 -0.091 -0.086 3.032 0.553
5 -0.084 -0.094 3.700 0.593
USD_JPY Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.999
2 -0.060 -0.060 0.335 0.846
3 -0.086 -0.086 1.027 0.795
4 0.037 0.033 1.153 0.886
5 0.085 0.076 1.848 0.870
USD_JPY Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.946
2 -0.296 -0.296 8.048 0.018
3 0.113 0.129 9.241 0.026
4 0.159 0.072 11.618 0.020
5 -0.033 0.032 11.723 0.039
USD_JPY Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.058 -0.058 0.309 0.578
2 -0.164 -0.168 2.794 0.247
3 -0.041 -0.064 2.952 0.399
4 -0.028 -0.066 3.026 0.554
5 0.080 0.057 3.638 0.603
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Appendix B11 – Autocorrelation in £/$ Net Flows (10 Day) 
 
GBP_USD Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.185 -0.185 3.127 0.077
2 0.222 0.194 7.657 0.022
3 -0.028 0.044 7.731 0.052
4 0.049 0.009 7.957 0.093
5 0.161 0.179 10.437 0.064
GBP_USD Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.950
2 0.042 0.042 0.167 0.920
3 0.055 0.055 0.453 0.929
4 0.041 0.039 0.612 0.962
5 0.182 0.178 3.771 0.583
GBP_USD Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.168 -0.168 2.581 0.108
2 -0.082 -0.113 3.198 0.202
3 -0.115 -0.156 4.433 0.218
4 0.087 0.027 5.151 0.272
5 -0.017 -0.025 5.179 0.394
GBP_USD Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.053 -0.053 0.257 0.612
2 -0.148 -0.152 2.287 0.319
3 -0.021 -0.039 2.329 0.507
4 -0.081 -0.111 2.952 0.566
5 -0.033 -0.058 3.058 0.691
GBP_USD Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.157 -0.157 2.254 0.133
2 -0.094 -0.122 3.072 0.215
3 -0.203 -0.248 6.904 0.075
4 0.057 -0.044 7.207 0.125
5 0.054 0.000 7.482 0.187
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Appendix B11 – Autocorrelation in £/¥ Net Flows (10 Day) 
 
 
GBP_JPY Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.994
2 0.142 0.142 1.848 0.397
3 0.086 0.087 2.536 0.469
4 -0.047 -0.068 2.746 0.601
5 0.003 -0.023 2.747 0.739
GBP_JPY Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.980
2 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.999
3 0.019 0.019 0.035 0.998
4 -0.038 -0.039 0.175 0.996
5 -0.044 -0.044 0.360 0.996
GBP_JPY Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.153 -0.153 2.139 0.144
2 -0.105 -0.131 3.148 0.207
3 0.059 0.022 3.478 0.324
4 0.023 0.024 3.526 0.474
5 -0.087 -0.073 4.253 0.514
GBP_JPY Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.994
2 0.069 0.069 0.442 0.802
3 -0.201 -0.203 4.225 0.238
4 0.158 0.164 6.583 0.160
5 -0.011 0.008 6.594 0.253
GBP_JPY Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.098 0.098 0.874 0.350
2 0.019 0.009 0.906 0.636
3 0.018 0.016 0.938 0.816
4 -0.012 -0.016 0.952 0.917
5 -0.067 -0.066 1.381 0.926
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Appendix B12 – Autocorrelation in €/$ Net Flows (15 Day) 
 
EUR_USD Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.472 0.472 13.815 0.000
2 0.481 0.333 28.437 0.000
3 0.579 0.392 50.004 0.000
4 0.430 0.065 62.122 0.000
5 0.560 0.284 83.056 0.000
EUR_USD Uneveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.155 -0.155 1.485 0.223
2 -0.057 -0.083 1.693 0.429
3 -0.044 -0.069 1.817 0.611
4 0.029 0.006 1.874 0.759
5 -0.073 -0.078 2.228 0.817
EUR_USD Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.175 -0.175 1.905 0.167
2 -0.123 -0.159 2.860 0.239
3 0.029 -0.025 2.914 0.405
4 -0.042 -0.064 3.030 0.553
5 0.103 0.088 3.732 0.589
EUR_USD Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.534 0.534 17.684 0.000
2 0.510 0.314 34.076 0.000
3 0.414 0.093 45.087 0.000
4 0.396 0.101 55.347 0.000
5 0.311 -0.011 61.782 0.000
EUR_USD Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.398 0.398 9.836 0.002
2 0.397 0.284 19.801 0.000
3 0.320 0.121 26.369 0.000
4 0.343 0.151 34.053 0.000
5 0.249 0.012 38.200 0.000
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Appendix B12 – Autocorrelation in €/£ Net Flows (15 Day) 
 
EUR_GBP Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.206 0.206 2.640 0.104
2 0.025 -0.018 2.679 0.262
3 0.170 0.176 4.532 0.209
4 0.266 0.210 9.174 0.057
5 0.142 0.063 10.526 0.062
EUR_GBP Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.081 -0.081 0.412 0.521
2 0.248 0.243 4.295 0.117
3 0.013 0.051 4.305 0.230
4 0.045 -0.012 4.435 0.350
5 -0.022 -0.038 4.468 0.484
EUR_GBP Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.201 -0.201 2.513 0.113
2 -0.187 -0.237 4.715 0.095
3 0.228 0.148 8.067 0.045
4 -0.308 -0.302 14.294 0.006
5 0.260 0.276 18.796 0.002
EUR_GBP Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.144 -0.144 1.285 0.257
2 -0.159 -0.183 2.878 0.237
3 0.206 0.161 5.597 0.133
4 -0.062 -0.038 5.852 0.211
5 -0.031 0.014 5.915 0.315
EUR_GBP Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.049 -0.049 0.149 0.700
2 -0.132 -0.135 1.251 0.535
3 0.062 0.049 1.502 0.682
4 0.082 0.072 1.940 0.747
5 0.135 0.162 3.159 0.676
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Appendix B12 – Autocorrelation in €/¥ Net Flows (15 Day) 
 
EUR_JPY Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.140 -0.140 1.219 0.270
2 0.109 0.091 1.971 0.373
3 -0.002 0.026 1.971 0.578
4 0.030 0.024 2.031 0.730
5 0.177 0.187 4.124 0.532
EUR_JPY Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.055 0.055 0.191 0.662
2 -0.140 -0.143 1.428 0.490
3 -0.197 -0.184 3.911 0.271
4 0.151 0.159 5.408 0.248
5 0.060 -0.008 5.648 0.342
EUR_JPY Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.167 0.167 1.733 0.188
2 -0.015 -0.044 1.746 0.418
3 -0.166 -0.161 3.524 0.318
4 -0.042 0.013 3.641 0.457
5 -0.013 -0.014 3.651 0.601
EUR_JPY Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.080 0.080 0.395 0.530
2 -0.345 -0.354 7.930 0.019
3 -0.079 -0.016 8.334 0.040
4 0.128 0.018 9.405 0.052
5 0.179 0.151 11.549 0.042
EUR_JPY Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.115 0.115 0.817 0.366
2 -0.253 -0.270 4.860 0.088
3 -0.191 -0.134 7.197 0.066
4 0.081 0.060 7.626 0.106
5 0.144 0.053 9.014 0.109
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Appendix B12 – Autocorrelation in $/¥ Net Flows (15 Day) 
USD_JPY Corporate
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.019 -0.019 0.023 0.879
2 0.061 0.061 0.261 0.878
3 -0.193 -0.192 2.656 0.448
4 0.059 0.053 2.883 0.578
5 -0.077 -0.057 3.284 0.656
USD_JPY Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.027 -0.027 0.045 0.833
2 -0.216 -0.217 2.994 0.224
3 -0.120 -0.140 3.922 0.270
4 -0.061 -0.129 4.164 0.384
5 0.224 0.168 7.515 0.185
USD_JPY Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.123 -0.123 0.946 0.331
2 0.023 0.008 0.979 0.613
3 0.051 0.056 1.147 0.766
4 -0.239 -0.230 4.875 0.300
5 0.012 -0.048 4.884 0.430
USD_JPY Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.175 -0.175 1.905 0.168
2 0.106 0.078 2.620 0.270
3 0.042 0.076 2.735 0.434
4 0.023 0.035 2.768 0.597
5 -0.136 -0.145 4.000 0.549
USD_JPY Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.156 -0.156 1.505 0.220
2 -0.100 -0.127 2.137 0.343
3 0.018 -0.020 2.159 0.540
4 0.005 -0.009 2.160 0.706
5 -0.029 -0.031 2.218 0.818
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Appendix B12 – Autocorrelation in £/$ Net Flows (15 Day) 
 
GBP_USD Corporate
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.045 -0.045 0.125 0.723
2 0.037 0.035 0.214 0.899
3 0.273 0.277 4.998 0.172
4 0.098 0.133 5.621 0.229
5 0.038 0.034 5.717 0.335
GBP_USD Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.046 0.046 0.133 0.715
2 -0.088 -0.091 0.625 0.732
3 0.303 0.315 6.537 0.088
4 0.170 0.137 8.422 0.077
5 0.024 0.075 8.459 0.133
GBP_USD Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.252 -0.252 3.956 0.047
2 -0.239 -0.323 7.564 0.023
3 0.259 0.117 11.887 0.008
4 -0.259 -0.266 16.265 0.003
5 0.032 -0.003 16.331 0.006
GBP_USD Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.170 -0.170 1.788 0.181
2 -0.067 -0.098 2.069 0.355
3 -0.039 -0.071 2.165 0.539
4 0.091 0.067 2.702 0.609
5 -0.105 -0.089 3.440 0.633
GBP_USD Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.268 -0.268 4.454 0.035
2 -0.256 -0.353 8.592 0.014
3 0.211 0.029 11.458 0.009
4 -0.042 -0.059 11.576 0.021
5 -0.046 0.003 11.716 0.039
Lag
 
  213
Appendix B12 – Autocorrelation in £/¥ Net Flows (15 Day) 
 
GBP_JPY Corporate
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.981
2 0.085 0.085 0.456 0.796
3 -0.049 -0.048 0.607 0.895
4 0.047 0.040 0.749 0.945
5 0.102 0.111 1.443 0.920
GBP_JPY Unleveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.028 0.028 0.048 0.826
2 -0.008 -0.009 0.053 0.974
3 -0.009 -0.008 0.057 0.996
4 -0.080 -0.079 0.473 0.976
5 -0.078 -0.074 0.881 0.972
GBP_JPY Leveraged
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.212 -0.212 2.791 0.095
2 0.046 0.001 2.923 0.232
3 -0.058 -0.050 3.138 0.371
4 -0.113 -0.142 3.976 0.409
5 -0.093 -0.155 4.548 0.474
GBP_JPY Other
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.050 0.050 0.156 0.693
2 -0.117 -0.120 1.017 0.601
3 0.103 0.117 1.698 0.637
4 0.021 -0.007 1.729 0.786
5 0.137 0.168 2.976 0.704
GBP_JPY Total
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.083 0.083 0.425 0.515
2 0.017 0.010 0.443 0.801
3 -0.055 -0.058 0.638 0.888
4 0.032 0.042 0.707 0.951
5 0.137 0.134 1.952 0.856
Lag
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Appendix B13      
Cross-Correlations Between 4 Customer Categories (Daily)  
      
      
      
      
      
      
Dollar_Yen (Daily)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 0.033585 0.020028 -0.0743 
 Levered 0.033585 1 0.066389 0.021141 
 Unlevered 0.020028 0.066389 1 0.021033 
 Other -0.0743 0.021141 0.021033 1 
      
      
Euro_Dollar (Daily)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 0.02134 0.033697 -0.082674 
 Levered 0.02134 1 0.05337 -0.079518 
 Unlevered 0.033697 0.05337 1 -0.010979 
 Other -0.082674 -0.079518 -0.010979 1 
      
      
Euro_Pound (Daily)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 -0.028636 0.098613 -0.058633 
 Levered -0.028636 1 0.008186 -0.091329 
 Unlevered 0.098613 0.008186 1 -0.00942 
 Other -0.058633 -0.091329 -0.00942 1 
      
      
Euro_Yen (Daily)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 -0.007074 0.014434 -0.075561 
 Levered -0.007074 1 0.0314 -0.038692 
 Unlevered 0.014434 0.0314 1 0.02402 
 Other -0.075561 -0.038692 0.02402 1 
      
      
Pound_Dollar (Daily)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 0.069612 0.040434 -0.114984 
 Levered 0.069612 1 0.110491 -0.043684 
 Unlevered 0.040434 0.110491 1 -0.017094 
 Other -0.114984 -0.043684 -0.017094 1 
      
      
Pound_Yen (Daily)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 0.03427 0.000153 -0.012303 
 Levered 0.03427 1 0.017379 -0.152988 
 Unlevered 0.000153 0.017379 1 -0.427347 
 Other -0.012303 -0.152988 -0.427347 1 
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Appendix B14      
Cross-Correlations Between 4 Customer Categories (5 Day)  
      
      
      
      
      
      
Dollar_Yen (5 Day)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 0.010279 -0.001814 -0.111217 
 Levered 0.010279 1 0.221851 0.150471 
 Unlevered -0.001814 0.221851 1 0.143993 
 Other -0.111217 0.150471 0.143993 1 
      
      
Euro_Dollar (5 Day)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 0.042669 -0.027943 -0.197889 
 Levered 0.042669 1 0.02141 0.077438 
 Unlevered -0.027943 0.02141 1 -0.073463 
 Other -0.197889 0.077438 -0.073463 1 
      
      
Euro_Pound (5 Day)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 0.102523 0.109487 -0.134165 
 Levered 0.102523 1 0.012074 -0.087151 
 Unlevered 0.109487 0.012074 1 0.06096 
 Other -0.134165 -0.087151 0.06096 1 
      
      
Euro_Yen (5 Day)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 -0.024491 0.053371 -0.1529 
 Levered -0.024491 1 -0.086074 -0.000569 
 Unlevered 0.053371 -0.086074 1 0.064322 
 Other -0.1529 -0.000569 0.064322 1 
      
      
Pound_Dollar (5 Day)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 -0.105264 -0.140078 -0.159006 
 Levered -0.105264 1 0.036503 -0.146528 
 Unlevered -0.140078 0.036503 1 0.108266 
 Other -0.159006 -0.146528 0.108266 1 
      
      
Pound_Yen (5 Day)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 0.037337 -0.020547 0.026934 
 Levered 0.037337 1 0.007774 -0.147294 
 Unlevered -0.020547 0.007774 1 -0.418954 
 Other 0.026934 -0.147294 -0.418954 1 
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Appendix B15      
Cross-Correlations Between 4 Customer Categories (10 Day)  
      
      
      
      
      
      
Dollar_Yen (10 Day)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 0.027605 -0.136331 -0.077476 
 Levered 0.027605 1 0.29414 0.020784 
 Unlevered -0.136331 0.29414 1 0.253408 
 Other -0.077476 0.020784 0.253408 1 
      
      
Euro_Dollar (10 Day)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 0.028045 -0.112162 -0.231912 
 Levered 0.028045 1 -0.038225 0.100619 
 Unlevered -0.112162 -0.038225 1 -0.056101 
 Other -0.231912 0.100619 -0.056101 1 
      
      
Euro_Pound (10 Day)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 0.125922 0.183356 -0.071621 
 Levered 0.125922 1 0.098155 -0.196348 
 Unlevered 0.183356 0.098155 1 0.119198 
 Other -0.071621 -0.196348 0.119198 1 
      
      
Euro_Yen (10 Day)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 0.105018 0.086616 -0.169649 
 Levered 0.105018 1 -0.030458 -0.087779 
 Unlevered 0.086616 -0.030458 1 0.155145 
 Other -0.169649 -0.087779 0.155145 1 
      
      
Pound_Dollar (10 Day)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 -0.045202 -0.158873 -0.041328 
 Levered -0.045202 1 0.010385 -0.18982 
 Unlevered -0.158873 0.010385 1 0.102423 
 Other -0.041328 -0.18982 0.102423 1 
      
      
Pound_Yen (10 Day)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 -0.000745 0.081772 -0.056699 
 Levered -0.000745 1 -0.002309 -0.143041 
 Unlevered 0.081772 -0.002309 1 -0.450744 
 Other -0.056699 -0.143041 -0.450744 1 
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Appendix B16      
Cross-Correlations Between 4 Customer Categories (15 Day)  
      
      
      
      
      
      
Dollar_Yen (15 Day)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 0.031434 0.025319 -0.09772 
 Levered 0.031434 1 0.40654 0.022025 
 Unlevered 0.025319 0.40654 1 0.154561 
 Other -0.09772 0.022025 0.154561 1 
      
      
Euro_Dollar (15 day)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 -0.048492 -0.094127 -0.254723 
 Levered -0.048492 1 -0.003468 -0.001756 
 Unlevered -0.094127 -0.003468 1 0.053063 
 Other -0.254723 -0.001756 0.053063 1 
      
      
Euro_Pound (15 Day)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 0.184829 0.16561 -0.143138 
 Levered 0.184829 1 0.060902 -0.197671 
 Unlevered 0.16561 0.060902 1 0.097542 
 Other -0.143138 -0.197671 0.097542 1 
      
      
Euro_Yen (15 Day)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 0.185824 -0.081088 -0.096458 
 Levered 0.185824 1 -0.01106 -0.128464 
 Unlevered -0.081088 -0.01106 1 0.146499 
 Other -0.096458 -0.128464 0.146499 1 
      
      
Pound_Dollar (15 Day)     
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 -0.274567 -0.308773 -0.006546 
 Levered -0.274567 1 0.204488 -0.101551 
 Unlevered -0.308773 0.204488 1 0.192748 
 Other -0.006546 -0.101551 0.192748 1 
      
      
Pound_Yen (15 Day)      
  Corporate Levered Unlevered Other 
 Corporate 1 0.048366 0.014717 0.066424 
 Levered 0.048366 1 0.044816 -0.186837 
 Unlevered 0.014717 0.044816 1 -0.498955 
 Other 0.066424 -0.186837 -0.498955 1 
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Appendix C2 – Contemporaneous OLS with Disaggregated Flows  
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Appendix D – Micro 1 and 2 Forecast Evaluation 
RMSE ratio & Directional Ability 
 
 
History Used:
1 5 10 15
Forecast 
Horizon:
1 1.004 1.048 1.037 1.092
2 1.007 1.042 1.042 1.032
3 1.010 1.008 1.047 1.090
4 1.014 1.014 1.053 0.998
5 1.017 1.016 1.052 0.983
6 - 1.027 1.095 0.997
7 - 1.047 1.121 0.989
8 - 1.030 1.067 0.999
9 - 1.033 1.059 0.991
10 - 1.043 1.083 1.020
11 - - 1.082 0.998
12 - - 1.137 1.024
13 - - 1.149 1.020
14 - - 1.196 1.063
15 - - 1.189 1.127
16 - - - 1.121
17 - - - 1.145
18 - - - 1.122
19 - - - 1.085
20 - - - 1.074
bold) would indicate the that model outperformed the random walk.
Micro 1 Model Forecast Evaluation
Currency: €/$
This table evaluates the Micro 1 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using total order flow -
using the RMSE ratio of the model to that of the random walk. A number below 1 (shown in
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Forecast 
Horizon:
1 1.008 1.205 1.041 1.202
2 1.005 1.048 1.045 1.272
3 1.004 1.007 0.989 1.255
4 1.016 1.033 1.013 1.349
5 1.015 1.079 0.999 1.408
6 - 1.137 1.030 1.199
7 - 1.190 1.104 1.115
8 - 1.134 1.048 1.028
9 - 1.177 1.128 1.019
10 - 1.150 1.139 1.037
11 - - 1.167 1.113
12 - - 1.167 1.113
13 - - 1.216 1.354
14 - - 1.331 1.287
15 - - 1.290 1.373
16 - - - 1.224
17 - - - 1.141
18 - - - 1.174
19 - - - 1.150
20 - - - 1.140
walk. A number below 1 (shown in bold) would indicate the that model outperformed the RW.
Micro 2 Model Forecast Evaluation
Currency: €/$
This table evaluates the Micro 2 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using order flow
disaggregated by customer type - using the RMSE ratio of the model to that of the random 
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Forecast 
Horizon:
1 50.00 38.67 56.25 47.06
2 48.17 41.33 43.75 52.94
3 47.91 53.33 50.00 47.06
4 47.12 48.00 50.00 58.82
5 48.95 52.00 50.00 70.59
6 - 52.00 50.00 64.71
7 - 53.33 56.25 64.71
8 - 50.67 46.88 47.06
9 - 49.33 50.00 47.06
10 - 52.00 40.63 41.18
11 - - 46.88 58.82
12 - - 46.88 70.59
13 - - 40.63 58.82
14 - - 43.75 47.06
15 - - 40.63 47.06
16 - - - 52.94
17 - - - 58.82
18 - - - 41.18
19 - - - 52.94
20 - - - 47.06
Micro 1 Model Directional Ability
Currency: €/$
This table evaluates the Micro 1 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using total order flow -
on the basis of directional ability. i.e. Can the model predict direction if not magnitude.
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Forecast 
Horizon:
1 49.87 44.59 56.25 43.75
2 51.31 40.54 62.50 50.00
3 50.00 55.41 40.63 37.50
4 47.64 48.65 50.00 50.00
5 50.00 47.30 46.88 56.25
6 - 45.95 43.75 50.00
7 - 52.70 43.75 50.00
8 - 43.24 34.38 56.25
9 - 50.00 46.88 56.25
10 - 51.35 40.63 50.00
11 - - 53.13 62.50
12 - - 46.88 56.25
13 - - 37.50 50.00
14 - - 37.50 50.00
15 - - 37.50 43.75
16 - - - 50.00
17 - - - 56.25
18 - - - 43.75
19 - - - 43.75
20 - - - 62.50
direction if not magnitude.
Micro 2 Model Directional Ability
Currency: €/$
This table evaluates the Micro 2 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using order flow
disaggregated by customer type - on the basis of directional ability i.e. Can the model predict 
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Forecast 
Horizon:
1 1.002 1.002 1.163 1.009
2 1.006 1.002 0.997 0.951
3 1.005 1.000 1.007 1.007
4 1.006 0.992 1.04 1.031
5 1.005 1.009 1.115 1.155
6 - 1.037 1.141 1.223
7 - 1.026 1.186 1.193
8 - 1.029 1.162 1.090
9 - 1.062 1.198 1.088
10 - 1.046 1.141 1.099
11 - - 1.154 1.100
12 - - 1.107 1.070
13 - - 1.114 1.114
14 - - 1.092 1.170
15 - - 1.094 1.134
16 - - - 1.134
17 - - - 1.042
18 - - - 1.049
19 - - - 1.039
20 - - - 1.039
This table evaluates the Micro 1 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using total order flow -
using the RMSE ratio of the model to that of the random walk. A number below 1 (shown in
bold) would indicate the that model outperformed the random walk.
Micro 1 Model Forecast Evaluation
Currency: €/£
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Forecast 
Horizon:
1 1.002 1.008 1.211 1.310
2 0.997 1.038 1.070 1.207
3 0.993 1.181 1.095 1.171
4 1.006 1.095 1.231 1.460
5 1.018 1.056 1.244 1.556
6 - 1.008 1.276 1.639
7 - 0.999 1.246 1.595
8 - 1.011 1.191 1.496
9 - 1.035 1.221 1.433
10 - 1.013 1.169 1.410
11 - - 1.164 1.307
12 - - 1.106 1.171
13 - - 1.100 1.149
14 - - 1.098 1.213
15 - - 1.094 1.224
16 - - - 1.169
17 - - - 1.081
18 - - - 1.060
19 - - - 1.031
20 - - - 1.025
disaggregated by customer type - using the RMSE ratio of the model to that of the random 
walk. A number below 1 (shown in bold) would indicate the that model outperformed the RW.
Micro 2 Model Forecast Evaluation
Currency: €/£
This table evaluates the Micro 2 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using order flow
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Forecast 
Horizon:
1 48.44 50.67 37.50 47.06
2 52.08 52.00 53.13 58.82
3 50.52 50.67 53.13 35.29
4 50.13 50.67 46.88 41.18
5 53.68 45.33 37.50 29.41
6 - 48.00 34.38 17.65
7 - 50.67 37.50 35.29
8 - 52.00 40.63 29.41
9 - 38.67 40.63 35.29
10 - 40.00 34.38 29.41
11 - - 34.38 29.41
12 - - 40.63 35.29
13 - - 40.63 35.29
14 - - 40.63 29.41
15 - - 40.63 29.41
16 - - - 47.06
17 - - - 47.06
18 - - - 47.06
19 - - - 58.82
20 - - - 58.82
Micro 1 Model Directional Ability
Currency: €/£
This table evaluates the Micro 1 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using total order flow -
on the basis of directional ability. i.e. Can the model predict direction if not magnitude.
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Forecast 
Horizon:
1 48.96 47.30 34.38 37.50
2 51.96 54.05 43.75 37.50
3 51.05 50.00 46.88 31.25
4 48.29 51.35 40.63 43.75
5 53.42 47.30 43.75 31.25
6 - 44.59 34.38 12.50
7 - 50.00 37.50 31.25
8 - 52.70 28.13 25.00
9 - 44.59 40.63 31.25
10 - 54.05 34.38 31.25
11 - - 40.63 18.75
12 - - 40.63 31.25
13 - - 46.88 50.00
14 - - 43.75 31.25
15 - - 71.88 37.50
16 - - - 43.75
17 - - - 43.75
18 - - - 43.75
19 - - - 62.50
20 - - - 50.00
disaggregated by customer type - on the basis of directional ability i.e. Can the model predict 
direction if not magnitude.
Micro 2 Model Directional Ability
Currency: €/£
This table evaluates the Micro 2 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using order flow
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Forecast 
Horizon:
1 1.004 1.048 1.037 1.092
2 1.007 1.042 1.042 1.032
3 1.010 1.008 1.047 1.090
4 1.014 1.014 1.053 0.998
5 1.017 1.016 1.052 0.983
6 - 1.027 1.095 0.997
7 - 1.047 1.121 0.989
8 - 1.030 1.067 0.999
9 - 1.033 1.059 0.991
10 - 1.043 1.083 1.020
11 - - 1.082 0.998
12 - - 1.137 1.024
13 - - 1.149 1.020
14 - - 1.196 1.063
15 - - 1.189 1.127
16 - - - 1.121
17 - - - 1.145
18 - - - 1.122
19 - - - 1.085
20 - - - 1.074
bold) would indicate the that model outperformed the random walk.
Micro 1 Model Forecast Evaluation
Currency: £/¥
This table evaluates the Micro 1 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using total order flow -
using the RMSE ratio of the model to that of the random walk. A number below 1 (shown in
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1 5 10 15
Horizon:
1 1.008 1.205 1.041 1.202
2 1.005 1.048 1.045 1.272
3 1.004 1.007 0.989 1.255
4 1.016 1.033 1.013 1.349
5 1.015 1.079 0.999 1.408
6 - 1.137 1.030 1.199
7 - 1.190 1.104 1.115
8 - 1.134 1.048 1.028
9 - 1.177 1.128 1.019
10 - 1.150 1.139 1.037
11 - - 1.167 1.113
12 - - 1.167 1.113
13 - - 1.216 1.354
14 - - 1.331 1.287
15 - - 1.290 1.373
16 - - - 1.224
17 - - - 1.141
18 - - - 1.174
19 - - - 1.150
20 - - - 1.140
walk. A number below 1 (shown in bold) would indicate the that model outperformed the RW.
Micro 2 Model Forecast Evaluation
Currency: £/¥
This table evaluates the Micro 2 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using order flow
disaggregated by customer type - using the RMSE ratio of the model to that of the random 
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Horizon:
1 50.00 38.67 56.25 47.06
2 48.17 41.33 43.75 52.94
3 47.91 53.33 50.00 47.06
4 47.12 48.00 50.00 58.82
5 48.95 52.00 50.00 70.59
6 - 52.00 50.00 64.71
7 - 53.33 56.25 64.71
8 - 50.67 46.88 47.06
9 - 49.33 50.00 47.06
10 - 52.00 40.63 41.18
11 - - 46.88 58.82
12 - - 46.88 70.59
13 - - 40.63 58.82
14 - - 43.75 47.06
15 - - 40.63 47.06
16 - - - 52.94
17 - - - 58.82
18 - - - 41.18
19 - - - 52.94
20 - - - 47.06
Micro 1 Model Directional Ability
Currency: £/¥
This table evaluates the Micro 1 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using total order flow -
on the basis of directional ability. i.e. Can the model predict direction if not magnitude.
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Forecast 
Horizon:
1 49.87 44.59 56.25 43.75
2 51.31 40.54 62.50 50.00
3 50.00 55.41 40.63 37.50
4 47.64 48.65 50.00 50.00
5 50.00 47.30 46.88 56.25
6 - 45.95 43.75 50.00
7 - 52.70 43.75 50.00
8 - 43.24 34.38 56.25
9 - 50.00 46.88 56.25
10 - 51.35 40.63 50.00
11 - - 53.13 62.50
12 - - 46.88 56.25
13 - - 37.50 50.00
14 - - 37.50 50.00
15 - - 37.50 43.75
16 - - - 50.00
17 - - - 56.25
18 - - - 43.75
19 - - - 43.75
20 - - - 62.50
direction if not magnitude.
Micro 2 Model Directional Ability
Currency: £/¥
This table evaluates the Micro 2 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using order flow
disaggregated by customer type - on the basis of directional ability i.e. Can the model predict 
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Horizon:
1 1.004 1.017 0.940 0.941
2 1.001 1.041 1.014 0.921
3 1.006 1.063 1.094 1.017
4 1.006 1.041 1.008 1.063
5 1.008 1.020 1.033 1.069
6 - 1.017 0.989 1.070
7 - 1.019 0.989 1.107
8 - 1.033 0.994 1.046
9 - 1.021 1.009 1.055
10 - 1.027 1.029 1.052
11 - - 1.035 1.015
12 - - 1.039 1.023
13 - - 1.090 1.040
14 - - 1.077 1.018
15 - - 1.086 1.024
16 - - - 0.980
17 - - - 0.962
18 - - - 1.013
19 - - - 1.032
20 - - - 0.984
Micro 1 Model Forecast Evaluation
Currency: $/¥
This table evaluates the Micro 1 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using total order flow -
using the RMSE ratio of the model to that of the random walk. A number below 1 (shown in
bold) would indicate the that model outperformed the random walk.
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Forecast 
Horizon:
1 1.005 1.096 0.836 1.163
2 1.003 1.091 1.040 1.221
3 1.005 1.166 1.171 1.390
4 1.004 1.133 1.020 1.245
5 1.012 1.080 1.130 1.212
6 - 1.072 0.965 1.314
7 - 1.056 0.961 1.278
8 - 1.059 0.973 1.115
9 - 1.071 1.010 1.340
10 - 1.139 1.075 1.299
11 - - 1.081 1.225
12 - - 1.077 1.186
13 - - 1.145 1.218
14 - - 1.118 1.188
15 - - 1.109 1.240
16 - - - 1.225
17 - - - 1.127
18 - - - 1.118
19 - - - 1.092
20 - - - 1.048
disaggregated by customer type - using the RMSE ratio of the model to that of the random 
walk. A number below 1 (shown in bold) would indicate the that model outperformed the RW.
Micro 2 Model Forecast Evaluation
Currency: $/¥
This table evaluates the Micro 2 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using order flow
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Horizon:
1 47.14 48.00 53.13 52.94
2 48.18 49.33 50.00 58.82
3 47.66 54.67 43.75 35.29
4 44.79 53.33 43.75 58.82
5 45.05 50.67 43.75 64.71
6 - 48.00 43.75 47.06
7 - 41.33 50.00 58.82
8 - 45.33 43.75 52.94
9 - 50.67 53.13 52.94
10 - 45.33 43.75 52.94
11 - - 43.75 52.94
12 - - 43.75 52.94
13 - - 34.38 47.06
14 - - 37.50 52.94
15 - - 28.13 41.18
16 - - - 47.06
17 - - - 52.94
18 - - - 52.94
19 - - - 52.94
20 - - - 58.82
on the basis of directional ability. i.e. Can the model predict direction if not magnitude.
Micro 1 Model Directional Ability
Currency: $/¥
This table evaluates the Micro 1 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using total order flow -
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1 5 10 15
Forecast 
1 49.22 44.59 62.50 68.75
2 45.83 54.05 53.13 50.00
3 44.27 47.30 53.13 37.50
4 52.86 56.76 56.25 25.00
5 52.34 48.65 53.13 31.25
6 - 48.65 59.38 31.25
7 - 48.65 59.38 43.75
8 - 47.30 62.50 37.50
9 - 51.35 59.38 25.00
10 - 52.70 62.50 31.25
11 - - 56.25 43.75
12 - - 56.25 50.00
13 - - 43.75 43.75
14 - - 53.13 50.00
15 - - 53.13 37.50
16 - - - 37.50
17 - - - 50.00
18 - - - 50.00
19 - - - 31.25
20 - - - 50.00
disaggregated by customer type - on the basis of directional ability i.e. Can the model predict 
direction if not magnitude.
Micro 2 Model Directional Ability
Currency: $/¥
This table evaluates the Micro 2 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using order flow
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Forecast 
Horizon:
1 1.005 0.989 1.084 0.995
2 1.001 0.999 1.010 1.049
3 0.999 1.111 1.018 1.041
4 1.002 1.099 1.086 1.029
5 1.001 0.998 1.014 1.111
6 - 1.003 1.005 1.011
7 - 1.014 1.002 1.074
8 - 1.037 0.992 1.162
9 - 1.028 0.991 1.182
10 - 1.046 1.108 1.220
11 - - 1.028 1.159
12 - - 1.033 1.142
13 - - 1.068 1.082
14 - - 1.073 1.050
15 - - 1.056 0.994
16 - - - 0.988
17 - - - 1.027
18 - - - 1.014
19 - - - 0.956
20 - - - 0.947
bold) would indicate the that model outperformed the random walk.
Micro 1 Model Forecast Evaluation
Currency: €/¥
This table evaluates the Micro 1 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using total order flow -
using the RMSE ratio of the model to that of the random walk. A number below 1 (shown in
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Forecast 
Horizon:
1 1.015 1.010 1.419 1.089
2 1.010 1.010 1.231 1.107
3 1.042 1.129 1.144 1.188
4 1.049 1.129 1.063 1.005
5 1.029 1.020 1.111 1.153
6 - 1.023 1.177 1.330
7 - 1.012 1.186 1.290
8 - 1.025 1.069 1.243
9 - 1.039 1.044 1.165
10 - 1.067 1.180 1.213
11 - - 1.104 1.125
12 - - 1.072 1.100
13 - - 1.044 1.073
14 - - 1.040 1.028
15 - - 1.039 0.980
16 - - - 0.994
17 - - - 1.099
18 - - - 1.069
19 - - - 0.974
20 - - - 0.980
walk. A number below 1 (shown in bold) would indicate the that model outperformed the RW.
Micro 2 Model Forecast Evaluation
Currency: €/¥
This table evaluates the Micro 2 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using order flow
disaggregated by customer type - using the RMSE ratio of the model to that of the random 
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Forecast 
Horizon:
1 53.03 56.76 29.03 52.94
2 55.94 56.76 51.61 52.94
3 58.58 47.30 48.39 47.06
4 58.58 50.00 51.61 35.29
5 59.37 62.16 64.52 58.82
6 - 62.16 58.06 52.94
7 - 52.70 54.84 52.94
8 - 50.00 54.84 47.06
9 - 59.46 58.06 52.94
10 - 58.11 45.16 52.94
11 - - 58.06 64.71
12 - - 54.84 58.82
13 - - 54.84 70.59
14 - - 45.16 64.71
15 - - 48.39 58.82
16 - - - 58.82
17 - - - 64.71
18 - - - 58.82
19 - - - 64.71
20 - - - 64.71
Micro 1 Model Directional Ability
Currency: €/¥
This table evaluates the Micro 1 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using total order flow -
on the basis of directional ability. i.e. Can the model predict direction if not magnitude.
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1 5 10 15
Forecast 
1 52.11 56.76 25.81 47.06
2 52.24 55.41 32.26 64.71
3 56.73 51.35 38.71 52.94
4 52.51 50.00 51.61 52.94
5 55.41 50.00 48.39 64.71
6 - 60.81 41.94 58.82
7 - 54.05 29.03 58.82
8 - 59.46 51.61 41.18
9 - 56.76 54.84 52.94
10 - 54.05 51.61 52.94
11 - - 45.16 64.71
12 - - 51.61 52.94
13 - - 51.61 64.71
14 - - 41.94 58.82
15 - - 45.16 58.82
16 - - - 58.82
17 - - - 64.71
18 - - - 58.82
19 - - - 64.71
20 - - - 62.50
direction if not magnitude.
Micro 2 Model Directional Ability
Currency: €/¥
This table evaluates the Micro 2 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using order flow
disaggregated by customer type - on the basis of directional ability i.e. Can the model predict 
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1 5 10 15
Horizon:
1 1.930 0.996 1.014 1.014
2 1.376 0.997 1.024 1.037
3 1.110 0.991 1.022 1.009
4 0.953 0.997 1.036 1.003
5 0.849 1.028 1.083 1.079
6 - 1.029 1.076 1.057
7 - 1.016 1.038 1.095
8 - 1.012 1.036 1.046
9 - 1.022 1.028 1.026
10 - 1.047 1.044 1.027
11 - - 1.073 1.028
12 - - 1.090 1.005
13 - - 1.089 0.971
14 - - 1.069 0.974
15 - - 1.080 0.991
16 - - - 0.988
17 - - - 0.979
18 - - - 0.983
19 - - - 0.951
20 - - - 0.944
This table evaluates the Micro 1 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using total order flow -
using the RMSE ratio of the model to that of the random walk. A number below 1 (shown in
bold) would indicate the that model outperformed the random walk.
Micro 1 Model Forecast Evaluation
Currency: £/$
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1 5 10 15
Horizon:
1 1.931 1.011 1.015 1.157
2 1.371 1.014 0.994 1.176
3 1.108 1.009 1.088 1.007
4 0.950 1.030 1.057 0.976
5 0.848 1.079 1.102 0.995
6 - 1.041 1.143 0.988
7 - 1.022 1.093 1.052
8 - 1.013 1.039 1.005
9 - 1.016 1.017 0.979
10 - 1.049 1.028 1.029
11 - - 1.053 1.015
12 - - 1.075 1.010
13 - - 1.128 0.995
14 - - 1.097 0.978
15 - - 1.106 1.036
16 - - - 0.972
17 - - - 0.959
18 - - - 0.938
19 - - - 0.911
20 - - - 0.921
disaggregated by customer type - using the RMSE ratio of the model to that of the random 
walk. A number below 1 (shown in bold) would indicate the that model outperformed the RW.
Micro 2 Model Forecast Evaluation
Currency: £/$
This table evaluates the Micro 2 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using order flow
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History Used:
1 5 10 15
Forecast 
Horizon:
1 51.57 49.33 50.00 58.82
2 48.69 52.00 34.38 52.94
3 50.79 62.67 50.00 58.82
4 50.00 49.33 43.75 52.94
5 50.79 49.33 40.63 47.06
6 - 49.33 37.50 41.18
7 - 45.33 37.50 23.53
8 - 53.33 46.88 47.06
9 - 52.00 50.00 41.18
10 - 50.67 50.00 47.06
11 - - 53.13 52.94
12 - - 43.75 52.94
13 - - 46.88 70.59
14 - - 43.75 70.59
15 - - 50.00 58.82
16 - - - 47.06
17 - - - 58.82
18 - - - 47.06
19 - - - 52.94
20 - - - 70.59
Micro 1 Model Directional Ability
Currency: £/$
This table evaluates the Micro 1 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using total order flow -
on the basis of directional ability. i.e. Can the model predict direction if not magnitude.
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1 5 10 15
Forecast 
1 51.96 55.41 62.50 56.25
2 48.17 51.35 59.38 56.25
3 51.05 59.46 50.00 50.00
4 50.52 54.05 62.50 56.25
5 51.31 48.65 50.00 50.00
6 - 52.70 46.88 56.25
7 - 54.05 40.63 43.75
8 - 56.76 56.25 68.75
9 - 55.41 59.38 56.25
10 - 45.95 53.13 43.75
11 - - 53.13 56.25
12 - - 46.88 56.25
13 - - 50.00 75.00
14 - - 40.63 68.75
15 - - 50.00 68.75
16 - - - 68.75
17 - - - 62.50
18 - - - 62.50
19 - - - 50.00
20 - - - 62.50
disaggregated by customer type - on the basis of directional ability i.e. Can the model predict 
direction if not magnitude.
Micro 2 Model Directional Ability
Currency: £/$
This table evaluates the Micro 2 model - based on forecasting the FX rate using order flow
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Appendix E - Micro 1 and 2 Graphical Forecast Evaluation 
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Euro_JPY Micro 1
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Euro_USD Micro 1
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GBP_USD Micro 1
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USD_JPY Micro 1
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USD_JPY Micro 2
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DAILY 5 DAY
Coefficient p-value R-Squared Coefficient p-value R-Squared
€/$ Corporate -0.089 0.154 0.109 -0.051 0.878 0.243
€/$ Leveraged 0.520 0.197 1.000 0.004
€/$ Unleveraged 0.454 0.264 0.427 0.341
€/$ Other -0.097 0.088 0.000 0.997
€/£ Corporate -0.157 0.387 0.025 0.966
€/£ Leveraged 0.141 0.457 -0.636 0.335
€/£ Unleveraged -0.465 0.505 -1.751 0.055
€/£ Other 0.197 0.157 0.010 0.968
€/¥ Corporate -0.192 0.533 -0.578 0.693
€/¥ Leveraged 1.161 0.808 2.305 0.118
€/¥ Unleveraged 3.943 1.091 4.167 0.085
€/¥ Other 1.538 0.144 2.097 0.000
DAILY 5 DAY
Coefficient p-value R-Squared Coefficient p-value R-Squared
€/¥ Corporate -0.180 0.733 0.118 -0.908 0.524 0.256
€/¥ Leveraged 1.324 0.096 1.271 0.402
€/¥ Unleveraged 3.859 0.001 2.524 0.276
€/¥ Other 1.424 0.000 1.831 0.000
$/¥ Corporate -0.392 0.232 -0.383 0.691
$/¥ Leveraged 0.076 0.786 -0.188 0.764
$/¥ Unleveraged 0.704 0.044 1.732 0.034
$/¥ Other 0.164 0.045 0.129 0.449
£/¥ Corporate -2.083 0.057 -0.814 0.761
£/¥ Leveraged 1.576 0.224 4.908 0.180
£/¥ Unleveraged 2.701 0.004 3.410 0.025
£/¥ Other 2.350 0.008 0.132 0.891
Euro Flows Equation R= {€/$, €/¥, €/£}       USD Flows Equation R= {€/$, £/$, $/¥}
GBP Flows Equation R= {€/£, £/$, £/¥}       JPY Flows Equation R= {€/¥, $/¥, £/¥}
Dependent Variable: €/¥
(JPY FLOWS)
(EURO FLOWS)
Cross-Currency Regression
Cross-Currency Regression
Dependent Variable: €/¥
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10 DAY 15 DAY
Coefficient p-value R-Squared Coefficient p-value R-Squared
€/$ Corporate -0.086 0.841 0.264 0.293 0.491 0.362
€/$ Leveraged 1.963 0.002 0.585 0.441
€/$ Unleveraged -0.017 0.975 -0.177 0.784
€/$ Other -0.063 0.730 -0.318 0.058
€/£ Corporate 0.302 0.696 0.556 0.364
€/£ Leveraged -2.287 0.083 -1.070 0.351
€/£ Unleveraged -0.472 0.707 -3.023 0.021
€/£ Other -0.081 0.859 0.018 0.957
€/¥ Corporate -1.251 0.480 2.398 0.309
€/¥ Leveraged 1.254 0.706 -1.469 0.599
€/¥ Unleveraged 6.954 0.030 7.865 0.005
€/¥ Other 1.880 0.000 1.860 0.001
10 DAY 15 DAY
Coefficient p-value R-Squared Coefficient p-value R-Squared
€/¥ Corporate -0.916 0.569 0.293 0.905 0.675 0.413
€/¥ Leveraged -0.440 0.884 -2.943 0.334
€/¥ Unleveraged 4.330 0.247 3.821 0.228
€/¥ Other 1.658 0.000 2.040 0.000
$/¥ Corporate -0.644 0.639 -0.634 0.274
$/¥ Leveraged 1.384 0.092 0.513 0.710
$/¥ Unleveraged 1.663 0.220 0.261 0.780
$/¥ Other 0.081 0.772 -0.457 0.118
£/¥ Corporate -2.709 0.475 -8.744 0.016
£/¥ Leveraged 9.803 0.124 12.182 0.035
£/¥ Unleveraged 5.556 0.031 4.747 0.052
£/¥ Other 1.515 0.455 -0.311 0.766
Euro Flows Equation R= {€/$, €/¥, €/£}       USD Flows Equation R= {€/$, £/$, $/¥}
GBP Flows Equation R= {€/£, £/$, £/¥}       JPY Flows Equation R= {€/¥, $/¥, £/¥}
Dependent Variable: €/¥
(JPY FLOWS)
(EURO FLOWS)
Cross-Currency Regression
Cross-Currency Regression
Dependent Variable: €/¥
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DAILY 5 DAY
Coefficient p-value R-Squared Coefficient p-value R-Squared
€/$ Corporate 0.244 0.075 0.098 0.008 0.978 0.279
€/$ Leveraged -0.507 0.008 -1.123 0.010
€/$ Unleveraged -0.381 0.131 -0.890 0.030
€/$ Other -0.033 0.696 0.011 0.955
£/$ Corporate 0.719 0.013 1.340 0.029
£/$ Leveraged -0.907 0.035 0.885 0.457
£/$ Unleveraged -0.484 0.290 -0.921 0.331
£/$ Other 0.270 0.099 1.189 0.004
$/¥ Corporate -0.656 0.026 -0.903 0.166
$/¥ Leveraged 0.620 0.039 0.160 0.805
$/¥ Unleveraged 1.542 0.000 3.029 0.000
$/¥ Other 0.495 0.000 0.523 0.004
DAILY 5 DAY
Coefficient p-value R-Squared Coefficient p-value R-Squared
€/¥ Corporate 0.226 0.606 0.100 0.616 0.573 0.247
€/¥ Leveraged 1.572 0.056 2.962 0.077
€/¥ Unleveraged 2.106 0.004 2.234 0.176
€/¥ Other 0.650 0.000 0.743 0.111
$/¥ Corporate -0.748 0.012 -0.737 0.304
$/¥ Leveraged 0.637 0.048 0.815 0.180
$/¥ Unleveraged 1.551 0.000 2.398 0.001
$/¥ Other 0.550 0.000 0.685 0.002
£/¥ Corporate 1.794 0.111 6.730 0.020
£/¥ Leveraged 0.931 0.612 2.518 0.464
£/¥ Unleveraged 0.190 0.825 1.373 0.345
£/¥ Other 1.352 0.060 0.637 0.496
Euro Flows Equation R= {€/$, €/¥, €/£}       USD Flows Equation R= {€/$, £/$, $/¥}
GBP Flows Equation R= {€/£, £/$, £/¥}       JPY Flows Equation R= {€/¥, $/¥, £/¥}
Dependent Variable: $/¥
(JPY FLOWS)
Cross-Currency Regression
Dependent Variable: $/¥
(USD FLOWS)
Cross-Currency Regression
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10 DAY 15 DAY
Coefficient p-value R-Squared Coefficient p-value R-Squared
€/$ Corporate -0.443 0.126 0.396 -0.262 0.588 0.457
€/$ Leveraged -0.202 0.716 -0.578 0.536
€/$ Unleveraged -1.788 0.001 -1.480 0.107
€/$ Other -0.085 0.656 0.036 0.872
£/$ Corporate 0.074 0.927 -0.047 0.967
£/$ Leveraged -0.734 0.611 -0.943 0.666
£/$ Unleveraged 0.047 0.964 -2.514 0.055
£/$ Other 0.610 0.232 1.177 0.082
$/¥ Corporate 0.152 0.849 0.502 0.459
$/¥ Leveraged 0.856 0.384 -0.099 0.931
$/¥ Unleveraged 3.629 0.000 3.201 0.001
$/¥ Other 0.834 0.002 0.624 0.082
10 DAY 15 DAY
Coefficient p-value R-Squared Coefficient p-value R-Squared
€/¥ Corporate 0.510 0.676 0.410 0.630 0.634 0.463
€/¥ Leveraged -0.297 0.912 4.241 0.172
€/¥ Unleveraged 1.630 0.413 2.266 0.343
€/¥ Other 0.910 0.190 1.685 0.019
$/¥ Corporate 0.015 0.989 1.071 0.176
$/¥ Leveraged 1.718 0.079 0.106 0.936
$/¥ Unleveraged 2.324 0.002 2.705 0.017
$/¥ Other 0.942 0.000 0.762 0.008
£/¥ Corporate 5.151 0.062 3.532 0.393
£/¥ Leveraged 8.734 0.148 7.787 0.207
£/¥ Unleveraged 5.119 0.121 4.509 0.107
£/¥ Other 3.729 0.124 3.171 0.151
Euro Flows Equation R= {€/$, €/¥, €/£}       USD Flows Equation R= {€/$, £/$, $/¥}
GBP Flows Equation R= {€/£, £/$, £/¥}       JPY Flows Equation R= {€/¥, $/¥, £/¥}
Dependent Variable: $/¥
(JPY FLOWS)
Cross-Currency Regression
Dependent Variable: $/¥
(USD FLOWS)
Cross-Currency Regression
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DAILY 5 DAY
Coefficient p-value R-Squared Coefficient p-value R-Squared
€/£ Corporate -0.460 0.041 0.077 0.032 0.958 0.116
€/£ Leveraged -0.305 0.428 -0.631 0.493
€/£ Unleveraged -0.426 0.419 0.534 0.735
€/£ Other -0.033 0.843 -0.196 0.540
£/$ Corporate -0.280 0.329 -1.075 0.197
£/$ Leveraged 2.288 0.000 1.551 0.179
£/$ Unleveraged 1.415 0.005 2.548 0.008
£/$ Other 0.036 0.852 -0.475 0.302
£/¥ Corporate -2.551 0.012 -4.159 0.019
£/¥ Leveraged 0.385 0.673 3.373 0.351
£/¥ Unleveraged 2.256 0.001 1.489 0.468
£/¥ Other 1.638 0.001 -0.395 0.764
DAILY 5 DAY
Coefficient p-value R-Squared Coefficient p-value R-Squared
€/$ Corporate -0.218 0.137 0.090 -0.128 0.680 0.135
€/$ Leveraged 0.430 0.014 0.715 0.053
€/$ Unleveraged 0.652 0.010 0.652 0.297
€/$ Other -0.052 0.527 -0.087 0.673
£/$ Corporate -0.279 0.346 -1.029 0.185
£/$ Leveraged 2.248 0.000 1.258 0.246
£/$ Unleveraged 1.355 0.007 2.700 0.005
£/$ Other 0.016 0.931 -0.542 0.222
$/¥ Corporate 0.139 0.673 0.036 0.959
$/¥ Leveraged 0.091 0.774 1.108 0.063
$/¥ Unleveraged -0.928 0.001 -0.592 0.378
$/¥ Other -0.212 0.045 -0.262 0.208
Euro Flows Equation R= {€/$, €/¥, €/£}       USD Flows Equation R= {€/$, £/$, $/¥}
GBP Flows Equation R= {€/£, £/$, £/¥}       JPY Flows Equation R= {€/¥, $/¥, £/¥}
Dependent Variable: £/$
(USD FLOWS)
(GBP FLOWS)
Cross-Currency Regression
Cross-Currency Regression
Dependent Variable: £/$
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10 DAY 15 DAY
Coefficient p-value R-Squared Coefficient p-value R-Squared
€/£ Corporate 0.332 0.644 0.164 1.051 0.136 0.376
€/£ Leveraged -0.611 0.568 0.161 0.898
€/£ Unleveraged 2.727 0.331 -1.089 0.460
€/£ Other -0.629 0.139 -0.425 0.317
£/$ Corporate -0.323 0.781 0.445 0.742
£/$ Leveraged 2.624 0.089 2.823 0.081
£/$ Unleveraged 2.081 0.098 3.898 0.072
£/$ Other 0.058 0.939 -0.642 0.456
£/¥ Corporate -1.804 0.573 -3.278 0.638
£/¥ Leveraged 1.206 0.792 10.318 0.191
£/¥ Unleveraged 1.437 0.662 0.316 0.889
£/¥ Other -2.156 0.372 -5.284 0.002
10 DAY 15 DAY
Coefficient p-value R-Squared Coefficient p-value R-Squared
€/$ Corporate 0.476 0.202 0.277 0.624 0.114 0.403
€/$ Leveraged 0.731 0.328 -0.159 0.881
€/$ Unleveraged 1.171 0.044 1.590 0.071
€/$ Other -0.106 0.561 -0.266 0.284
£/$ Corporate 0.263 0.786 -0.670 0.544
£/$ Leveraged 2.918 0.091 1.973 0.277
£/$ Unleveraged 1.963 0.154 3.172 0.204
£/$ Other 0.512 0.375 0.321 0.708
$/¥ Corporate -2.100 0.028 -0.178 0.863
$/¥ Leveraged 1.637 0.128 2.755 0.082
$/¥ Unleveraged -1.103 0.225 -2.266 0.043
$/¥ Other -0.762 0.011 -0.631 0.149
Euro Flows Equation R= {€/$, €/¥, €/£}       USD Flows Equation R= {€/$, £/$, $/¥}
GBP Flows Equation R= {€/£, £/$, £/¥}       JPY Flows Equation R= {€/¥, $/¥, £/¥}
Dependent Variable: £/$
(USD FLOWS)
(GBP FLOWS)
Cross-Currency Regression
Cross-Currency Regression
Dependent Variable: £/$
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DAILY 5 DAY
Coefficient p-value R-Squared Coefficient p-value R-Squared
€/£ Corporate 0.286 0.326 0.054 0.258 0.720 0.100
€/£ Leveraged -0.986 0.014 -1.614 0.020
€/£ Unleveraged -0.820 0.117 -0.636 0.635
€/£ Other -0.172 0.262 -0.454 0.082
£/$ Corporate 0.417 0.174 0.163 0.825
£/$ Leveraged 1.284 0.001 2.134 0.041
£/$ Unleveraged 0.576 0.183 0.729 0.595
£/$ Other 0.302 0.070 0.697 0.067
£/¥ Corporate -2.013 0.038 0.671 0.785
£/¥ Leveraged 1.949 0.368 6.787 0.153
£/¥ Unleveraged 2.428 0.020 4.514 0.003
£/¥ Other 2.850 0.000 1.078 0.324
DAILY 5 DAY
Coefficient p-value R-Squared Coefficient p-value R-Squared
€/¥ Corporate 0.606 0.253 0.094 0.057 0.952 0.239
€/¥ Leveraged 1.218 0.136 1.298 0.450
€/¥ Unleveraged 2.842 0.005 2.451 0.358
€/¥ Other 1.078 0.000 1.470 0.000
$/¥ Corporate -0.440 0.185 -0.800 0.266
$/¥ Leveraged 0.676 0.019 1.259 0.032
$/¥ Unleveraged 0.579 0.082 1.309 0.056
$/¥ Other 0.232 0.020 0.198 0.321
£/¥ Corporate -1.315 0.107 0.623 0.779
£/¥ Leveraged 1.846 0.403 5.997 0.201
£/¥ Unleveraged 2.048 0.044 1.814 0.194
£/¥ Other 2.598 0.001 -0.607 0.461
Euro Flows Equation R= {€/$, €/¥, €/£}       USD Flows Equation R= {€/$, £/$, $/¥}
GBP Flows Equation R= {€/£, £/$, £/¥}       JPY Flows Equation R= {€/¥, $/¥, £/¥}
Dependent Variable: £/¥
(JPY FLOWS)
(GBP FLOWS)
Cross-Currency Regression
Cross-Currency Regression
Dependent Variable: £/¥
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10 DAY 15 DAY
Coefficient p-value R-Squared Coefficient p-value R-Squared
€/£ Corporate 0.517 0.568 0.174 0.474 0.494 0.196
€/£ Leveraged -2.870 0.003 -1.121 0.254
€/£ Unleveraged 1.468 0.423 -0.224 0.859
€/£ Other -0.121 0.839 0.188 0.683
£/$ Corporate 0.351 0.787 0.402 0.773
£/$ Leveraged 1.501 0.446 1.699 0.296
£/$ Unleveraged 0.938 0.667 0.678 0.683
£/$ Other 0.894 0.208 0.927 0.148
£/¥ Corporate 0.802 0.867 -4.575 0.565
£/¥ Leveraged 10.719 0.195 10.921 0.145
£/¥ Unleveraged 8.575 0.004 4.742 0.238
£/¥ Other 2.987 0.138 -0.825 0.772
10 DAY 15 DAY
Coefficient p-value R-Squared Coefficient p-value R-Squared
€/¥ Corporate -0.207 0.869 0.377 -0.340 0.829 0.421
€/¥ Leveraged -0.156 0.960 -1.552 0.577
€/¥ Unleveraged 3.386 0.301 0.866 0.739
€/¥ Other 1.800 0.002 2.069 0.002
$/¥ Corporate -1.691 0.095 -0.144 0.852
$/¥ Leveraged 3.347 0.001 2.957 0.006
$/¥ Unleveraged 1.059 0.369 0.379 0.602
$/¥ Other 0.073 0.781 -0.068 0.826
£/¥ Corporate 2.355 0.488 -2.410 0.636
£/¥ Leveraged 10.719 0.130 14.846 0.025
£/¥ Unleveraged 3.765 0.040 4.450 0.009
£/¥ Other 0.220 0.872 -1.991 0.152
Euro Flows Equation R= {€/$, €/¥, €/£}       USD Flows Equation R= {€/$, £/$, $/¥}
GBP Flows Equation R= {€/£, £/$, £/¥}       JPY Flows Equation R= {€/¥, $/¥, £/¥}
Dependent Variable: £/¥
(JPY FLOWS)
(GBP FLOWS)
Cross-Currency Regression
Cross-Currency Regression
Dependent Variable: £/¥
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Appendix G – Cross-Currency Forecast Evaluation 
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Appendix H – Conditional Forecasting Models  
 
Appendix H1           
Simple Conditional Model - No threshold - Daily Frequency       
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  Follow levs Contrary to corps Follow unlevs Follow financials Follow corps Contrary to Contrary corps  Contrary to corps  Contrary to corps Contrary to corps & others 
            financials Follow levs Follow Financials follow financials  follow financials 
                   & other   
Euro_GBP                     
Trading days 385 385 385 385 385 385 385 385 385 385 
Trades Triggered 370 384 382 179 384 179 184 82 39 43 
Number correct 180 192 190 86 191 92 91 38 23 15 
% correct 48.65 50.00 49.74 48.04 49.74 51.40 49.46 46.34 58.97 34.88 
Euro_JPY                     
Trading days 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 
Trades Triggered 370 381 317 147 381 147 182 52 24 28 
Number correct 184 197 150 69 183 77 94 27 13 14 
% correct 49.73 51.71 47.32 46.94 48.03 52.38 51.65 51.92 54.17 50.00 
Euro_USD                     
Trading days 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 
Trades Triggered 386 386 384 190 386 190 208 97 51 46 
Number correct 191 171 197 97 212 91 93 50 30 20 
% correct 49.48 44.30 51.30 51.05 54.92 47.89 44.71 51.55 58.82 43.48 
GBP_USD                     
Trading days 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 
Trades Triggered 386 387 384 216 387 216 198 108 51 57 
Number correct 196 191 186 107 194 108 99 57 25 32 
% correct 50.78 49.35 48.44 49.54 50.13 50.00 50.00 52.78 49.02 56.14 
USD_JPY                     
Trading days 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
Trades Triggered 389 390 385 178 390 178 164 78 36 42 
Number correct 200 195 182 87 194 91 85 35 16 19 
% correct 51.41 50.00 47.27 48.88 49.74 51.12 51.83 44.87 44.44 45.24 
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Appendix H2           
Conditional 2 with absolute mean over first 500 days of data as threshold value creating artificial band at + and - value of absolute mean - Daily Frequency 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  Follow levs 
Contrary to 
corps Follow unlevs Follow financials Follow corps Contrary to Contrary corps  Contrary to corps  Contrary to corps Contrary to corps 
            financials Follow levs Follow Financials follow financials  & others 
                   & other  follow financials 
Euro_GBP Trading Days: 385                 
#BUYS: 44 35 40 8 66 3 7 1 0 0 
#SELLS 46 66 27 3 35 8 13 0 0 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 90 101 67 11 101 11 20 1 0 0 
#correct: 45 51 35 6 50 4 8 1 0 0 
%correct: 50.00 50.50 52.24 54.55 49.50 36.36 40.00 100.00 NA NA 
Euro_JPY Trading Days: 384                 
#BUYS: 93 37 51 12 41 14 10 1 1 0 
#SELLS 84 41 47 14 37 12 11 1 0 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 177 78 98 26 78 26 21 2 1 0 
#correct: 87 38 44 11 39 15 11 2 1 0 
%correct: 49.15 48.72 44.90 42.31 50.00 57.69 52.38 100.00 100.00 NA 
Euro_USD Trading Days: 387                 
#BUYS: 112 156 44 18 23 18 48 6 4 0 
#SELLS 103 23 59 18 156 18 9 1 1 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 215 179 103 36 179 36 57 7 5 0 
#correct: 111 82 49 15 96 20 27 2 2 0 
%correct: 51.63 45.81 47.57 41.67 53.63 55.56 47.37 28.57 40.00 NA 
GBP_USD Trading Days: 387                 
#BUYS: 95 81 48 17 105 14 19 3 0 0 
#SELLS 75 105 56 14 81 17 16 1 0 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 170 186 104 31 186 31 35 4 0 0 
#correct: 87 93 57 19 92 12 21 2 0 0 
%correct: 51.18 50.00 54.81 61.29 49.46 38.71 60.00 50.00 NA NA 
USD_JPY Trading Days: 390                 
#BUYS: 132 38 46 19 64 14 9 2 0 2 
#SELLS 107 64 40 14 38 19 16 4 2 1 
TOTAL TRADES: 239 102 86 33 102 33 25 6 2 3 
#correct: 119 56 45 21 46 12 16 5 1 3 
%correct: 49.79 54.90 52.33 63.64 45.10 36.36 64.00 83.33 50.00 100.00 
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Appendix H3           
Conditional 3 with mean over first 500 days of data as threshold value creating artificial band at + and - absolute value of mean - Daily Frequency  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  Follow levs 
Contrary to 
corps Follow unlevs Follow financials Follow corps Contrary to Contrary corps  Contrary to corps  Contrary to corps Contrary to corps 
            financials Follow levs Follow Financials follow financials  & others 
                   & other  follow financials 
Euro_GBP Trading Days: 385                 
#BUYS: 188 72 192 94 151 76 43 17 13 3 
#SELLS 177 151 170 76 72 94 63 27 10 16 
TOTAL TRADES: 365 223 362 170 223 170 106 44 23 19 
#correct: 178 109 183 84 113 85 47 21 14 6 
%correct: 48.77 48.88 50.55 49.41 50.67 50.00 44.34 47.73 60.87 31.58 
Euro_JPY Trading Days: 384                 
#BUYS: 160 174 150 57 170 61 69 15 9 6 
#SELLS 163 170 143 61 174 57 74 19 4 11 
TOTAL TRADES: 323 344 293 118 344 118 143 34 13 17 
#correct: 162 178 137 59 165 59 73 18 8 7 
%correct: 50.15 51.74 46.76 50.00 47.97 50.00 51.05 52.94 61.54 41.18 
Euro_USD Trading Days: 387                 
#BUYS: 194 273 138 69 87 93 144 53 31 22 
#SELLS 177 87 183 93 273 69 46 20 9 11 
TOTAL TRADES: 371 360 321 162 360 162 190 73 40 33 
#correct: 185 164 160 84 194 76 88 38 23 15 
%correct: 49.87 45.56 49.84 51.85 53.89 46.91 46.32 52.05 57.50 45.45 
GBP_USD Trading Days: 387                 
#BUYS: 207 179 129 79 207 83 99 34 15 18 
#SELLS 178 207 145 83 179 79 98 43 22 21 
TOTAL TRADES: 385 386 274 162 386 162 197 77 37 39 
#correct: 195 190 137 84 194 77 98 43 18 25 
%correct: 50.65 49.22 50.00 51.85 50.26 47.53 49.75 55.84 48.65 64.10 
USD_JPY Trading Days: 390                 
#BUYS: 216 184 172 86 190 75 88 37 19 18 
#SELLS 168 190 192 75 184 86 66 29 11 18 
TOTAL TRADES: 384 374 364 161 374 161 154 66 30 36 
#correct: 196 186 175 83 187 78 79 31 14 17 
%correct: 51.04 49.73 48.08 51.55 50.00 48.45 51.30 46.97 46.67 47.22 
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Appendix H4           
Conditional 4 with mean over first 500 days of data as threshold value - Daily Frequency     
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  Follow levs 
Contrary to 
corps Follow unlevs Follow financials Follow corps Contrary to Contrary corps  Contrary to corps  Contrary to corps Contrary to corps 
            financials Follow levs Follow Financials follow financials  & others 
Euro_GBP Trading Days: 385              & other   
#BUYS: 208 234 192 101 151 86 120 48 33 15 
#SELLS 177 151 193 86 234 101 63 30 12 18 
TOTAL TRADES: 385 385 385 187 385 187 183 78 45 33 
#correct: 186 181 194 91 203 95 83 36 25 11 
%correct: 48.31 47.01 50.39 48.66 52.73 50.80 45.36 46.15 55.56 33.33 
Euro_JPY Trading Days: 384                 
#BUYS: 221 174 241 139 210 61 102 54 32 22 
#SELLS 163 210 143 61 174 139 91 24 6 18 
TOTAL TRADES: 384 384 384 200 384 200 193 78 38 40 
#correct: 201 197 187 102 186 97 104 41 23 18 
%correct: 52.34 51.30 48.70 51.00 48.44 48.50 53.89 52.56 60.53 45.00 
Euro_USD Trading Days: 387                 
#BUYS: 194 273 204 110 114 99 144 86 48 38 
#SELLS 193 114 183 99 273 110 64 27 13 14 
TOTAL TRADES: 387 387 387 209 387 209 208 113 61 52 
#correct: 193 176 196 106 208 101 96 56 33 23 
%correct: 49.87 45.48 50.65 50.72 53.75 48.33 46.15 49.56 54.10 44.23 
GBP_USD Trading Days: 387                 
#BUYS: 207 180 129 79 207 130 99 34 15 19 
#SELLS 180 207 258 130 180 79 99 69 34 35 
TOTAL TRADES: 387 387 387 209 387 209 198 103 49 54 
#correct: 196 191 197 108 194 100 99 56 26 30 
%correct: 50.65 49.35 50.90 51.67 50.13 47.85 50.00 54.37 53.06 55.56 
USD_JPY Trading Days: 390                 
#BUYS: 216 184 172 86 206 88 88 37 19 18 
#SELLS 174 206 218 88 184 86 78 40 16 24 
TOTAL TRADES: 390 390 390 174 390 174 166 77 35 42 
#correct: 198 193 189 86 196 88 84 34 16 18 
%correct: 50.77 49.49 48.46 49.43 50.26 50.57 50.60 44.16 45.71 42.86 
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Appendix H5           
Conditional 5 with mean +/- 1st. dev. over first 500 days of data as threshold values - Daily Frequency    
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  Follow levs 
Contrary to 
corps Follow unlevs Follow financials Follow corps Contrary to Contrary corps  Contrary to corps  Contrary to corps Contrary to corps 
            financials Follow levs Follow Financials follow financials  & others 
                   & other  follow financials 
Euro_GBP Trading Days: 385                 
#BUYS: 10 34 18 1 18 0 3 0 0 0 
#SELLS 17 18 13 0 34 1 2 0 0 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 27 52 31 1 52 1 5 0 0 0 
#correct: 13 22 14 0 30 1 0 0 0 0 
%correct: 48.15 42.31 45.16 0.00 57.69 100.00 0.00 NA NA NA 
Euro_JPY Trading Days: 384                 
#BUYS: 72 8 19 4 10 3 2 0 0 0 
#SELLS 54 10 18 3 8 4 4 1 0 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 126 18 37 7 18 7 6 1 0 0 
#correct: 61 8 20 4 10 3 2 1 0 0 
%correct: 48.41 44.44 54.05 57.14 55.56 42.86 33.33 100.00 NA NA 
Euro_USD Trading Days: 387                 
#BUYS: 77 87 16 8 15 3 13 0 0 0 
#SELLS 81 15 16 3 87 8 6 0 0 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 158 102 32 11 102 11 19 0 0 0 
#correct: 85 48 9 2 53 8 11 0 0 0 
%correct: 53.80 47.06 28.13 18.18 51.96 72.73 57.89 NA NA NA 
GBP_USD Trading Days: 387                 
#BUYS: 57 50 16 4 68 5 7 0 0 0 
#SELLS 45 68 22 5 50 4 4 0 0 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 102 118 38 9 118 9 11 0 0 0 
#correct: 51 65 19 6 53 3 7 0 0 0 
%correct: 50.00 55.08 50.00 66.67 44.92 33.33 63.64 NA NA NA 
USD_JPY Trading Days: 390                 
#BUYS: 97 23 25 10 31 4 6 1 0 1 
#SELLS 80 31 17 4 23 10 5 1 0 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 177 54 42 14 54 14 11 2 0 1 
#correct: 85 28 20 7 26 7 7 1 0 1 
%correct: 48.02 51.85 47.62 50.00 48.15 50.00 63.64 50.00 NA 100.00 
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Appendix H6           
Simple Conditional Model - No threshold - 5Day Frequency       
           
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Follow levs Contrary to corps Follow unlevs Follow financials Follow corps Contrary to Contrary corps  Contrary to corps  Contrary to corps Contrary to corps & others 
      financials Follow levs Follow Financials follow financials  follow financials 
          & other  
Euro_GBP           
Trading periods 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
Trades Triggered 75 75 75 34 75 34 36 11 3 8 
Number correct 46 29 35 20 46 14 18 4 1 3 
% correct 61.33 38.67 46.67 58.82 61.33 41.18 50.00 36.36 33.33 37.50 
           
Euro_JPY           
Trading periods 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Trades Triggered 75 75 75 37 75 37 40 17 11 6 
Number correct 41 32 45 24 43 13 19 11 7 4 
% correct 54.67 42.67 60.00 64.86 57.33 35.14 47.50 64.71 63.64 66.67 
           
Euro_USD           
Trading periods 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
Trades Triggered 76 76 76 40 76 40 32 13 6 7 
Number correct 32 41 37 17 34 23 15 7 3 4 
% correct 42.11 53.95 48.68 42.50 44.74 57.50 46.88 53.85 50.00 57.14 
           
GBP_USD           
Trading periods 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
Trades Triggered 74 73 73 33 74 33 36 21 9 12 
Number correct 45 36 36 19 39 13 22 12 5 7 
% correct 60.81 49.32 49.32 57.58 52.70 39.39 61.11 57.14 55.56 58.33 
           
USD_JPY           
Trading periods 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Trades Triggered 77 77 77 39 77 39 39 17 11 6 
Number correct 40 36 38 20 41 19 19 10 7 3 
% correct 51.95 46.75 49.35 51.28 53.25 48.72 48.72 58.82 63.64 50.00 
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Appendix H7           
Conditional 2 with absolute mean over first 100 5-day periods of data as threshold value creating artificial band at + and - value of absolute mean - 5Day Frequency 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  Follow levs 
Contrary to 
corps Follow unlevs Follow financials Follow corps Contrary to Contrary corps  Contrary to corps  Contrary to corps Contrary to corps 
            financials Follow levs Follow Financials follow financials  & others 
                   & other  follow financials 
Euro_GBP Trading Periods: 75                 
#BUYS: 5 5 10 1 15 1 0 0 0 0 
#SELLS 8 15 7 1 5 1 1 1 0 1 
TOTAL TRADES: 13 20 17 2 20 2 1 1 0 1 
#correct: 11 9 9 1 11 1 0 0 0 0 
%correct: 84.62 45.00 52.94 50.00 55.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 NA 0.00 
Euro_JPY Trading Periods: 75                 
#BUYS: 24 9 14 5 11 2 4 0 0 0 
#SELLS 20 11 7 2 9 5 3 1 0 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 44 20 21 7 20 7 7 1 0 0 
#correct: 24 9 12 5 11 2 4 0 0 0 
%correct: 54.55 45.00 57.14 71.43 55.00 28.57 57.14 0.00 NA NA 
Euro_USD Trading Periods: 76                 
#BUYS: 27 51 5 3 1 2 17 1 0 0 
#SELLS 27 1 12 2 51 3 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 54 52 17 5 52 5 17 1 0 0 
#correct: 22 25 5 2 27 3 7 1 0 0 
%correct: 40.74 48.08 29.41 40.00 51.92 60.00 41.18 100.00 NA NA 
GBP_USD Trading Periods: 76                 
#BUYS: 17 10 12 4 24 2 5 2 0 1 
#SELLS 16 24 10 2 10 4 2 1 0 1 
TOTAL TRADES: 33 34 22 6 34 6 7 3 0 2 
#correct: 18 13 12 4 21 2 1 1 0 1 
%correct: 54.55 38.24 54.55 66.67 61.76 33.33 14.29 33.33 NA 50.00 
USD_JPY Trading Periods: 77                 
#BUYS: 24 7 11 5 14 1 3 0 0 0 
#SELLS 14 14 7 1 7 5 1 0 0 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 38 21 18 6 21 6 4 0 0 0 
#correct: 20 10 8 4 11 2 1 0 0 0 
%correct: 52.63 47.62 44.44 66.67 52.38 33.33 25.00 NA NA NA 
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Appendix H8           
Conditional with mean over first 100 5-day periods of data as threshold value creating artificial band at + and - absolute value of mean - 5Day frequency 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  Follow levs 
Contrary to 
corps Follow unlevs Follow financials Follow corps Contrary to Contrary corps  Contrary to corps  Contrary to corps Contrary to corps 
            financials Follow levs Follow Financials follow financials  & others 
                   & other  follow financials 
Euro_GBP Trading Periods: 75                 
#BUYS: 24 8 39 10 22 20 2 0 0 0 
#SELLS 46 22 32 20 8 10 15 4 1 3 
TOTAL TRADES: 70 30 71 30 30 30 17 4 1 3 
#correct: 45 14 32 18 16 12 10 2 0 2 
%correct: 64.29 46.67 45.07 60.00 53.33 40.00 58.82 50.00 0.00 66.67 
Euro_JPY Trading Periods: 75                 
#BUYS: 33 34 37 17 35 16 16 7 4 3 
#SELLS 34 35 36 16 34 17 17 6 4 1 
TOTAL TRADES: 67 69 73 33 69 33 33 13 8 4 
#correct: 35 29 44 22 40 11 16 9 6 3 
%correct: 52.24 42.03 60.27 66.67 57.97 33.33 48.48 69.23 75.00 75.00 
Euro_USD Trading Periods: 76                 
#BUYS: 36 67 26 14 3 16 29 11 5 5 
#SELLS 38 3 36 16 67 14 1 0 0 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 74 70 62 30 70 30 30 11 5 5 
#correct: 32 37 29 12 33 18 15 7 3 3 
%correct: 43.24 52.86 46.77 40.00 47.14 60.00 50.00 63.64 60.00 60.00 
GBP_USD Trading Periods: 76                 
#BUYS: 44 34 24 13 41 11 20 10 5 5 
#SELLS 32 41 26 11 34 13 18 6 2 4 
TOTAL TRADES: 76 75 50 24 75 24 38 16 7 9 
#correct: 45 36 24 15 38 8 22 9 4 5 
%correct: 59.21 48.00 48.00 62.50 50.67 33.33 57.89 56.25 57.14 55.56 
USD_JPY Trading Periods: 77                 
#BUYS: 44 34 37 21 39 15 20 8 5 3 
#SELLS 31 39 38 15 34 21 15 7 4 3 
TOTAL TRADES: 75 73 75 36 73 36 35 15 9 6 
#correct: 40 33 36 18 40 18 18 10 7 3 
%correct: 53.33 45.21 48.00 50.00 54.79 50.00 51.43 66.67 77.78 50.00 
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Appendix H9           
Conditional 4 with mean over first 100 5-day periods of data as threshold value - 5Day frequency     
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  Follow levs 
Contrary to 
corps Follow unlevs Follow financials Follow corps Contrary to Contrary corps  Contrary to corps  Contrary to corps Contrary to corps 
            financials Follow levs Follow Financials follow financials  & others 
                   & other  follow financials 
Euro_GBP Trading Periods: 75                 
#BUYS: 29 53 39 13 22 20 22 8 4 4 
#SELLS 46 22 36 20 53 13 15 4 1 3 
TOTAL TRADES: 75 75 75 33 75 33 37 12 5 7 
#correct: 49 35 33 20 40 13 23 6 2 4 
%correct: 65.33 46.67 44.00 60.61 53.33 39.39 62.16 50.00 40.00 57.14 
Euro_JPY Trading Periods: 75                 
#BUYS: 41 34 39 21 41 16 20 9 6 3 
#SELLS 34 41 36 16 34 21 20 8 5 3 
TOTAL TRADES: 75 75 75 37 75 37 40 17 11 6 
#correct: 41 32 45 24 43 13 19 10 7 3 
%correct: 54.67 42.67 60.00 64.86 57.33 35.14 47.50 58.82 63.64 50.00 
Euro_USD Trading Periods: 76                 
#BUYS: 36 67 40 17 9 17 29 13 6 7 
#SELLS 40 9 36 17 67 17 2 0 0 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 76 76 76 34 76 34 31 13 6 7 
#correct: 33 41 34 13 34 21 15 8 3 5 
%correct: 43.42 53.95 44.74 38.24 44.74 61.76 48.39 61.54 50.00 71.43 
GBP_USD Trading Periods: 76                 
#BUYS: 44 34 24 13 42 21 20 10 5 5 
#SELLS 32 42 52 21 34 13 18 10 3 7 
TOTAL TRADES: 76 76 76 34 76 34 38 20 8 12 
#correct: 45 36 39 21 39 12 22 12 4 8 
%correct: 59.21 47.37 51.32 61.76 51.32 35.29 57.89 60.00 50.00 66.67 
USD_JPY Trading Periods: 77                 
#BUYS: 44 34 37 21 43 17 20 8 5 3 
#SELLS 33 43 40 17 34 21 19 10 5 5 
TOTAL TRADES: 77 77 77 38 77 38 39 18 10 8 
#correct: 40 34 37 19 43 19 18 10 7 3 
%correct: 51.95 44.16 48.05 50.00 55.84 50.00 46.15 55.56 70.00 37.50 
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Appendix H10           
Conditional 5 with mean+/- 1st. Dev. over first 100 5-day periods of data as threshold values - 5Day frequency    
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  Follow levs 
Contrary 
to corps Follow unlevs Follow financials Follow corps Contrary to Contrary corps  Contrary to corps  Contrary to corps Contrary to corps 
            financials Follow levs Follow Financials follow financials  & others 
                   & other  follow financials 
Euro_GBP Trading Periods: 75                 
#BUYS: 1 12 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
#SELLS 1 2 4 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 2 14 9 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 
#correct: 2 5 6 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 
%correct: 100.00 35.71 66.67 NA 64.29 NA NA NA NA NA 
Euro_JPY Trading Periods: 75                 
#BUYS: 24 4 7 2 4 0 2 0 0 0 
#SELLS 14 4 3 0 4 2 2 0 0 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 38 8 10 2 8 2 4 0 0 0 
#correct: 19 4 6 2 4 0 3 0 0 0 
%correct: 50.00 50.00 60.00 100.00 50.00 0.00 75.00 NA NA NA 
Euro_USD Trading Periods: 76                 
#BUYS: 21 38 1 0 1 0 8 0 0 0 
#SELLS 27 1 4 0 38 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 48 39 5 0 39 0 8 0 0 0 
#correct: 20 17 2 0 22 0 4 0 0 0 
%correct: 41.67 43.59 40.00 NA 56.41 NA 50.00 NA NA NA 
GBP_USD Trading Periods: 76                 
#BUYS: 12 7 0 0 18 2 1 0 0 0 
#SELLS 12 18 9 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 24 25 9 2 25 2 1 0 0 0 
#correct: 17 12 4 2 13 0 0 0 0 0 
%correct: 70.83 48.00 44.44 100.00 52.00 0.00 0.00 NA NA NA 
USD_JPY Trading Periods: 77                 
#BUYS: 18 1 8 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 
#SELLS 13 7 3 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL TRADES: 31 8 11 2 8 2 0 0 0 0 
#correct: 17 4 5 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 
%correct: 54.84 50.00 45.45 100.00 50.00 0.00 NA NA NA NA 
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Appendix I – Price Impact Model Size Cut-offs 
Total
cutoffs # obs %
q1 <=1 modal 12955 46.51%
q2 >1 and <=4
normal (IQR adjusted up as over 
40% data is 1) 9062 32.53%
q3 >4 and <10 large (q3 - 95th percentile) 3594 12.90%
q4 >=10 extremely large 2243 8.05%
Total: 27854 100.00%
Financial
cutoffs # observations %
fq1 <=1 modal 3899 43.77%
fq2 >1 and <=4
normal (IQR adjusted up as 
+40% is 1) 2775 31.16%
fq3 >4 and <10 large (q3 - 95th percentile) 1351 15.17%
fq4 >=10 extremely large 882 9.90%
Total: 8907 100.00%
Corporate
cutoffs # observations %
cq1 <=1 763 29.51%
cq2 >1 and <=4 844 32.64%
cq3 >4 and <=10 582 22.51%
cq4 >10 397 15.35%
Total: 2586 100.00%
Internal
cutoffs # observations %
iq1 <=1 820 42.89%
iq2 >1 and <=4 550 28.77%
iq3 >4 and <10 318 16.63%
iq4 >=10 224 11.72%
Total: 1912 100.00%
Interbank
cutoffs # observations %
ibq1 <=1 7473 51.72%
ibq2 <1 6976 48.28%
ibq3 IGNORE N/A
ibq4 IGNORE N/A
Total: 14449 100.00%
Size Cutoffs - Total and by Counterparty
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Appendix J – FX Relevant Data Releases Within HF Sample Period 
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Appendix K – Madhavan Smidt Models 
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